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“I am convinced that we rely far too much on organization, in the sense of sketching 
formal relationships on a chart, and we forget that within each box on the chart there are 
men and women who may or may not know anything about what they are doing—who 
may or may not know anything about what they are doing—who may or may not agree 
with each other—and who may be far more sympathetic with the ideas of some outside 
pressure group than with the purpose of the authority in the next box above them”-Don 
K. Price “The New Dimension of Diplomacy” 1951 
 
“There are dangers in oversimplification in any discussion of this subject. Analysis 
inevitably produces some distortion. One makes nice distinctions between policy 
formulation and operations or between command and staff functions. One draws neat 
charts dividing responsibilities into geometrically precise compartments. One speaks of 
levels of authority as if government could be arranged with the measured symmetry of a 
staircase. For analysis we divide things up; in practice they are all of a piece together.”-
Paul Nitze statement before the Jackson Subcommittee, 6/17/60 
 
“Good people can triumph over faulty organization, but good policy machinery can never 
substitute for outstanding officials.”-Memo on Transition-Senate Subcommittee on 
Policy Machinery 
 
“Policy isn’t made on paper; it’s a continuously changing mix of people and ideas.” 
-NSC staffer comment to Harold Saunders, 1961 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight 
Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it 
formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White 
House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and 
increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under 
Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms 
despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary 
and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex 
reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow 
legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 
presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The 
Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy 
used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The 
motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either 
President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 
 	
world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight 
of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation.  
 This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political 
Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. 
Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in 
isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a 
more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite 
Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both 
presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways 
the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires 
understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of 
the early Cold War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	 xi	
Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements        v 
 
Abstract         vii  
      
Table of Contents        xi 
 
List of Figures         xii 
 
List of Abbreviations         xiii 
 
Introduction: Richmond Hobson’s Dream     1 
 
Chapter 1: Nelson Rockefeller’s Nightmare     17 
 
Chapter 2: Henry Jackson’s Public Victory     64 
 
Chapter 3: Henry Jackson’s Pyrrhic Victory      115 
 
Chapter 4: McGeorge Bundy’s Transitionitis    152 
 
Chapter 5: Robert Komer’s Cure      189 
 
Chapter 6: Charles Wilson’s Questions     225 
 
Chapter 7: Robert McNamara’s Answers     256 
 
Conclusion: The Strength of Government     295 
 
Works Cited          307 
 
Curriculum Vitae        328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	 xii	
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Functions and Organization of the NSC During the Eisenhower Administration     63 
 
Figure 2: 
An ode to Our Chairman on his 48th Birthday     114 
 
Figure 3: 
Functions and Organization of the NSC During the Early Months of the Kennedy 
Administration           188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	 xiii	
List of Abbreviations 
 
5412 Committee-Covert Action Coordinating Group (part of NSC) 
 
EOB-Executive Office Building 
 
GOC-Government Operations Committee 
 
ICBM-Intercontinetal Ballistic Missile 
 
IRBM-Imtermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
 
ISA-Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense 
 
NME-National Military Establishment  
 
NSC-National Security Council 
 
NSRB-National Security Resources Board 
 
OCB-Operations Coordination Board (part of NSC) 
 
ONE-Office of National Estimates (part of CIA) 
 
ORE-Office of Research and Estimates (predecessor to ONE, part of CIA) 
 
OSS-Office of Strategic Services 
 
PACGO-President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization 
 
PB-Planning Board (part of NSC) 
 
PCG-Planning Coordination Group  
 
PNSR-Project on National Security Reform 
 
PPS-State Department Policy Planning Staff 
 
PSB-Psychological Strategy Board  
 
SANSA-Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
 
SCU-Statistical Control Unit 
 
 	 xiv	
SLBM-Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
 
SNPM-Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery (Jackson’s Subcommittee) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
1 
Introduction: Richmond Hobson’s Dream 
Richmond Hobson should probably have died on June 3, 1898. Hobson, a 
lieutenant in the US Navy during the Spanish American War, volunteered to lead a 
mission to trap the Spanish fleet in Santiago Harbor by scuttling a ship in the entrance to 
the bay. Faced by powerful Spanish shore defense and the Spanish fleet, survival and 
success seemed unlikely at best. The Spanish detected his vessel and opened fire. The 
ship sank, having failed its mission. But Hobson and his entire crew survived unharmed. 
Despite the failure, Hobson emerged a hero, the only Naval officer to win the Medal of 
Honor during the war. His Navy career fizzled, but he remained popular, and in 1906 
won a seat in the House of Representatives.1 Once there, he was appointment to the 
House Naval Affairs Committee.  
Hobson used his position to argue that America was dangerously unprepared to 
confront the 20th Century. The world was in flux: old powers, like Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, seemed to be declining. New powers, like Japan, were jousting for 
power with an increasingly powerful America. Europe was rife with tensions. America, 
Hobson argued, needed to meet these challenges head on. That could only be done by 
better coordinating the policies of America’s military services, as well as the nation’s 
diplomatic efforts. Hobson proposed a “Committee of National Defense,” a group that 
would “determine a general policy of national defense and shall recommend to the 
President, for transmission to Congress, such measures relating to the national defense as 
																																																								
1 Barton C. Shaw, "The Hobson Craze" United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 102, Issue 2 
(February 1976), p. 54-60.  
 	
2 
it shall deem necessary and expedient.”2 Hobson tried to rally his colleagues by pointing 
out that lacking such coordination could have dire consequences.3 He also noted that 
every other major European nation, as well as Japan, already possessed some form of 
national defense council.4 Hobson proposed that the US council be led by the Secretary 
of War, joined by other military officials and the Congressional leadership of the finance, 
military, and naval committees.5 He introduced a bill to form this committee in 1910, 
1911, and 1912.6 Each time it failed to pass, despite an endorsement by William Howard 
Taft in his 1911 State of the Union.  
 Hobson left Congress in 1915, his dream unrealized. In fact, it took two world 
wars, the start of the Cold War, and thirty more years to finally see the inklings of his 
ideas come to fruition. That began in 1947, with the passage of the National Security Act. 
That Act, however, proposed weak institutions that failed to function as envisioned or as 
modified. Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy sought to change that. During their 
administrations, the government of the United States centralized power in the hands of 
the president in unprecedented ways. The White House effectively gained its own foreign 
policy arm through the staff of the National Security Council, and the Secretary of 
Defense gained increasing control over the vast military bureaucracy. This was not, of 																																																								
2 HR 29371, A Bill to Establish a Council of National Defense, 61st Congress, December 14, 1910. 
3 Report No. 2078, Council of National Defense, 61st Congress, February 6, 1911. He specially cited 
Russia’s performance during the Russo-Japanese War and Britain’s strategy during the Boer War. 
4 Ibid. Included in this were the UK, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain. 
5 Report No. 584, Council of National Defense, 62nd Congress, April 22, 1912 and S 6691, A Bill to 
Establish a Council of National Defense, 63rd Congress, December 7, 1914. This included the Secretary of 
the Navy, the Army’s Chief of General Staff, his Naval opposite number, and the presidents of the Army 
and Navy War Colleges. 
6 He also tinkered with the concept. Originally the board seemed like a proto-Defense Department. In the 
end, after he added the President and Secretary of State, it seems far closer to the National Security 
Council. 
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course, the first time that presidents had this power. During the First and Second World 
Wars, the United States had created similar organizations to manage the foreign and 
defense policies of the nation. Yet, two things made these later changes stand out. The 
first was that this all, ostensibly, took place in a time of peace. Tensions with a foreign 
power were nothing new, even if the threat from the Soviet Union hit a new high. The 
second was that these moves were not justified as temporary solutions to merely combat 
the Soviet threat; they were permanent modifications that changed the very structure and 
operations of the US government. They swelled the ranks of the civil service and stripped 
the State Department, the traditional manager of America’s diplomacy, of its primacy of 
position. Moreover, they were an acknowledgement that the line between war and peace, 
diplomacy and military force, had become almost inseparable. They caused a rupture in 
the functioning of government.  
 What about this time period that inspired these changes? In part, officials were 
responding to the failure of the National Security Act of 1947. That piece of legislation 
had introduced the concept of a unified defense department and National Security 
Council, among other ideas. However, their implementation during the Truman 
Administration proved rocky, at best. The question when Eisenhower took office was 
how much of this apparatus should be retained and what should be scrapped.  
 The search for an answer began as set of very practical reforms begun by 
Eisenhower and other officials in his Administration. It also set off a decade’s worth of 
change to these institutions. It is too facile to explain this as simply an aspect of a 
growing “imperial presidency.” Nor is the explanation merely that America was in the 
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throes of the Cold War. What was so special about this period that convinced these 
officials to take steps no one had considered before and that seemed deeply at odds with 
America’s political tradition? In some cases, it was relatively selfish: a handful of 
officials advocated for reforms in the hope they could leverage the new system to win a 
bureaucratic turf war with a colleague or to expand their own federal fiefdoms. Others 
seemed motivated by distrust. If the idea of the “deep state” is more modern, distrust of 
an existing bureaucracy is not. Presidents have always worried that the federal 
bureaucracy was arrayed against their interest. Both Dwight Eisenhower and John 
Kennedy often felt they had to rely primarily on their handpicked advisors to carry out 
their orders and offer advice. 
Yet this explanation, too, is somewhat misleading. Many of the officials who 
endorsed strengthening the powers of the Executive agencies had previously served in the 
federal government and knew that their former coworkers were trustworthy. For them, it 
was a question of time. They worried that the federal government was too inflexible to 
deal quickly enough with the issues of the day. That was, of course, a nod to the threat of 
nuclear war. But it also referred to a world where all events, big and small, seemed to be 
increasing in importance, and in speed, and in need of the president’s attention. Many of 
those who endorsed these changes had spent their careers prioritizing careful, deliberate, 
decision-making. It seemed shocking that the world could change so fast. This was not a 
power grab for the presidency; it was a pragmatic decision they felt needed to be made 
for the nation’s security. Most of the aforementioned officials were members of the 
Executive Branch or consultants brought in to help in reorganization efforts.  
 	
5 
Perhaps as importantly, there was an overall desire for improved governmental 
organization at this time. Between 1947 and 1955, Congress sponsored three different 
reviews of this subject. Eisenhower retained his own stable of reorganization experts 
throughout his entire presidency and constantly kept them engaged with work. That 
paved the way for some of these improvements. Equally important, Democratic Senator 
Henry Jackson (D-WA) launched his own investigation of government organization in 
1959, cumulating in 1960. Despite its partisan beginnings, that effort attracted surprising 
bipartisan support. The findings laid waste to much of Eisenhower’s efforts. Kennedy did 
not attach nearly as much importance to organization as Eisenhower did, but Jackson’s 
investigations allowed Kennedy and his officials wide latitude in codifying what they 
liked from the Eisenhower years, and pushing their own organizational ideas. 
The method of foreign policy management during these years essentially 
established the operating methods of the US government today. If you took a member of 
the White House staff from before this period and dropped him into the present, he would 
be in a world that would be largely unfamiliar. Yet to someone from during or after this 
period, the current operations of the federal government would, with perhaps the 
exception of technological advances, feel similar to what he knew. Despite the brief 
interlude of Jackson, however, the fact is that these reforms had wide bipartisan support. 
Almost every stripe of American political official believed that change was needed.  
That relative unanimity can be seen in examining the specifics of how these 
developments took place. On entering office, Eisenhower identified problems with each 
organization. In terms of the National Security Council, Eisenhower reinvented it as an 
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organization that would centralize policy making and execution in the White House. For 
the Defense Department, the reorganization that took place in 1949 had failed to fix many 
of the issues inherent in the decentralized institution. Eisenhower instituted an initial 
round of reforms in 1953, building up the NSC and giving more power to the Secretary of 
Defense. Yet neither of these reforms worked as Eisenhower expected. In the White 
House, the NSC performed its job, but failed to do so as intended due to issues of 
structure and personnel. In the Defense Department, the Secretary of Defense found it 
difficult to harness the new powers bestowed by Eisenhower. In part, this was because 
the first incumbent, Charles Wilson, effectively served as Eisenhower’s placeholder in 
the Pentagon. This arrangement discouraged him from taking the initiative on any 
number of management issues. 
 During his second term, Eisenhower continued to fix these problems. He did so 
by tapping a variety of sources from within the administration as well as heavily relying 
on the President’s Advisory Commission on Government Organization. In the end, 
Eisenhower made only minor changes to the NSC, despite pressures from others within 
the administration to do more. Sputnik forced Eisenhower to enact more serious reforms 
to the Pentagon via congressional legislation in 1958. That process was slow, and only 
partially effected by 1960. During that year, however, Eisenhower confronted another 
threat: Jackson’s investigation. His Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery focused 
most of its energy on attacking Eisenhower’s organization and use of the NSC. The 
reforms to the Pentagon, starting in 1958 with that year’s Defense Reorganization Act, 
largely spared that institution Jackson’s wrath, though Eisenhower’s defense budget came 
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under attack. The Jackson investigation had a politically biased motive, but it also told 
some important truths, while simultaneously inflicting tremendous damage to 
Eisenhower’s reputation as a national security expert.  
 More importantly, during the Kennedy Administration Jackson’s work led to a 
concentration of power at the fingertips of the president heretofore unknown. The ideas 
that Eisenhower either rejected or only partially implemented lay dormant in the 
bureaucratic milieu of the US Government. Kennedy cared little for organization, but did 
care for efficiency and responsiveness. How he achieved that responsiveness mattered 
little to him. But the micromanaging President’s move allowed the ideas that had been 
gestating since the Eisenhower years to blossom. While some of the change was the 
result of outside sources, many of the organizational innovations came from within, or 
were a happy medium between members of the new Administration and long service 
employees.  
 Understanding this is not just of interest for state development, but also policy 
development. The choices that took place during this period decided early US Cold War 
grand strategy and the nation’s policy towards nuclear weapons, to say nothing of 
countless foreign policy entanglements around the world. These decisions did not take 
place in isolation, but in a specific bureaucratic context that is not always obvious in 
documents or oral histories. If we are to fully grasp the choices made by officials during 
this period, we must understand the institutional restraints that existed when the decision 
were made. 
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Despite its importance in the making of the modern state, this process has been 
unevenly studied. Presidential biography remains a booming business, but a more 
academic study of the presidency itself has only recently returned.7 Some of the key 
figures in this study have received lavish attention, while others remain surprisingly 
unexamined.8 The field of American political development has done extensive work 
excavating the development of the early American state.9 Yet the same attention has 
largely not been given to the general development of national security intuitions.10 The 
major exceptions are works looking at the development of the national security state in 
the Truman years.11 But that approach has not been applied to later administrations in the 
same manner. Several important monographs focus on the development of National 
Security Council, but the same cannot be said for the Departments of State and Defense.12 
Another approach, to examine the evolution of an institution via biography, has also 
																																																								
7 Brian Balogh and Bruce Schulman, eds. Recapturing the Oval Office (Cornell UP, 2015). 
8 For instance, outside of Vietnam, Robert McNamara has received limited biographical coverage (see 
footnote 13). Regardless, Kennedy staffers have received significantly more scholarly attention, with some 
exceptions, than Eisenhower’s staffers.  
9 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight (Cambridge UP, 2009); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New 
American State (Cambridge UP, 1982); Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 
(Princeton UP, 2001), Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soliders and Mothers (Belknap, 1995). 
10 Amy Zegart Flawed by Design (Stanford UP 2000); John Burke, Honest Broker (Texas A&M UP 2009). 
Anna Katsen Nelson did several important shorter works that address some of these issues. See 
bibliography.  
11 Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron (Cambridge UP, 2000), Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory (Stanford 
UP, 2002); Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (Stanford UP, 1993), Douglas Stewart, Creating 
the National Security State (Princeton UP, 2012). 
12 In addition to the Zegart and Burke books mentioned above, there is also Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler, In 
the Shadow of the Oval Office (Simon and Schuster, 2009); John Prados, Keepers of the Keys (William 
Morrow and Co, 1991); Charles Stevenson, SECDEF (Potomac Books, 2006); Douglas Kinnard, The 
Secretary of Defense (UP of Kentucky, 1981). While the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the 
United States is invaluable, the Department has no equivalent of the Secretary of Defense Historical Series 
released by the Pentagon.  
 	
9 
achieved some notable successes.13 As with the presidency, historians and political 
scientists in the last two decades have been focusing more on Congress’ role in these 
developments as well.14 These all tell some of the story, but they do so in an 
understandably divided fashion and often ignore or underplay the important links that 
existed between the organizational ideas of the Eisenhower Administration and those 
seen in the Kennedy Administration.  
A brief note: at various points, I refer to the national security state. By this I 
mean, simply, the institutions in government devoted to ensuring the security of the 
nation. From the United States’ independence until 1940, one might have argued that the 
nation’s security was overseen by the military and the State Department with some 
amount of oversight from the White House. The list of institutions that could fit that 
description, however, ballooned in the years after the Second World War. This included 
organizations devoted to intelligence gathering, like the CIA and National Security 
Agency; those that oversaw the management of the nation’s security, like the NSC; a new 
military service in the form of the Air Force; the Defense Department to oversee all of the 
United States’ military efforts; and even new departments that, at first glance, seemed 
tangential to either diplomacy or armed conflict, like the Agency for International 
Development or the US Information Agency. This expansion alone speaks to the sudden 
realization, or fear, in US political circles that post-war national security required robust 
control, oversight, and expanded capabilities.  																																																								
13 Andrew Preston, The War Council (Harvard UP, 2006); Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power (Little, 
Brown, and Co, 1993); H.R. McMasters, Dereliction of Duty (Harper, 1997); Paul Henderickson, The 
Living and the Dead (Vintage, 1997); Henry Trewhitt, McNamara (Harper and Row, 1971). 
14 Julian Zelizer. Arsenal of Democracy (Basic Books, 2009), Paul Light, Government by Investigation 
(Brookings Institution, 2013), Linda Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill (Princeton UP 2015).  
 	
10 
-   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
I believe that to understand this story completely one must understand the 
background of the National Security Act of 1947, the intellectual heritage of the Act, and 
how it played out in the final years of the Truman Administration. That Act took place 
because the US Navy and Army spent the early part of the 20th Century pushing for a 
greater role in making national policy. In the aftermath of the 1947 Act, however, they 
lost much of the power they initially hoped to gain. Moreover, the Act itself proved 
brittle. The groups it created, almost from the start, needed significant reform.  
 The size and capability of the Army and Navy expanded dramatically during the 
19th century.15 This growth, however, masked a problematic truth: while the departments 
that controlled these organizations increased tremendously in size, they remained 
bureaucratic wrecks. One might argue that the success of the Army and Navy in the wars 
of the 19th century came in spite of the chaos at the War and the Navy Departments.16 
The organization of the departments and the relative lack of power held by the service 
secretaries prevented effective organization.17 One Army historian called the late 19th 
century War Department “little more than a hydra-headed holding company.”18 The Navy 
was the first service to take professionalization seriously.19 It did this in part by wooing 																																																								
15 Clayton Newell, The Regular Army Before the Civil War (Center for Military History, 2014), p. 7-8 and 
50-51, Max Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle (U of Chicago Press, 2014), p. 165 and 217-218; Richard W. 
Stewart ed American Military History Vol 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-
1917 Richard W. Stewart ed. (Center for Military History, 2009), p. 308. 
16 Leonard White, The Federalists (Macmillan, 1956), p. 152. 
17 James Hewe, From Root to McNamara (Center for Military History, 1975), p. 3; Paul Koistinen, 
Mobilizing for Modern War (UP of Kansas 1997), p. 64. 
18 Hewe, From Root, p. 5. 
19 James C. Rentfrow, Home Squadron: The US Navy on the North Atlantic Station (Naval Institute Press, 
2014), p. 1,4, and 7-8; Koistinen, Mobilizing, p. 33, 41, and 44; Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The 
Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (UP of the Pacific, 1977), p. 73 and 77. 
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powerful allies in Congress. Officer like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen Luce showed 
that the service could play an active role in expanding and protecting America’s new 
overseas ambitions. The service also moved from a “heroic leadership” model to more 
“managerial leadership” model.20 In fact, the Navy began to see its role overseas as 
almost a universal representative of state, engaging in diplomatic negotiations 
independent of the State Department in several instances.21 Further efforts to 
professionalize the officer corps in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, in effect 
produced a Navy general staff.22 While the Navy increasingly focused on the world stage, 
the Army struggled to keep pace.23 It began to plan for wars around the world as much 
for the possibility of those wars as to train its officers to think through problems.24 In the 
Navy, some officers reasoned that it would be better to play a more proactive role, 
believing that they should have access to either the President or the State Department in 
order to help set America’s foreign policy on the grand level. Both the Navy and Army 
																																																								
20 Rentfrow, Home, p. 138 and Morris Janowitz The Professional Soldier (Free Press, 1971), p. 425. 
21 George Herring, From Colony to Superpower (Oxford UP, 2008), p. 141; John Kuehn, “A Turning Point 
in Anglo-American Relations? The General Board of the Navy and the London Naval Treaty” in At the 
Crossroads Between Peace and War JH Maurer and CM Bell eds (Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 34-36; 
Jim Leeke, Manila and Santiago (Naval Institute Press, 2009), p. 17 and 78-80. The idea that the Navy 
knew diplomacy better than Washington had a darker side, too: retired naval officers criticized the 
Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron after the destruction of the USS Maine in 1898. His 
predecessors, they argued, would not have consulted the White House and instead sailed to Havana, and 
forced the Spanish to surrender the island. Renfrew, p. 137 and 138. The Army also played a significant 
role in overseas diplomacy. Andrew Bacevich, Diplomat in Khaki: (UP of Kansas, 1989), p. 211.  
22 John T. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated 
Japan (Naval Institute Press, 2008), p. 11. 
23 Graham Cosmas, An Army for Empire (Texas A&M, 1998), p. xviii; Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for 
Defense (Princeton UP, 1961), p. 35. 
24 Dirk Bonker, Militarism in A Global Age (Cornell UP, 2012), p. 146-147. Mark Stoler, Allies and 
Adversities: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (UNC Press, 
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attempted to reach out to the State Department to form some sort of joint planning agency 
so that diplomatic and political concerns might be merged with military plans or, at the 
very least, so that the military might understand America’s broad political aims.25 The 
Navy, however, was far more enthusiastic about this possibility and the Army was 
considered the “handmaiden of policy.”26  
During the First World War the Navy got its wish. The State Department engaged 
in limited coordination of foreign policy objectives with the armed services. That ceased 
after the end of hostilities.27 The Navy was not satisfied. In 1919, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, sent Secretary of State Robert Lansing a highly detailed 
memo advocating for a joint Army-Navy-State planning board. As it turned out, 
Roosevelt’s memo was never opened.28 Two years later in 1921, the Secretaries of the 
Navy and War worked from Roosevelt’s initial plans and together submitted a plan to 
Secretary of State Charles Hughes for a similar planning body. Hughes dismissed the 
notion out of hand.29 It took another decade, and repeated attempts, for the Navy to win 
its cause.30 In part, this happened because former naval official Franklin Roosevelt 
occupied the White House.31 But it was also because of military concerns military 
																																																								
25 Stoler, Allies, p. 3 and 15. 
26 Hammond, Organizing, p. 85-86 and 105. 
27 Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States” Political Science 
Quarterly (June 1955), p. 171. 
28 Ibid, p. 168. In part, this was due to a bureaucratic snafu. That being said, Ernest May considered the 
plan unworkable and overly complicated, especially given that simpler plans were vetoed by the State 
Department.  
29 Ibid, p. 169. 
30 Hammond, Organizing, p. 105; May, “Development”, p. 171. 
31 May, “Development”, p. 171. 
 	
13 
concerns of the war and because Roosevelt had more faith in the military’s ability to 
carry out his orders.32  
 Starting in the middle of the Second World War, the Army and Navy began to 
jockey for position in the post-war world. The Army wanted to achieve unification of the 
services, with it as the main beneficiary.33 The Navy wanted to retain its independence, as 
well as a seat at the policy planning table, cementing the role in national policy it 
developed during the 1930s and 1940s.34 Supporters of both services in Congress 
introduced legislation trying to transform their ideas into law. Truman wavered on how to 
proceed, even as he grew increasingly frustrated at the constant infighting between the 
services, both the halls of Congress and in the press. Ending this very public three-year 
long debate was a priority. But the question remained which side to support. Two facts 
perhaps swayed Truman to endorse the Navy’s plan. First, it had a slightly advantage in 
Congressional support. Second, Truman’s own military advisor, Admiral William Leahy, 
apparently advised him against accepting the Army’s plan.35 That helped secure victory 
for Navy. The original “do-nothing” Congress passed the bill, titled the National Security 
Act of 1947.36 
Five major organizations, in additional to several minor ones, came from this act. 
The National Military Establishment (NME), the forerunner of the Defense Department, 																																																								
32 Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America 
(Princeton UP, 2012), p. 34-37 and Stoler, Allies, p. x-xi. 
33 Hammond, Organizing, p. 186-187, 213-214. 
34 Hammond, Organizing, p. 101-105, 206; Paul Koistenen, Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political 
Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939 (UP of Kansas, 1998), p. 10-12. 
35 Stuart, Creating, p. 83-103.  
36 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge UP, 2006), p. 12. As Johnson argues, 
often the debate in Congress was less about the theory of the two bills, and more about who supported what 
service. 
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was created with a weak secretary who would essentially serve as a coordinator. The 
power in the NME would rest with the service secretaries overseeing the Army, Navy, 
and the Air Force (which was created by the Act). In the White House, two organizations 
were formed. One, the National Security Council (NSC) aimed to be a forum where the 
President could discuss international and security matters with his closest advisers, 
including the military services. The other, the National Security Resources Board 
(NSRB), would oversee the connection between industry and the military, and make sure 
the armed forces stayed equipped to oversee future mobilization. Lastly, the Central 
Intelligence Group, formed in January 1946, became the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). These changes did not give the Navy everything it wanted, but they fulfilled 
interests the Navy had held for decades. 
Two men played a key role in drafting this Act: Ferdinand Eberstad and 
Pendleton Herring. Herring, a Harvard political science professor was, by far, the more 
radical of the two. His view of the National Security Act was of a fundamental 
transformation of US government, arguing that “The day of the positive state is upon 
us.”37 He argued that the only way America could confront overseas threats was to fuse 
the organizational capabilities of a totalitarian state to America’s democratic heritage.38 
He believed this could be done without significant problems. Eberstadt, whose final 
report formed the basis of the National Security Act, embraced Herring’s idea, but only to 
a degree. Eberstadt was originally a Wall Street banker. Like so many of his ilk, he was 
pulled into government service in both the First and Second World Wars. He also became 																																																								
37 Quoted in Stuart, Creating, p. 21. 
38 Stuart, Creating, p. 29. 
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good friends with Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who asked Eberstadt to help 
him write the Navy’s version of the National Security Act. Unlike Herring, Eberstadt had 
a mixed view of the state. Central coordination could be a force for good, especially one 
between business and government.39 But he also feared the New Deal, and what he saw 
as the needless, and perhaps dangerous, growth of the government under Franklin 
Roosevelt.40  
Eberstadt designed what was effectively a series of organizations that could be 
expanded or shrunk as needed. He still believed business and government worked best 
together and believed in times of national emergency, as in the First and Second World 
Wars, that these institutions could be staffed by technocrats and Wall Street lawyers like 
himself.41 He both embraced the power of the state while simultaneously displaying a 
strong undercurrent of anti-statism.42  
That attitude set the National Security Act up for disaster, specifically the NSC, 
NME, and NSRB. These agencies proved too weak or were easy to ignore. For instance, 
Truman rarely attended NSC meeting until after the Korean War began, and the 
Secretaries of the Army and Navy were quickly removed as statutory members. The 
board’s utility remained questionable. The NME proved so difficult to manage that 
stories of internal battles made their way into the press, embarrassing the Administration. 
They also, most likely, caused James Forrestal to kill himself in 1949. Congress passed a 
set of reforms in 1949, renaming NME the Department of Defense and putting some 																																																								
39 Jeffrey Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal (Texas A&M Press, 1991), p. 84-85. 
40 Ibid, p. 26. 
41 Ibid, p. 3-10. Eberstadt even compiled what he termed the “Good Man List” of who should get these 
jobs. 
42 Aaron Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State (Princeton UP, 2000), p. 3-4 
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limits on the powers of the service secretaries to allow greater centralized control. Many 
questions remained unanswered about its proper organization. For the most part, the 
NSRB rarely met, disappearing entirely by 1950. 
Harry Truman patched these institutions up as best he could, but after 1950 
organization took a back seat to fighting the Cold War in Korea and elsewhere. The 
National Security Act as envisioned by Eberstadt effectively ceased to exist. The loose 
and decentralized bodies Eberstadt hoped would manage national security had failed in to 
survive peacetime. Eberstadt’s concept of filling government with “dollar-a-year men” 
did survive. The system was not set up to necessarily encourage promotion from within, 
but to have individuals join the government temporarily. If 1947 was a turning point, it 
was one that also demonstrated how much more work needed to be done. Yet, it was a 
start. If Richmond Hobson had lived to 1950 he might have argued that however messy 
the debates, or poorly executed the plans, America was finally serious about developing 
the institutions it needed to project its power and defend the nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
17 
Chapter 1: Nelson Rockefeller’s Nightmare 
During the first week of January in 1955, Nelson Rockefeller settled into his new 
job as Dwight Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs. His office, Room 208 
in the old State, War, and Navy Building across from the White House, had an illustrious 
history. It had been the office of the Secretary of State between 1888 and 1947, when 
George Marshall moved the department out.43 Originally, the three departments that 
represented the US overseas were expected to fit snuggly in one building. As the number 
of employees in each department increased, space grew tighter. Things got so bad the 
Navy moved out of the building entirely in 1918. That solved the problem for two 
decades, but the same problem forced the Army to relocate in 1938. A year after the 
Army left, however, White House staffers started moving in.44 The influx of White House 
denizens forced State to move, ironically to a building originally meant for the War 
Department complete with a warlike mural in its entrance way. The history of the State, 
War, and Navy Building in many respects mimicked the growth of the national security 
state. 
Yet the building barely survived the Eisenhower Administration. The new 
administration bestowed upon it a far blander title: the Executive Office Building 
(EOB).45 Perhaps befitting Eisenhower’s reputation for corporate and military 
management styles, some in the White House wondered whether the aging building 																																																								
43 “The Cordell Hull Conference Room-Room 208: The Former Secretary of State’s Office” White House 
Website, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/history/eeobtour/room208-flash.html, accessed 
3/10/15.    
44 “Eisenhower Executive Office Building” White House Website, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/eeob, 
accessed 3/10/15.    
45 It gained the even less appealing name of Old Executive Office Building in 1965 after a New Executive 
Office Building was built. 
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should be torn down altogether.46 In 1957 a presidential advisory commission said it 
should be replaced by a new, modern office building. In the end, the EOB was saved 
through a combination of financial prudence—demolishing and replacing the building 
would have been expensive—and an outpouring of support from prominent individuals.47  
Rockefeller appreciated the building. In fact, he was one of the people who helped 
save it. His main opponent in this and many other things was Eisenhower’s frugal White 
House chief of staff Sherman Adams.48 Rockefeller was not content just to save the 
building: he wanted to improve it. He had his office walls repainted from their general 
issue government green to a more pleasing Williamsburg yellow.49 Frustrated by the size 
of his staff, he brought over a large, handpicked group from other parts of government 
and from his private offices in New York. Moreover, he paid many of their salaries out of 
his own pocket when Adams refused the additional positions.50 When he found he needed 
an auditorium, he again turned to his own bank account to build such a space in the 
EOB.51 Rockefeller served the Eisenhower Administration in a variety of capacities for 
almost six years and, in many cases, he played an outsized and prophetic role. Yet he 
struggled to change policy. As with the EOB, many of his assignments focused on 
advising Eisenhower on building, repairing, renovating, and fixing, the evolving national 
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security state. Some of those renovations were successful but, unlike his success with the 
EOB, others proved elusive. Nelson Rockefeller advocated for modifications to the 
structure of the National Security Council that mimicked the changes that took place 
during the Kennedy Administration. Despite Rockefeller’s best efforts, however, the 
President failed to embrace his most ambitious recommendations.   
-   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Eisenhower’s administration was a great experiment in governance. In 1952, 
Harvard professor William Y. Elliot oversaw a report on the future of the US 
government. That report admitted that, in the past, the control over foreign policy 
wavered between the White House and the State Department. While the State Department 
always controlled day-to-day activities, setting the overall direction of US diplomacy 
could come from either the White House or the Secretary of State. As Elliot’s report said, 
“the relationship of power to policy was never clearly accepted…Either the President 
allowed a dominant Secretary of State…or he acted in effect as his own Secretary of 
State.”52 The agencies and offices proposed by the National Security Act of 1947 
attempted to introduce an order to this system. No longer would there be a question of 
who controlled foreign policy. The NSC members would jointly advise the President. As 
with so much of the Act, however, the Truman Administration embraced some of these 
ideas, but many of the new powers and organizations prescribed by the Act went 
underused or ignored. After winning the 1952 election, Eisenhower attempted to reorder 
the chaos. Unlike Truman, Eisenhower placed great interest in matters of organization 																																																								
52 United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control William Y. Elliot ed. (Columbia UP, 1952), 
p. 86. 
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and set about reordering the government and studying organization with great zeal. He 
wanted to complete what the National Security Act had started.  
 On the face of it, many of these were simple organizational changes. In effect, 
however, Eisenhower attempted to use military organizational structures and operating 
methods to address Elliot’s concerns. If foreign policy had swung between two poles in 
the past, Eisenhower hoped to move foreign policy coordination, if not day-to-day 
control, to the White House via the mechanism of the National Security Council (NSC). 
Eisenhower believed that a central organization and a robust staffing mechanism was the 
key to success, be it in organizing the invasion of France or running America’s foreign 
policy. He felt the NSC would give him that oversight and organization. After his first 
two years in office, Eisenhower’s experiment had proven, at best, a partial success. He 
spent the balance of his administration trying to correct the problems he encountered, but 
solutions proved elusive.  
Adding more advisors to the system proved pointless, as did most attempts at 
reform. In both cases, failure can be partially attributed to the fact that Eisenhower’s 
deputies resisted his call for reforms, and Eisenhower rarely pushed to overrule them. 
This led to mounting frustration, both within and outside the government. It also sullied 
the reputation of Eisenhower and his advisors after a damaging leak in 1957. Even when 
Eisenhower approved a complete overhaul of his system, towards the very end of his 
second term, that attempt was frustrated. A long gestation process, the death of John 
Foster Dulles, and mounting Congressional opposition, doomed the effort. The most 
successful reforms to the system, ironically, came only when Eisenhower largely 
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abandoned his idea that there should be a “policy middle ground” in the NSC, and 
allowed his White House staff to play a more prominent role in making and executing 
policy. 
Four problems underpinned his attempts at reform. The first was whether to 
enforce organizational principles or allow individuals to work outside the system. The 
inability of both the President and others to decide which to support, or to create a system 
that allowed either or both to flourish inhibited the administration from finding a pattern 
of operation that truly fit its needs. Second, the administration never seemed to properly 
identify what a good organization was supposed to do. Was it supposed to allow the 
President to create a grand strategy? Was it supposed to facilitate day-to-day coordination 
between different parts of government? Was it to respond to crises? Or was it to 
consolidate the wide responsibilities of foreign policy management into the hands of a 
few? These questions were not mutually exclusive, but many contradictions existed in 
them. Third, the NSC system prioritized long-range planning at the expense of 
responding to immediate problems. Eisenhower’s military planning background leaned 
heavily on the former. The latter seemed to grow in importance the longer the 
administration was in office.  
The fourth problem involved reforms to the system. To learn from lessons and 
adjust to changing circumstances is the sign of a healthy organization. It is a mistake to 
claim that the very fact Eisenhower considered reorganization schemes implies failure. 
Yet members of his administration seemed consumed by continuous concerns about what 
was wrong with the NSC system and how it might be fixed. While Ike’s people often 
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correctly identified the problems in the system, they seemed flummoxed by how to fix 
them. That the President in 1960 was prepared to completely restructure the way he 
conducted foreign policy suggests that, after eight years of trying to make the system 
work, Eisenhower felt he had failed. This failure was not just one in the abstract or of 
organization. For eight years the NSC outwardly claimed to rationally manage the foreign 
policy of the United States. More often than not, however, it was instead a bureaucratic 
muddle that hamstrung US policy, offered little oversight of policy, and actively 
prevented an easing of Cold War tensions.  
 
A Voyage Up and Down the Policy Hill 
Under Truman, the national security state changed dramatically. The trials and 
tribulations of the National Defense Establishment, soon the Department of Defense, are 
chronicled in later chapters. In the White House, however, the main change was the 
establishment of the NSC. Until the Korean War began, Harry Truman rarely attended his 
NSC meetings. Much like Wilson and Roosevelt, Truman had his own, small, group of 
national security advisors in the White House including W. Averell Harriman and George 
Elsey. Even if he did not use the Council extensively, it continued to meet and its 
executive secretary, Admiral Sidney Souers, kept Truman informed of its discussions.53  
In Truman’s absence, the State Department ran NSC meetings with most chaired 
by either George Marshall or, later, Dean Acheson. Much of the material discussed by the 
council came from the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) thanks to 
																																																								
53 John Prados, Keepers of the Keys (William Murrow and Co, 1991), p. 34-35. 
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Marshall. Befitting his planning background, Marshall hired George Kennan to lead this 
new staff.54 Marshall modeled the staff after the Army’s own strategy planning 
department that, for much of the interwar period, he managed. Under Kennan and his 
successor, Paul Nitze, Policy Planning produced some of the most sophisticated and 
authoritative papers concerning government policy and America’s grand strategy. It far 
surpassed any comparable unit in government, and Policy Planning’s papers often set the 
agenda for NSC discussions. While the most famous of these was NSC-68, the work of 
Kennan, Nitze, and the PPS influenced US policy for decades to come. The influence of 
the State Department reached its zenith during these years. Led by strong secretaries, 
supported by confident planning group, and with a staff sharpened by years of war and 
expanding power, it claimed an outsized role. In large part this was because there was no 
one to challenge it. The Defense Department was in a state of flux for Truman’s entire 
term. The President also liked and supported Marshall and Acheson. State stepped into a 
power vacuum, happy to be the first among foreign policy equals.  
During the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower attacked Truman’s foreign policy and his 
use of the NSC. In a speech at the Cow Palace in San Francisco he argued that Truman 
had “failed to bring into line [the] criss-crossing [sic] and overlapping and jealous 
departments and bureau and agencies” pointedly adding that “[Truman] has failed to 
follow up the policies made by the National Security Council.”55 George Marshall 
privately agreed with Eisenhower’s critique, believing that Truman’s process was 
counter-productive. He argued that Truman played almost no role in the meetings and did 																																																								
54 John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (Penguin, 2011), p. 264-266. 
55 “General Eisenhower Foreign Policy Speech at San Francisco Cow Palace” Daily Boston Globe 10/9/52. 
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nothing to lead the assembled group. The non-PPS papers discussed were often a 
collection of meaningless compromises, and the participants were often unprepared or 
uninterested in meetings.56 A member of the Defense Department wrote a memo arguing 
that what Truman really needed was an aide who could represent him on the NSC and 
generally troubleshoot foreign policy matters for the President.57 Ferdinand Eberstadt, 
godfather of the National Security Act, commented that “[t]he NSC must be for national 
policy, as the Bureau of the Budget is for national administration, the focal point for the 
generation of national security policy and the principal instrument for supervising its 
coordinated execution.”58 The study done by Elliot made similar recommendations.59  
Though Eisenhower promised massive reforms, many of the Truman era officials 
in the NSC, State, and Defense Departments retained their jobs. In part, this was because 
most staff were considered non-partisan. Eisenhower also ran into one of the inherent 
problems of Eberstadt’s plan: the institutions created in 1947 were often meant to be bare 
boned formations, augmented in times of trouble. Instead of starting from scratch, 
Eisenhower often relied on people already serving. The State Department proved the 
major exception to this rule.  
Even if, in this new administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expected 
to wield considerable power, he made it clear early that the Department’s personnel 																																																								
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would not necessarily wield the same power. Dulles told PPS chair Paul Nitze that, from 
now on, strategy would be run out of the White House—presumably code for the NSC.60 
Dulles also purged most of the PPS staff. He wanted Nitze out of Foggy Bottom, but 
approved a lateral move to the Pentagon. Sen Robert Taft (R-OH) vetoed that move, and 
Nitze found himself without a job.61 In the coming years, Nitze and other former 
members of his PPS staff would cause headaches large and small for Eisenhower.62  
Upon taking office, Eisenhower began a substantial reorganization of both the 
White House and US Cold War strategy. Eisenhower entrusted both of these reviews to 
Robert Cutler, a Boston banker who helped write Eisenhower’s Cow Palace speech. 
Cutler first organized “Project Solarium,” Eisenhower’s review of US Cold War strategy. 
Eisenhower used this exercise to adopt a strategy mimicking the ideas presented by 
Kennan and Nitze.63 As importantly, Cutler addressed the NSC system. He first 
recommended that, in addition the NSC’s Executive Secretary—a purely administrative 
job after Souers left—the board needed someone to oversee the organization. Out of this 
recommendation came the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(SANSA). The SANSA was not supposed to make policy, but ensure the NSC 
mechanism ran smoothly and that the President remained informed. Cutler, who was 
quickly appointed SANSA, made an extensive review in designing a new NSC system. 
He, however, ignored the overwhelming advice given by officials from the Truman years: 																																																								
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63 Though Eisenhower’s New Look strategy would focus more on nuclear weapons than it would on the 
Truman era conventional buildup.  
 	
26 
give the NSC its own staff which could both produce policy and execute orders on behalf 
of the President.64 Perhaps he felt that move was too dramatic. Instead, he modified 
Truman’s existing organization to create what appeared to be an impressive policy 
creation and monitoring mechanism, what Cutler said Eisenhower considered a “valuable 
tool for his constant use.”65 This was needed because, “[i]n a world shrunk by supersonic 
speeds, loomed over by ominous atomic clouds, fragmenting into new political entities, 
living in uneasy peace or scourged…by war, it was no long possible for a President 
himself to integrate the intelligence and opinions flooding to him from all sides.”66 In 
response, Cutler created what he called the “Policy Hill” of the Planning Board, the 
National Security Council itself, and the Operations Coordinating Board.67 [See Figure 1 
on page 63] 
To understand Eisenhower’s style and Cutler’s recommendations it is important to 
remember the President’s background. As Cutler noted, “Eisenhower [believed] in 
continuous policy planning…based on his long experience with war planning…More 
important than what is planned is that the planners become accustomed to working and 
thinking together on hard problems.”68 The planning process, and resulting debate, was 
often as important as the actual outcome. In many respects the National Security Act of 
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1947 set up an organization that mimicked a military organization. Eisenhower attempted 
to take this a step further into the Oval Office.69 
  Eisenhower hoped to use the NSC to generate ideas and discussion. General 
Andrew Goodpaster, who served as Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary, later said that the 
President “would have an occasional idea he would want…investigated, but mostly what 
he did was to cause studies…to be made, out of which…ideas would flow.” 
Eisenhower’s preferred method was to have “an energetic and alert staff bat thing up to 
him…But he did provide goals…he provided a style and sense of what we were reaching 
for.”70 Elmer Staats, Executive Secretary of the Operation Coordinating Board, added 
that the findings of the NSC reports often were not a surprise to the President.71 He was, 
to a greater or lesser extent, kept informed of progress as it developed. That was how the 
White House was supposed to function. The goal of the NSC was to keep officials 
informed of what was going on and to make sure they knew how to carry out the 
President’s orders if they acted independently.  
The first step in the NSC process took place in the Planning Board (PB). The PB 
was originally set up as a combination policy writing group and policy ombudsman. 
Known in the Truman Administration as the Senior Staff, it was comprised primarily of 
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Assistant Secretaries from the various departments. The SANSA, often under 
Eisenhower’s guidance, set the PB’s agenda. The PB would discuss a policy topic and 
outline the best recommendations they had to address a situation. Those suggestions 
would be compiled into a report that was sent to the NSC itself for review. At a typical 
Council meeting, possibly consisting of up to thirty statutory members plus occasional 
guests, the Council would discuss the PB’s papers and other topics.72 They technically 
aimed to render some judgment on the PB’s reports and recommendations. Yet, as an 
NSC official later observed, Eisenhower “used the NSC structure to ‘exercise the 
troops’…[I]t was an effort to give officials some practice, as a general would do in field 
maneuvers, so that when a real life situation would arise, the bureaucracy would know 
how to respond. In effect, Eisenhower demanded policy ‘dry runs.’”73 Robert Bowie, 
head of Dulles’ PPS, said that the NSC meetings were a way for officials to experience 
“living with the problem.” Bowie believed “meetings were the most effective means to 
school his subordinates about the guidelines he expected them to follow.”74  
																																																								
72 In addition to the President and Vice President the Council consisted of the following members- 
White House Special Assistants: SANSA, Atoms for Peace, Foreign Economic Policy, Information 
Projects, Science and Technology, Security Operations Coordination,   
White House Staff: NSC Executive Secretary, Deputy NSC Executive Secretary,   
Foreign Affairs: Secretary of State, Aide to the Secretary of State, Director of the International 
Cooperation Agency,  
Defense Matters: Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Aide to the Secretary of Defense, 
Chairman of the JCS, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization,   
Others: Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury , Director of the CIA, Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget 
Annex E. Karl Harr Papers Box 2, Cutler, Robert, “Report on National Security Council Mechanism,” 6-
24-58, DDE. 
73 Harold H. Saunders Interview, 11/24/93, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association 
for Diplomatic Studies and Training, p. 9-10.  
74 R. Bowie and R. Immerman, Waging Peace (Oxford UP, 1998), p. 89. 
 	
29 
 After the NSC decided on a course of action, it was passed down for 
implementation by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Chaired by the 
Undersecretary of State and comprised primarily of similarly ranked officials from 
around the government, this group met weekly. At these meetings, representatives of the 
line agencies dealing with foreign affairs, and a White House representative, discussed 
how the various departments were carrying out Eisenhower’s policies. Their brief was 
not only to monitor implementation, but also manage coordination between the 
departments. Often they would farm out papers dealing with particular regions or issues 
to an ever-growing number of subcommittees—sometimes numbering twenty or thirty 
people in each—in addition to White House representatives.75 They were supposed to 
recorded their observations in reports back to the NSC. The Council could analyze those 
reports and issue updates in the form of new directives.   
 In its day-to-day work, the NSC handled a wide variety of issues. Eisenhower’s 
“New Look” defense policy was fleshed out in a paper drafted in the PB and subjected to 
a thorough discussion in the NSC.76 OCB officials largely oversaw America’s response to 
Iceland’s flirtation with Communism in 1956, not only convincing the nation to stay in 
NATO but expanding the US military presence on the island in the process.77 The 
Council and its boards were instrumental in coordinating US scientific policy towards 
Antarctica.78 In addition to the reports it produced, the discussions in the NSC system 																																																								
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disseminated information throughout the US government: the CIA, for instance, found it 
a useful venue to collect information on what other agencies were doing.79  
A more detailed example of how the board worked can be seen in the NSC’s 
management of the United States’ spy satellite program. In 1954, a panel recommended 
the US needed to improve its intelligence collection capabilities.80 Two major programs 
resulted from this NSC-sponsored review. One was the U-2, over which Eisenhower gave 
control to the CIA.81 The other was a satellite program and remained under control of the 
NSC.82 The Council outlined a course of research in a document, NSC-5520.83 While 
NSC 5520 highlighted the dual civilian and military uses of such research, it still 
concluded that all research “represent a technological step towards…a large surveillance 
satellite.”84  
Eisenhower farmed out the day-to-day management of the program to another 
panel, but the NSC continued to monitor NSC 5520, reviewing its progress and cost.85 
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When the Defense Department gave funding to a Navy satellite design instead of an 
Army satellite design, the NSC was forced to step in. The Army scientists, mostly 
Germans and led by Wernher von Braun, were outraged. They went to the chairman of 
the OCB, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and claimed the decision was not made on the technical 
merits, but stemmed from anti-German prejudice.86 Given the OCB’s reporting duties, 
Hoover passed the complaint to Goodpaster and Eisenhower.87 Though the NSC decided 
not to act on von Braun’s charges, the anecdote gives some understanding of how the full 
NSC system worked.  
 Four years later, the NSC again intervened in the project. This time it did so after 
a group of officials pushed for a more ambitious—and potentially dangerous—approach. 
They wanted to develop a satellite-based anti-missile system to defend the US. After 
years of being sidelined, a supporter used a 1960 meeting of the NSC to advocate for the 
idea.88 This was a desperate attempt and it did nothing to change the President’s mind.89 
Eisenhower never evinced much enthusiasm for putting weapons in space, and used the 
NSC to stop similar projects by issuing Council directives. Starting with NSC 5522, the 
PB drew up a series of documents for Council approval proclaiming that the United 
States believed no country could claim sovereignty over Outer Space and should not 
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militarize it.90 Eisenhower restated this principle again in 1958 in NSC 5814.91 A year, 
later the NSC outlined what it considered the military applications of the US space 
program in the January 1960 NSC 5918. This stated that America’s only military goals in 
space concerned reconnaissance, early warning, communications, mapping, and related 
matters.92 
The NSC proved remarkably successful in providing oversight to this effort. The 
Council oversaw the efforts of numerous subgroups and advisory bodies to create what 
became a highly successful reconnaissance satellite program. NSC 5520 inspired both the 
first spy satellite—the CIA’s Corona program—as well as an early warning satellite 
system.93 At the very least, it gave the US an intelligence advantage that continues to this 
day. Most members of the PB, NSC, or OCB had little technical training, or even interest 
in these matters. Yet they kept the focus on programs that eventually proved incredibly 
successful.  
By contrast, Eisenhower felt there were limits to the NSC’s utility. He considered 
the U-2 program so secret, for instance, he forbade discussion of it in Council meetings. 
He instead coordinated the program with his staff secretary, Andrew Goodpaster, and the 
Dulles brothers.94 Goodpaster felt that not having NSC oversight caused the 
Administration to bungle their response to the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. 																																																								
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As Goodpaster remarked, “we handled the situation in a very miserable and 
unsatisfactory way.”95 He even asked Eisenhower “whether in retrospect he felt that the 
NSC and any of its machinery should have been more formally involved.”96 Eisenhower 
reiterated it was too sensitive.97  
That Eisenhower decided to keep such an important program out of the NSC 
gives some insight into a problem hanging over the Administration. Despite success 
stories like Iceland or the spy satellite program, many felt that NSC systems did not work 
very well. Those complaints covered all aspects of the Council. The PB, for instance was 
instructed not to write policy papers as such, but instead write documents expressing “the 
most statesmanlike solutions to the problems of national security.”98 Planning Board 
documents aimed to create a perfect synthesis of administration thinking.99 However, an 
observer reported that its reports were “victims of the passion for unanimity.”100 In 
reaching consensus between different viewpoints, it struggled over how to report 
significant disagreements, new ideas, contradictory thoughts, or disputes. NSC attendees 
sometimes seemed to care little about the documents.101 When the PB did highlight 
disagreements, the reports were criticized for complicating the task of briefing the 																																																								
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Council members, and “confused council discussion, and waste[d] time at the Council 
table.”102 PB staff morale plummeted. They did not like their jobs, nor did they think their 
papers mattered.103 Cutler, too, felt the Board was not performing as designed.104 
Eisenhower attempted to boost morale by having the PB focus less on specific issues and 
more on creating new policy ideas. Despite his good intentions, the Board’s outlook 
remained unchanged.105  
 Problems also existed in the Council. For the first two years the agenda was so 
dense that the meetings often ran well over two and a half hours.106 Cutler blamed this on 
the participants, saying they were not prepared.107 As he noted, “Without adequate 
preparation, few men have the over-all perspective to deal with long range security 
issues.”108 Eisenhower eventually became frustrated by the document driven meetings, 
and asked Cutler to structure the meetings around more freewheeling discussions. This 
upset the agenda-focused Cutler, who only partially complied.109 The changes did not 
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mollify the President, who sometimes felt the meetings were so predictable that he would 
leave in the middle of the NSC’s discussions.110  
The Council faced a series of other issues. First, for instance, it had problems 
handling anything but longer-range issues. Indeed, a review conducted in early 1957, 
after Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution, noted that the Council was “out of its 
element” when discussing emergencies. It struggled with Hungary since, “all the policy 
papers it had written were useless. Moreover, it took “at least two months” to develop 
new policy papers.111 Second, there was a fear that departments and agencies regularly 
withheld information in NSC meetings that might either tip their hand or portray them in 
a negative light.112 Third, like the U-2, there were some issues Eisenhower just rarely 
discussed in the NSC, including disarmament, most of America’s Middle East policy, and 
budget issues.113 All of these issues limited the effectiveness of NSC meetings. 
The NSC mechanism also gave little oversight for covert programs, one of 
Eisenhower’s favorite tools. To oversee these the Council established the 5412 
Committee—named after the NSC act governing covert actions. Cutler considered the 
5412 Committee deeply flawed. He wrote that “ad hoc projects are taken up without 
advanced study…and without guiding criteria. [I]t is almost impossible for the [SANSA 
to] satisfactorily determine as to the quality, comparative need, and effectiveness of a 
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particular project and to give or withhold ‘policy approval.’”114 Cutler might not have 
been relieved had he known that other officials also doubted the NSC could provide the 
needed overview of covert operations.115 
 The OCB was perhaps the most problematic piece of the entire NSC. An OCB 
staffer noted, “The question of reorganizing or revamping the [OCB] is much like a hardy 
perennial: it come up anew each year.”116 Administration officials expressed concern 
that, like the PB, the OCB’s reports to the NSC were watered down and of little value.117 
The OCB also lacked a mechanism where members could easily register disagreement or 
could come to any solution other than a compromise. All its reports to Eisenhower were 
unanimous and officials feared that a thin veneer of compromise masked disagreements 
between the departments.118 Perhaps most disturbing to White House officials was the 
rumor that departments and agencies were purposely undermining the OCB by dumping 
unreliable officials in its committees while sending their most trusted staffers to work 
with each other outside the NSC system.119 An idea pervaded Washington that the Board 
would disappear when the next Administration took power, if not sooner.120 One OCB 
member complained that Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Board’s secretary, was part of the 
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problem. He turned the OCB into an “‘ice cold morgue’ with his ‘bureaucratic pocket 
veto methods.’”121 His replacement, Christian Herter, did a poor job of coordinating with 
other members, often leaving the board unprepared for their meetings.122  
 At one point, Eisenhower believed the key was to do a better job selling the board 
to the rest of the government.123 Even the OCB’s own staffers felt that was a difficult 
task: Karl Harr, the Board’s Vice Chair noted two weeks after starting, “The OCB staff is 
practically useless as far as I am concerned” while complaining that OCB members, 
“already suspect that the [board] is a backwater [and] a paper mill.”124 Officials all over 
Washington rejoiced at “‘getting the OCB out of their hair’” considering it “effectively 
curtailed.”125 One OCB member pessimistically noted “A heavy shot of adrenaline is 
needed to keep [it] from lapsing into [a] comatose state for the remainder of the present 
administration.”126 Nelson Rockefeller commented that part of the problem stemmed 
from the fact the State Department ran the Board. In “an era which is neither peace nor 
war” the denizens of Foggy Bottom lacked the perspective of all the agencies dealing 
with foreign affairs and the military.127 He recommended that the White House run the 
board to ensure “vigorous leadership, imaginative planning, and critical review of 
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operations.”128 Despite all this discussion, no amount of reform seemed to fix the Board’s 
problems. 
Some of the problems with the NSC clearly stemmed from more than just 
dysfunctional machinery. An analysis of the NSC system commented that the Council 
had “certain members who are especially powerful…If these influential members take a 
strong position for or against something, usually this is what the direction will be.” 
Eisenhower avoided confronting these individuals “if an overruling jeopardizes the 
continued close harmony of his Administration.” Such powerful forces tended “to inhibit 
real latitude in criticism and in devising novel approaches to problems.”129 In fact, 
Eisenhower often relied on small groups, rather than the formal NSC system, to make 
important decisions. The 1958 decision to intervene in Lebanon, for instance, was made 
outside the Council.130 One might see this as part of Eisenhower’s “Hidden-Hand” 
strategy.131 The formal NSC meetings provided him cover, and a reasonably public 
forum, in which to make decisions. In fact, Eisenhower’s reliance on advisors over the 
system perpetuated a vicious cycle: the more he relied on people, the less the system 
functioned. That further angered Eisenhower, who, in turn, relied more on advice from 
outside the system. He also proved unwilling to intervene with staffers who were 
disrupting the system. This set up a scenario leading to a substantial scandal for the 
Administration.  																																																								
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The Problem with People 
Despite its logical and tidy organization, the story of Eisenhower’s national 
security apparatus is about the push and pull between a reliance on organization and a 
reliance on people. If the public story of the administration was about military-like 
organization, the private story was about how people interacted with and sometimes 
overruled that system. Eisenhower seemed unwilling to either change the system to allow 
for these personalities, nor address the problems with the people upsetting the system. 
Eisenhower’s reliance on individuals instead of machinery grew during his time in office. 
By the end of the decade Eisenhower felt he needed to set up entirely new committees to 
do what it seemed the NSC was incapable of doing. Three people intentionally or 
unintentionally challenged the NSC system: Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff 
Secretary, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State and, ironically, Robert Cutler 
himself. Each had a lengthy tenure, Goodpaster served as Staff Secretary between 1955 
and 1960 while John Foster Dulles served as Secretary of State between 1953 and 1958. 
Cutler served on and off between 1953 and 1958.  
Soon after taking office, Eisenhower decided he needed something akin to a 
foreign policy version of White House chief of staff Sherman Adams. Andrew 
Goodpaster came to the post with an impressive background: in addition to a decade-long 
friendship with Eisenhower, he had the endorsement of George Marshall, and was seen as 
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a member of the Army intelligentsia.132 Goodpaster’s role, while crucial, was often near 
invisible. His duties were, in part, clerical, but he played an operational role in some 
situations. In addition to his aforementioned role in the U-2 program, he occasionally 
acted as Eisenhower’s representative in meetings and generally functioned the President’s 
“spot” man, making sure things got done.133 Though Goodpaster was not formally an 
advisor, this sort of role meant that his own ideas and proclivities must have seeped 
through into his work. His job remained so shadowy that, during the transition to the 
Kennedy Administration, no one took over the unofficial aspects of his job. There was 
nothing inherently wrong in having someone who could get the job done but it, in part, 
allowed Eisenhower to end-run the NSC system.  
Cutler himself posed a series of problems. Eisenhower era officials are often 
compared unfavorably to their Kennedy era counterparts: gray, stodgy, bureaucrats 
versus worldly and cosmopolitan action intellectuals. Robert Culter was an investment 
banker, yet he also composed poetry and wrote two romantic novels. The Saturday 
Evening Post noted in a profile that he was one of Boston’s “funniest after-dinner 
speakers.”134 He may not have been as outwardly dynamic as McGeorge Bundy, but he 
was not a simple hidebound bureaucrat. Cutler came to the job with his own foreign 
policy bona fides. He worked in the War Department with Henry Stimson during the 
Second World War and met Eisenhower in the late 1940s while working on temporary 
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assignment for the Defense Department.135  After these initial meetings Culter became 
one of the key backers of the “draft Eisenhower” movement, and helped write 
Eisenhower’s Cow Palace speech.136 
As noted previously, Cutler helped shape both the NSC system and the SANSA 
job. He served from 1953 until 1955 and then returned for another stint between 1956 and 
1958. This was a job with many responsibilities. It is perhaps no coincidence that his 
memoirs were titled No Time for Rest. Both his memoirs and the Saturday Evening Post 
noted it seemed Cutler enjoyed nothing more than complaining about how overworked he 
was.137 Some of this was surely for show, but some was legitimate. Cutler proved 
obstinate in the face of Eisenhower’s requests for NSC reforms. Late in his tenure he 
seemed to be calling for Eisenhower to replace him, writing “Implicitly as I believe in the 
Heraclitan theory of the necessity for constant change, it is more difficult for one who has 
operated the Council mechanism for almost four years to change long-established 
procedures than it is for a [new SANSA] to do so.”138 Yet Eisenhower did not replace 
Cutler until he voluntarily stepped down. 
 One figured overshadowed all others among Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
advisors: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles was a polarizing Secretary. Either 
a genius at managing US foreign policy, or a dangerous madman all too ready to rattle 
the nuclear saber. When Paul Nitze was asked for comment after Dulles’s death, he 
remarked that “I thought much of what [Dulles] said was sanctimonious moralizing 																																																								
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which bore little relations to the things which he actually did or authorized.”139 Karl Harr 
countered that Dulles was an astute and shrewd diplomat who possessed impressive 
“intellect, strength of character, and determination.”140 Dulles left a mixed record as 
Secretary of State. While he was a formidable diplomat, he cared little for the operational 
and managerial aspects of running a department.141 Under his watch department 
personnel were targeted by both the Red and Lavender Scares. Morale generally 
plummeted. Yet, Dulles hated to part with any of the power of the State Department.142 
Harr, who faced off against Dulles as a member of both the Defense Department and 
White House staff called him “one of the great in-fighters of our time… When the time 
came he just spoke to the President and laid it out cold…[Dulles] used to wander over to 
the White House almost every night…just to talk things over.”143 He was often joined in 
this by his brother, Allen, the head of the CIA. 
 As a result, Dulles effectively short circuited the elaborate NSC system. From the 
start, he fought against the powers of the White House in the management of foreign 
policy. He effectively cut out some of his early competitors and quickly established a 
position from which only death managed to dislodge him.144 When the analysis of the 
NSC system quoted earlier referred to members “who are especially powerful” who 
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“inhibit[ed] real latitude in criticism and in devising novel approaches to problems” it 
was talking about Dulles.145 
 All this, however, does point to Eisenhower’s personnel/organization problem. 
Eisenhower could be expected to have people like Goodpaster and Dulles serve on his 
staff. Every president did, does, and will continue to. Even a highly critical review of the 
NSC noted, “many of these so-called ‘weakness’ are attributed to the frailties of 
humans…[N]o organizational arrangement may be capable of effectively overcoming 
them.”146 Yet, Eisenhower seems to never have considered, or admitted, the many costs 
these people imposed on the overall system. Goodpaster’s coordination role challenged 
the function of the OCB. Dulles, by the same token, made many of the NSC discussions 
questionable. If he was going to make the final decision, why engage in all this paper 
writing and discussion? At the same time Eisenhower, even as he grew more frustrated, 
proved unwilling to fire Cutler even though the SANSA himself seemed to be begging 
for relief. All of this, of course, preserved Eisenhower’s “innocence” to some extent. By 
not working harder to incorporate Dulles into the NSC system or actively firing staffers, 
he retained deniability and broad support, even as frustration grew. This all came at an 
institutional cost in morale and efficiency.  
 In one instance, however, Eisenhower tried to use a person, Nelson Rockefeller, 
to both end run the system while simultaneously fixing it. In some respects, this was 
perhaps an effort to placate the New York millionaire. Rockefeller initially joined the 
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administration as Assistant Secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, as well as leading the President’s Advisory Committee on Government 
Organization. Though he liked his Assistant Secretary job, he grew frustrated at his 
subordinate position and upon seeing many of his policy initiatives frustrated by both the 
White House and Congress.147 He announced his intent to resign with the hopes that 
Eisenhower would offer him another job. The ploy worked when Eisenhower offered him 
a White House post. Rockfeller became Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Foreign 
Affairs and moved into the EOB.148 Whether Eisenhower genuinely wanted Rockefeller, 
or aimed to simply buy his loyalty, is open to debate. Regardless, Rockefeller’s new post 
came with an opaque brief, the sort of thing that seemed out of place in Eisenhower’s 
hierarchy precisely because of its ambiguity and flexibility. That latitude suggests at 
hidden motives on Eisenhower’s part. With access to the President and a seat on the 
NSC, Rockefeller was placed at key points in the national security apparatus. Almost 
nothing went as Rockefeller hoped. Yet, even in failure, he proved remarkably prescient 
on a number of fronts.  
Initially Eisenhower tasked Rockefeller with overseeing America’s Cold War 
public information and psychological warfare strategy.149 When Rockefeller described his 
job, however, it seemed far more grandiose. Via James Reston and The New York Times, 
Rockefeller plated a story saying that John Foster Dulles was so overwhelmed with the 
day-to-day work of State that Rockefeller was brought in to “supply the miraculous 
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element” to American foreign policy.150 This was not a complete fabrication. Rockefeller 
believed that, in order to create a grand narrative to sell the world, you needed a grand 
strategy for the nation. Containment, nuclear sabre rattling, or whatever Dulles did, was 
not enough. Moreover, Rockefeller considered the State Department’s rank-and-file 
intellectually timid.151 In reality, more conservative leadership, like Dulles and Hoover, 
often squelched the Department’s bold ideas.152 Regardless, this caused tensions between 
Rockefeller and the State Department.153 Rockefeller also harbored a long-standing 
personal animosity towards Dulles which Dulles reciprocated.154 
Rockefeller sought to challenge Dulles by, in March 1955, establishing an 
Eisenhower-endorsed alternative to the NSC, called the Planning Coordinating Group 
(PCG).155 The idea of the PCG was simple. It would basically perform the OCB’s 
coordination tasks, but the committee would be smaller—the Under Secretary of State, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA—and Rockefeller would 
manage it, reporting directly to Eisenhower. One of Rockefeller’s staffers, Army Col. 
William Kintner, laid out the stakes for the PCG in a memo to Rockefeller. He said,  
The secret of “selling” the [PCG] will lie in the aura which surrounds it and in the 
attitude of mind which pervade the set-up. [If it] can be made to look, act, and 
radiate as if it were the top level government planning group in an active shooting 
war, it has a chance to become one... This calls for a psychological campaign in 
Washington, the success of which will depend upon personalities and props. 
Chairman Rockefeller and his…associates and staff must act like there is a war 																																																								
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going on. Dedicated, almost ruthless urgency must be the keynote of its 
impact…Some of the props [include] the cold war situation center [and] up-to-
date and dramatic charts and maps…[Its] report should be short memos and 
informal chits. A paper blizzard must be avoided…Although the [PCG] is to 
“advise and assist” and is not directly responsible for the implementation of plans 
and programs…it must devise means of insuring that the various 
departments…implement vigorously the plans it adopts….”156 
 
In many respects, Kintner believed this all boiled down to a far more basic problem, 
 
The truth of the matter is that there are very few “implementers” in Washington. 
Government charts list many policy makers and advisers but few reflect the 
presence of implementers or expediters. Consequently, results in Washington 
depend upon the personality of “activists” who see that things get done.157 
 
Rockefeller threw himself into the PCG. When Sherman Adams refused to give him more 
staffers, he hired them personally. He also worked hard to establish what he called the 
Cold War Situation Center in the EOB. The idea was to create a central location where 
Rockefeller and the President could monitor the Cold War in real time. Rockefeller tried 
to get the PCG involved in every major foreign policy and program in the 
administration’s portfolio.  
 The experiment did not go as Rockefeller hoped. The White House refused the 
funds he requested for renovations.158 Far more importantly, the Dulles brothers, with the 
help of Herbert Hoover, Jr., froze the PCG out of most important discussions. As one 
staff lamented, “[t]he failure of the PCG stemmed largely from the lack of sincere, 
enthusiastic support from the member agencies.”159 Rockefeller admitted his gambit had 																																																								
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failed.160 Only a few months after its creation, he wrote Eisenhower a memo suggesting 
the PCG be abolished. The President agreed.161  
As the PCG disbanded, William Kintner wrote Rockefeller a memo complaining 
that Eisenhower had “not developed a satisfactory method for making timely operational 
decisions and for assuring the effective implementation of decisions… The next 
‘solution’ must tap into the presidential authority.”162 Kintner argued the best way to 
manage foreign policy was to form a new group run from the White House. The staffers 
of that new organization “should sever the connections with any other governmental 
department or agency…The key problem is one of absolute loyalty to the” White 
House.163 In effect, Kintner proposed what would become the model of operations 
pioneered by Kennedy and Bundy’s NSC staff.  
With the PCG dead, Rockefeller made one last attempt to prove his relevance. 
Working with a committee of academics, he created the “Open Skies” concept, which 
would have allowed regular reconnaissance overflights of US and Soviet territory as a 
step towards reducing tensions. Rockefeller brought the report to Eisenhower, bypassing 
the NSC system entirely, and argued he should present it to Nikita Khrushchev at the 
upcoming 1955 Geneva Conference. Dulles objected, but was overruled by the 
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President.164 “Open Skies” failed to take flight at Geneva, laid low by a Soviet veto. Yet, 
Eisenhower received considerable international praise for suggesting such a bold idea. 
When Rockefeller tried to replicate this success a few months later, however, Dulles 
successfully shot down the initiative.165 
Rockefeller then submitted his resignation. In his brief stint, he made a growing 
list of enemies in the Administration. His operating style annoyed colleagues and his free 
spending angered fiscal conservatives. One aide argued that Rockefeller proposed “too 
many new ideas and departures, rather too bumptiously for a junior man.”166 Even 
Eisenhower himself admitted if Rockefeller had “100 ideas…maybe one of those ideas is 
brilliant.”167 When Rockefeller announced his resignation he might have expected 
Eisenhower would again step in and offer him another post. He did not.168  
While Eisenhower quietly enabled Rockefeller’s initial power grab, the President 
also did little to support him or stop Dulles from effectively sidelining his efforts. 
Rockefeller’s own tenacity and self-assurance, to the point of folly, robbed him of allies 
that might have helped him succeed. Yet he also deserves significant credit. “Open 
Skies” became a key aspect of reducing post-Cold War tensions when a modified form 
was passed in 1992 and remains active today. The PCG failed, but pointed to a set of 
																																																								
164 Though “Open Skies” was seen as an idea rebelling against the Cold War orthodoxy, like so much of 
Cold War policy, it came from a place of fear. Rockefeller’s group, like the Gaither Committee two years 
later, believed that America would be so vulnerable in the next decade that it had to negotiate now from a 
place of strength lest the Soviets gain the upper hand. Ibid, p. 238-245. 
165 Reich, p. 628-629. Included in this were an ambitious plan to use psychological warfare and an 
increased use of foreign aid to combat expanding Soviet influence in the Third World.  
166 Quoted in Sander, p. 140. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Smith, p. 250. 
 	
49 
reforms that might have fixed many of the NSC’s problems. Rockefeller, at times, might 
have been his own worst enemy, but his ideas had merit.  
Eisenhower could have used Rockefeller to change to his system. It is possible to 
view Rockefeller’s stint as a low-risk, high reward ploy. Eisenhower would never have 
challenged Dulles outright but Rockefeller’s new position and the PCG could do this. 
That Eisenhower allowed Rockefeller such free rein, even if he also did little to help him, 
is significant. The President even supposedly staged an argument in front of Dulles with 
Rockefeller to convince his Secretary of State that he was adopting “Open Skies” under 
great duress.169 He might have secretly hoped that Rockefeller’s almost limitless energy 
would be enough to overcome the system. The problem was “the dominant powers in our 
government, such as State and Defense…see in such a venture an intrusion…and loss of 
jurisdiction and freedom of action.”170 Perhaps if Rockefeller had been a better 
bureaucratic infighter he might have succeeded.  
 Eisenhower now turned to groups of consultants from outside the government— 
primarily from, business, industry, and academia—to “supply the miraculous element” to 
American foreign policy.171 Cutler was wary of these groups.172 He reminded Eisenhower 
that it was the NSC’s job to conduct investigations and make recommendations.173 When 
Cutler left the White House in 1955, and prior to his return in 1957, Eisenhower’s use of 
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outside consultants grew.174 One of these groups, the Gaither Committee, proved to be 
one of the great missteps of the Eisenhower Administration. The principle behind the 
Committee was simple. Officially titled the “Security Resources Panel” their mission was 
to investigate America’s vulnerability to a Soviet attack.  
 The Committee, eventually chaired by Sprague Electric Company CEO Robert 
Sprague, first convened in August 1957 and spent months interviewing officials and 
reviewing highly classified reports. Many of its approximately 100 members had worked 
for Eisenhower on other review boards.175 One interesting addition was Paul Nitze. The 
White House allowed him to serve only after members of the committee insisted he be 
added. He quickly assumed a key role in drafting the committee’s findings.176 The final 
report painted a picture of an overwhelming and existential threat from the Soviet Union, 
calling for a massive investment in offensive and defensive systems.177 While some of 
their suggestions seemed prudent, others seemed outlandish to the White House and were 
dismissed almost immediately. 
This angered some members of the Committee. One member, still unknown, 
leaked the report to the press. The Washington Post first broke the story and a redacted 
copy made its way to Congress. Lest one simply blame this on Nitze, over twenty 
committee spoke to the press after the news broke.178 Coming in the wake of Sputnik, and 
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endorsing the notion of a “Missile Gap” in the favor of the Soviet Union, the report 
haunted the Administration. Disgruntled Committee members began challenging the 
Administration’s security policies and decision-making process. Much like the Team B 
exercises of the late 1970s—in which Nitze also played a key role—the Gaither Report 
created a false image of America’s vulnerabilities, causing irreparable damage to the 
White House that Democrats exploited in 1960. 
In seeking a solution to the administration’s organizational problems Eisenhower 
accidentally stumbled into a greater morass. Outside experts could solve some of the 
NSC’s problems, but came with their own risks. The President’s inability to match his, 
understandable, reliance on personal advisors with the elaborate machinery he created 
caused a reoccurring problem. This mounting frustration caused Eisenhower to finally 
consider meaningful reforms, in some cases more fundamental than what took place in 
1947. It was an ambitious project that aimed to discard the NSC, and replace it entirely 
with a system that would have the White House run US foreign policy. 
 
The First Secretary of Government 
The twelve months after the launch of Sputnik might have been the annus 
horribilis for Eisenhower’s national security apparatus. The NSC was in flux. The OCB 
was barely functioning. Eisenhower’s long held reliance on outside experts backfired 
when the Gaither Committee leaked their classified report, warning that the nation was 
vulnerable to a Soviet attack. As Eisenhower dealt with a variety of international crises—
including a failed US coup in Indonesia, the US intervention in Lebanon, and the notion, 
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albeit incorrect, of a growing Soviet missile menace—he also launched a final attempt to 
fix the national security infrastructure of the White House. He did this through the aegis 
of the President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO). These 
moves foreshadowed many of the changes made during the Kennedy years, even if 
neither side would have admitted that. Eisenhower was defeated in this effort by internal 
debate, Congressional opposition, personnel changes, and, eventually, the looming 1960 
presidential election. Despite the vision and foresight displayed by many involved, the 
overall process was a start-stop effort muddled by timing, politics, and personalities. 
 PACGO’s genesis lay in Eisenhower’s interest in increase efficiency and 
eliminate waste in government.179 In the words of the press release announcing its 
formation, its function was to “promote economy and efficiency in the operation of [the 
Executive B]ranch.”180 It also stemmed from a relatively bipartisan feeling that, after the 
haphazard agency creation of the New Deal and World War Two, some effort should be 
made towards better organization. This idea was nothing new. Debates over organization 
boomed in the late 1940s. In addition to the National Security Act, Hebert Hoover 
oversaw a reorganization committee in the late 1940s, and Nelson Rockefeller even self-
financed his own set of reviews, with the help of Temple University, in early 1953. 
Though the reports from Temple were serious, Rockefeller also used this effort to secure 
PACGO’s top spot.181 During Eisenhower’s first term PACGO developed a series of 
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reorganization plans that impressed both Eisenhower and Congress.182 Despite his rocky 
White House tenure, Rockefeller stayed attached to PACGO until he was elected 
Governor of New York in 1958.183  
If PACGO was a tool to improve the administration, it was also a weapon 
Eisenhower used offensively against Herbert Hoover. Hoover was both upset at the 
expansion of the New Deal state and frustrated that fellow-Republican Eisenhower 
seemed to be expanding it. Hoover recruited allies in Congress to put forward a bill 
establishing a second Hoover Commission.184 Through this, he hoped to cut down the 
growing state. Eisenhower feared an attack from his political right, and worried about his 
legislative agenda. He countered with a risky ploy: he offered Hoover and his 
congressional allies a compromise. Hoover could have his Commission, but it had to 
focus on policy, not structural, recommendations.185  
Hoover took the bait. As Eisenhower hoped, Hoover produced many policy ideas 
toxic to anyone not in the extreme wing of Republican party.186 Eisenhower allied with 
Democrats in Congress, including Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) to beat back other ideas. He 
killed some of Hoover’s ideas with bureaucracy, subjecting them to long and thorough 
reviews by PACGO. And Eisenhower’s adopted Hoover’s more commonsense measures, 
giving the impression that the Administration was fully committed to the Commission’s 
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findings.187 Eisenhower won, but at a price. PACGO performed their job perfectly, yet 
the review of Hoover’s suggestions took almost Eisenhower’s entire first term. Only in 
1956 could they turn their attention to other reforms.  
The most pressing reform was how to reduce the president’s workload. PACGO, 
and Eisenhower, felt that too much minutia, of all types, crowded his days. The modern 
presidency was busy, and he needed to concentrate on important matters. PACGO 
pitched a solution. The White House needed three new vice presidents: a Vice President 
for International Affairs, Domestic Affairs, and Business.188 The names caused 
understandable confusion: these were supposed to be appointed, not elected officials. 
There were also charges Eisenhower was “shucking [his] duties.”189 Rockefeller tried to 
take the high road, responding that “The President does not want this for himself; he 
wants it for the country.”190 This did not quell congressional opposition.191 As it was, 
Democrats did not believe the White House needed more staffers.192  
The idea of extra vice presidents died, but the idea of a foreign affairs assistant 
survived. It gained a new name, “The First Secretary of Government.” That name, too, 
inspired skepticism with its decidedly parliamentarian connotations.193 Under this 
concept the First Secretary would oversee the NSC, State Department, and every other 
part of the Federal Government that dealt with foreign policy. Such oversight would be 
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possible because they would be unencumbered with day-to-day managerial minutia. They 
would, in effect, run America’s foreign policy. PACGO believed Eisenhower needed this 
help, calling it “One of the big issues” facing government.194 Rockefeller argued that 
America needed to complete the development of its foreign policy apparatus.195 Even 
Sherman Adams, Rockefeller’s nemesis, agreed the “time [was] ripe” for such a move.196 
 The idea took on many permutations.197 But most returned to Eisenhower’s call 
for getting “top notch administrators” into the White House.198 Both Adams and Andrew 
Goodpaster agreed: there were plenty of staffers in the White House, what was needed 
was better oversight and coordination. Yet the constant talk of recruiting top talent 
implies, on some level, a dissatisfaction with those already serving.199 There also seemed 
to be an evolving consensus that, however this new position evolved, the NSC could be 
downgraded and the OCB could be eliminated.200 John Foster Dulles agreed with this, 
noting that the NSC, is “‘too much a paper operation’ and is not serving effectively as a 
top forum for consideration of basic policy issues.”201 He ominously warned one staffer, 
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“We do not know what is going to happen to the NSC.”202 Indeed, Eisenhower might 
have seen the First Secretary post as a way to keep the increasingly frail Dulles in 
Washington and by his side. Throughout these discussions Eisenhower emphasized that 
this position would not deal with military issues nor would it include the CIA. The First 
Secretary would be solely a diplomatic position.  
 The president needed help, and the First Secretary might be the person to do so. 
Yet PACGO debated the idea for two years. Only in 1958, right after the Gaither 
Committee debacle, did they start considering legislation. To PACGO’s frustration, the 
concept continuously hit roadblocks. Was it unconstitutional, for instance, to give a 
member of the Executive Branch, who was neither the President nor Vice President, 
statutory powers over the cabinet?203 When PACGO tried to resolve this issue, and draw 
up legislation, a Bureau of the Budget staffer commented the draft was so confusing it 
implied that “Congress does not even have a legitimate interest in the exercise of the 
President’s constitutional powers.”204 The Bureau recommended that Eisenhower avoid 
legislation completely, and instead make informal changes.205 Another problem was that, 
in 1958, Eisenhower had already pushed a massive sets of Pentagon reforms through 
Congress. The White House felt they could not fight two reorganization battles in one 
year (see chapter 6).206 Dulles’ death in 1959, as well as continued discussions over the 
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act, caused a further delay to 1960.207 At that point, Eisenhower lost interest in 
legislation. As PACGO’s administrative secretary concluded, the best outcome “may be 
[to] put [it] forward as a statesmanlike proposal for consideration by the next President 
and Congress.”208 This did not prevent PACGO from working on related plans, even 
discussing the establishment of an Office of National Security Affairs in the White 
House.209 The First Secretary idea made its way into the 1960 Republican Platform.210 In 
August, 1960 Sen. Jacob Javitts (R-NY) even introduced, to little fanfare, an act to create 
such a post.211  
The First Secretary plan died a prolonged death. Even some of its greatest 
supporters, however, worried that it might not solve any problems. Rockefeller worried 
that “All of [our investigations] are studying the tools- not the fundamental national and 
foreign [policy] objectives.”212 The lack of new policy ideas coming from either the 
White House or the State Department frustrated Rockefeller, who additionally 
complained that “What the President needs [are] concepts [of] how to achieve objectives-
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---[but] everyone [is] too busy [with operations].”213 This could not just be accomplished 
merely by making a more powerful position: the lower echelons would have to function 
more effectively as well.214 Early in the process a member of PACGO worried “[The] 
more powerful the top structure, [the] weaker the subordinates”215 Yet the universal 
belief that something like a First Secretary was needed shows just how much members of 
the administration understood the flaws in their system. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1959, while the First Secretary concept was being discussed, America and the 
Soviet Union were facing off over Berlin. Gordon Gray, Cutler’s replacement as SANSA, 
grew increasingly frustrated by the problems in the PB/NSC/OCB system. After one 
particularly fruitless meeting, he went to Eisenhower and stated his view that the 
president, and Council members generally, were being ill-served by the Council. Gray 
felt that US policy had to be tightly controlled and monitored. That was flatly not 
possible in the existing NSC system. Gray asked that he be allowed to function more as a 
troubleshooter and even policy creator, and less as a functionary. Eisenhower agreed and 
Gray began to increasingly exert his influence.216 He made small, but important, 
modification to the NSC system. One of these was an increasing emphasis on the OCB’s 
weekly, informal lunches, where top officials from all over the government met to have 																																																								
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unstructured discussions. It was a widely applauded solution.217 Bromley Smith, a veteran 
of the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House, said it was “one of the most effective 
devices I have ever experienced, short of the [Cuban Missile Crisis EXCOM].”218  
 Gray, unlike Cutler, felt unencumbered by the NSC system. He also did not have 
to fight John Foster Dulles. Unlike Rockefeller and PCG, Gray also made these changes 
with Eisenhower’s unhesitating support. Gray’s greater powers, however, partially 
suggest why Eisenhower might have allowed PACGO’s planning to languish, even if he 
thought the First Secretary concept was important. In effect, he followed the Bureau of 
the Budget’s advice, using his existing powers to make his own First Secretary.219 This 
also moved the NSC from a group focused, however imperfectly, on long range planning 
to one dealing more with day-to-day issues. It was what Eisenhower felt was needed, 
even if went against his original plans.220  
 Eisenhower’s NSC system, whatever its original intentions, was flawed. The 
system itself proved too inflexible and individuals, like Cutler and Dulles, did little to 
help it function. It is impossible to blame any particular event on the problems related to 
Eisenhower’s NSC. Yet, in preserving his NSC system, Eisenhower kept most of the 
foreign policy bureaucracy in knots. The constant paper writing and discussion might 
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have had a tangible benefit, allowing members from across the government to share ideas 
and talk. The records, however, suggest otherwise. The old interpretation of the NSC was 
that it prevented Eisenhower from responding quickly to emerging threats. That, patently, 
is untrue. The NSC did, however, cause damage. At the very least, it inhibited the 
introduction of new ideas into discussions over foreign policy. It is instructive that 
something like the “Open Skies” idea came from far outside the NSC structure. 
Compromise is not inherently bad, but the focus on compromise and clinically written 
papers worked against the ability to bring new ideas to the attention of the NSC. For a 
president who felt his job was already overloaded with minutia, dealing with the NSC 
and its various components added to an already crowded schedule. In his memoirs 
Eisenhower admitted that he could have perhaps used a smaller staff to run foreign 
policy, but that was about as far as he went in publically acknowledging the flaws in his 
system.221 For all intents and purposes, however, Eisenhower ended his administration by 
consolidating power in the White House.222 The NSC was not designed to inhibit ideas. It 
was designed to both synthesize opinions and bring those opinions to the attention to 
policymakers.223 The system, however, had several unintentional choke points in its 
design where dissent could be eliminated, and its emphasis on synthesis created a 																																																								
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situation that favored the status quo.224 The system did not automatically force 
Eisenhower to perpetuate a hardline Cold War strategy. Nor did avowed Cold Warriors 
overwhelm the system. Both, however, worked in concert to endorse a more conservative 
approached to foreign policy.  
 Recent works on Eisenhower have praised him for largely avoiding Cold War 
crises.225 When compared to Kennedy, with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam, or 
even Truman, with Korea, Eisenhower does look accomplished. Yet, America’s 
international situation in 1960 was not particularly promising. Relations with the Soviets 
were growing increasingly frosty, especially over Berlin. America seemed to be out of 
step with the emerging Neutralist movement. Even in its own hemisphere, in the case of 
Cuba, America seemed to be threated. Eisenhower also appeared to have committed a 
series of blunders. Some of that criticism was true—the administration’s handling of the 
U-2 crisis caused a black eye for the nation and further degraded relations with the 
Soviets. Some seems unfair—the “Missile Gap” did not exist. Eisenhower claimed that 
he had a system to deal with the Cold War and American foreign policy generally. From 
the perspective of could 1960, system seemed to have failed, and America was a step 
behind of international developments. Looking on from the Governor’s Mansion in 
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Albany, Nelson Rockefeller must have wondered how, after almost a decade of working 
to equip the government with the machinery it needed prevent this outcome, the nation 
still faced this nightmare situation. 
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Figure 1 
Theoretical Proper Function of the NSC System (Late 1953 onward) 
Note: Staff members provide largely clerical, research, and other support functions for boards. They are not   
involved in executing policy decisions and only rarely directly involved in making policy. Roughly 90  
individuals serve in varying capacities.  
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Chapter 2: Henry Jackson’s Public Victory 
On July 11, 1960, Charles Haskins snapped. Sitting in his EOB office, the NSC 
staffer probably wondered how he ended up with such a painful assignment. Haskins had 
a distinguished past. A graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Business School, he 
served in Army intelligence in both Europe and the Pacific during World War II. After 
the war, he attended law school and clerked for a prominent federal judge. He parlayed 
that into a post at the prestigious law firm Ropes and Gray. Recalled to duty during the 
Korean War, he did another stint in intelligence as well as a legal posting, until he was 
transferred to the White House in 1955.226   
 The NSC staff during the Eisenhower years played largely a support role. They 
researched issues, sometimes advised Cabinet members, but mostly stayed in the 
background. Haskins seemed to enjoy the job but languished in a different type of 
purgatory. In late 1959 the White House made Haskins the NSC liaison to Washington 
Democratic Senator Henry Jackson’s Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery 
(SNPM). An offshoot of the Senate’s Government Operations Committee (GOC), the 
name hardly implied a dynamic subject. Initially, Haskins’ assignment was easy, mostly 
observing members of the SNPM staff as they conducted background research. In 
February 1960, however, Jackson started to hold hearings. This initially benign and 
boring assignment now took on a sinister tone. Egged on by Jackson’s pointed questions, 
Haskins sat mute as witness after witness attacked Eisenhower, his administration, and 
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the NSC. Haskins vented his frustrations to a former colleague who testified before 
Jackson’s committee. Haskins wrote:    
I have patiently heard 32 witnesses testify…Of these, 13 have specifically 
testified, or in many instances speculated, about the NSC…One witness, for 
example, after testifying for over 30 pages [of prepared text] as to what was 
wrong with the NSC…admitted that he had actually attended only one meeting of 
the council…I would only like to say that I found your testimony thoughtful, 
objective, and refreshingly authentic.227 
 
Haskins would have rued the thought, but he was witnessing a key event in the 
development of the National Security State. Jackson’s investigation was a series of 
contradictions. Jackson simultaneously framed it as the most serious examination of 
national security organization since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 
even as he struggled to hide its partisan undertones. It was intended to raise Jackson’s 
national profile and establish his foreign policy bona fides. Foreign policy experts took 
the hearings so seriously that, for decades, they cast a shadow over interpretations of 
Eisenhower’s administration and his management of the NSC. Jackson represented one of 
the Democrats’ strongest attacks on both Eisenhower and the Republicans during the run-
up to the 1960 campaign. His investigation painted the Eisenhower Administration as 
obsessed with institutional organization at the expense of actual policymaking. Jackson, 
however, struggled to get the investigation off the ground. The Democratic party 
hierarchy in the Senate worked hard to scuttle his investigation before it began. Although 
the investigation focused on some of the driest subjects in the field of national security, 
Jackson still made it front page news for several months. It changed the narrative of 
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Eisenhower’s NSC, and its lasting influence overshadowed more serious studies 
conducted around the same time. Between April 1959 and June 1960, Jackson skillfully 
maligned Eisenhower’s administration, promoted his own political future, challenged the 
Imperial Presidency, and proved to be a headache for the long-suffering Charles Haskin.  
Eisenhower spent the 1950s building the public image of his administration: 
technocratic, corporate, and efficient. Though he struggled with the NSC machinery 
behind the scenes, he believed his system was better than any alternative, especially those 
recommended by people without insider experience. That image was not without 
blemishes, but Eisenhower retained an aura of expertise and command. Although little 
remembered today, Jackson’s investigation did considerable damage to that aura. While 
Jackson himself did much of this, he transformed his committee into a venue where other 
Democrats and Republicans did much of the work for him. Especially among foreign 
policy experts, Jackson’s subcommittee tore down the façade of Eisenhower’s NSC. It 
questioned the need for elaborate organization, and highlighted the drowning out of 
individual voices in the national security process. Moreover, it directly questioned 
whether this over-organization hurt the national security of the United States. At the very 
least, the Jackson Subcommittee opened the way for the more decentralized organization 
of Kennedy’s NSC staff, even if that set up bore little resemblance to Jackson’s actual 
findings. 
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 Between 1952 and 1959, Henry Jackson witnessed a tremendous amount of 
history, but the most part he did not make it. He lived adjacent to it. Not that one should 
downplay the accomplishments of the life-long Democrat. Starting as a local prosecutor 
in Washington State, he fought a tough primary campaign in 1940 to win one of 
Washington’s Congressional seats. Denied a chance to join the Army due to his seat in 
Congress, Jackson finally got overseas in 1945. There, he toured newly liberated 
Buchenwald. Another trip took him to Norway where he listened to the locals about life 
under occupation and their fear of the Soviets. While he remained a solid liberal on 
domestic grounds, these experiences gave Jackson lasting memories of totalitarianism’s 
effects.228  
 Jackson’s was popular in Washington State. Despite his tough primary campaign 
in 1940, he easily won the general election. He was also the only House Democrat from 
the Pacific Northwest to survive the 1946 midterms. He won a comfortable victory to the 
Senate in 1952, running against an unpopular opponent with close ties to Joseph 
McCarthy. Though one-on-one he came across as likeable, he was an indifferent public 
speaker.229 Jackson was a workaholic. Most nights Jackson sequestered himself away in 
his room to study policy.230 When he did go to social events, he followed a familiar 
pattern. Upon arrival Jackson would request a glass of scotch and water. With an aide 
dutifully at his shoulder he would then proceed to make his way around the room, usually 
over the course of an hour or two. After that, the scotch only half consumed, he would 																																																								
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say his goodbyes. For Jackson, this was more about politics than it was socializing. 
Depending on the night and time he finished the first event, he might repeat this routine 
at another one or two cocktail parties, aide still in tow, before turning in for the 
evening.231 Jackson was about as straight an arrow as they came. Considering his 
company in Congress, Jackson seemed positively boring. At the height of Jackson’s 
political power in the 1970s, the KGB tried several times to dredge up incriminating 
material. They found nothing.232 Jackson was a hard worker who liked policy, liked 
details, and kept his nose to the grindstone. Not surprisingly for a Senator with a small 
social life, he had few close friends in the Senate. He entered the Senate with three other 
new Democrats, John F. Kennedy (D-MA), Stuart Symington (D-MO), and Mike 
Mansfield (D-MT). Kennedy and Jackson quickly developed a friendship. Jackson might 
not have been one of the uber-social Kennedy’s closest friends, but the two had served 
together in the House and seemed to have a bond, perhaps due to their shared intense 
interest in national security issues.233  
 Jackson, Kennedy, and Kennedy’s brother Robert cemented this bond when all 
three found themselves assigned to the Senate’s Government Operations Committee 
(GOC). For a new Senator, the forty-year-old GOC could be a backwater assignment. 
The Legislative Reform Act of 1946 allowed for a proliferation of investigatory 
subcommittees all over the Senate, and gave the GOC oversight over the laws enacted to 
reorganize the Executive Branch as well as America’s interactions with international 
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organizations.234 That, in and of itself, did nothing to make the GOC’s mandate more 
exciting, but enterprising senators, with a little creative thinking, could use the GOC’s 
broad jurisdiction to their advantage.  
 Joseph McCarthy may have been the first to do this. McCarthy long hoped to get 
a seat on the Foreign Relations subcommittee. When that failed, he used his seat on the 
GOC, and the Committee’s broad oversight powers, to form his notorious Communist 
hunting subcommittee.235 John McClellan (D-AR), the Committee’s Chair assigned 
Jackson to McCarthy’s Subcommittee and Jackson had a ringside seat for McCarthy’s 
excesses. He participated in the Democratic boycott of the Committee aimed at cutting 
McCarthy’s power.236 It was on that committee that Jackson grew close to Robert 
Kennedy, then the Democrats’ minority counsel.  
Jackson also served on Stuart Symington’s 1956 subcommittee on Air Force 
Preparedness for the Cold War. Symington’s hearings exposed what seemed to be 
dangerous flaws in the Air Force’s readiness for nuclear war and helped perpetuate the 
notion of the “bomber gap.”237 It also significantly elevated Symington’s profile as he 
prepared for his presidential run in 1960 and energized the Democrats.238 In many 
respects this committee was a formative experience for Jackson. Symington knew this 
investigation would damage Eisenhower, but he did not consider it an entirely partisan 
enterprise. He went out of his was to make sure Republicans were included in the 																																																								
234 Robert David Johnson, “The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy During the Cold 
War” Political Science Quarterly (113, No. 4), p. 648-649.  
235 Ibid. 
236 Kaufman, p. 77. 
237 Paul C. Light, Government by Investigation (Brookings, 2014), op. 150-151. 
238 Ibid, p. 151. 
 	
70 
investigation to ensure it maintained a veneer of bipartisanship, even as the committee’s 
Democrats, including Jackson, sharped their legislative knives for an attack on the White 
House.239 Jackson even remarked, “We all realize that once [the committee] becomes a 
political football, why, then, the whole thing will blow up in smoke and confusion.”240 
Starting with a high caliber witness, in this case retired General Omar Bradley, 
Symington initially seemed to be making headway in his attack on Eisenhower. Until, 
that is, he publically attacked Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson.241 Jackson joined in 
the assault.242 Even as they painted a picture of military unpreparedness, the investigation 
seemed increasingly partisan.243 Once it crossed this threshold, it slowly faded from the 
public view. The final report, little noticed when published, further undermined 
Symington’s efforts. While the Democrats on the committee wrote a blistering attack, the 
committee’s Republicans undermined the findings when they issued a dissenting report 
that stoutly defended the Administration.244 Even if Symington’s political misstep, and 
Jackson’s excessive enthusiasm, gave the Administration a temporary reprieve, 
Symington’s investigation began to build the case that Eisenhower’s national security 
strategy was dangerous and poorly planned. The idea of the “missile gap,” a key belief to 
many testifying before the SNPM, fit into a narrative bolstered by the Symington 
Committee. It also gave Jackson a roadmap of what to do, and not do, with his own 
investigation.  																																																								
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 Though he remained passionate about domestic issues, Jackson tried to increase 
his profile on international matters, sensing a growing Soviet threat.245 Jackson developed 
a keen interest, and expertise, on nuclear weapons via his service on the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy. He spent much of the 1950s crusading for America to improve its 
atomic arsenal.246 One might have expected Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy, 
underpinned by nuclear weapons, to mesh well with Jackson’s beliefs. But for many 
Democrats and a growing number of Republicans it did not. The New Look was 
criticized on any number of fronts. Some felt that the strategy relied too heavily on covert 
operations. Others lamented Eisenhower’s stingy support for conventional capabilities. 
Even on the nuclear front, the President seemed vulnerable. During Eisenhower’s tenure, 
Strategic Air Command expanded significantly. Yet, America seemed far behind on 
missile technology. Only a few months before the launch of Sputnik Jackson gave a 
speech in the Senate highlighting America’s technological deficit.247 If Sputnik portended 
Soviet nuclear superiority, the leaked findings of the Gaither Committee confirmed 
America’s vulnerability. Jackson could understand part of the problem: Eisenhower 
deliberately chose to eschew a large defense budget. Jackson was less sure how the 
President could ignore an avalanche of advice coming from foreign policy experts and 
military officials.  
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 Jackson was hardly alone in expressing his concerns. Democratic organizations, 
like Americans for Democratic Action and the Democratic Advisory Committee, also 
spoke out against Eisenhower’s military and foreign policies. More luminous lights in the 
field, like Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, trod the same ground as Jackson. As the 1960 
election approached, Jackson feared for America’s security and hoped to give a boost to 
his political career. The question was how best to do this? Jackson wanted to launch an 
investigation that examined the whole of US cold war strategy, not just military matters. 
In his mind, the ideal place to do this would be from the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), however, denied him a seat 
when one opened.248 Jackson also sat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, but the 
purview of that body limited what he could investigate. Jackson and his staff considered 
their options, and seemed to reach the same conclusion McCarthy did years before: use 
the GOC. The GOC, under its mandate, could investigate all the entities created by the 
National Security Act of 1947, including the Pentagon and the NSC. Moreover, if he 
played his cards right, Jackson could turn the words of others into political weapons. 
Jackson could only tarnish Eisenhower so much, but the statements of others, especially 
non-partisan experts, might have an even greater effect. The most explosive parts of 
Symington’s subcommittee came often from those testifying, not Symington himself. 
Still, Jackson first needed to have the Senate to pass a resolution authorizing a 
subcommittee. He began the process in early 1959.  
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 Jackson kicked off his efforts with a speech in April 1959 delivered at the 
National War College in Washington, DC, where he laid out the case against the 
Eisenhower Administration. While Jackson highlighted the deficiencies of the 
Eisenhower defense budget, he argued that much of the problem stemmed from how 
Eisenhower made decisions. He acknowledged that “Organization by itself cannot assure 
a strategy for victory…But good organization can help, and poor organization does hurt. 
Let’s face it: we are poorly organized.”249 He then described Eisenhower’s NSC system 
as being not just overly bureaucratic, but dangerous to the nation. Jackson pointed to a 
myriad of reports warning the White House of national security and defense problems. 
That the president ignored these warnings was proof to Jackson that good ideas seemed to 
disappear in the NSC’s warren of alphabet soup subcommittees. At the very least, it 
inhibited good decision-making. At worst, the machinery actively encouraged poor 
choices. Lest anyone doubt how seriously Jackson took all this, he concluded his speech 
by saying “The truth is that to every threat of defeat there has always come the resolute 
response of free men—‘it shall not be.’ This can be so again, as we in our time bend out 
efforts to building a decent world for which we stand—knowing that humanity’s hope 
depends on us.”250 This speech got Jackson got the attention he sought. Positive press 
coverage portrayed the senator as finally exposing pitfalls in the President’s planning.251  
 Over the next several months, Jackson engaged in combat with both the 
luminaries of his party and the White House. Both wanted to quash his investigation and 
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went to lengthy measures to do so. Jackson bested each of these attempts with cunning 
and guile. When Senate Democrats tried to shut down his investigation on procedural 
grounds, Jackson rebuffed their attempts by outlining the holes in their claims. When 
Lyndon Johnson and Dwight Eisenhower accused Jackson of being reckless, the Senator 
from Washington avoided the pitfalls of the Symington Committee, moderated his tone, 
and kept plotting. The White House made the greatest mistake: it agreed to let Jackson 
have his subcommittee, but only if he agreed to terms it believed would defang his 
investigation. Jackson agreed and built carefully worded loopholes into the agreement. 
Jackson’s success rested in part on luck and the poor strategy of his opponents. But it also 
resulted from good staff work in Jackson’s office and the Senator’s own instincts.  
 The White House was not happy with Jackson’s speech, but felt it could be 
ignored. One official said that Jackson’s attack was so scattershot, it was hard to tell 
where exactly to begin the rebuttal.252 Robert Cutler characterized the speech as “a 
vigorous polemic.”253 He claimed that Jackson misidentified how the NSC operated, its 
functions, and its purpose. Nor, Cutler correctly noted, did the Senator make any 
recommendations for how to fix any of this.254 Cutler suggested the best response would 
be a “careful statement of how the mechanism does operate.”255 Jackson did not wait for 
the White House’s response. On May 5, he introduced Senate Resolution (S Res) 115, 
which aimed to investigate  																																																								
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the effectiveness of present organizational structures and operational methods of 
agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government at all levels in the 
formulation, coordination, and execution of an integrated national policy for the 
solution of the problems of survival with which the free world is confronted in the 
contest with communism.256 
 
Surprisingly, the first line of resistance Jackson encountered came from the top 
echelon of his own party: J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Richard Russell (D-GA), and 
Lyndon Johnson. Fulbright, for one, looked askance at Jackson’s study because his 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was, simultaneously, almost exactly what Jackson 
proposed. The Foreign Relation’s Committee’s detailed study ran 15 volumes, including 
an entire volume dedicated to the formulation and administration of America’s foreign 
policy. Released in the fall of 1959, it heavily criticized the NSC, noting “it is clear that 
an interdepartmental committee, no matter how exalted, operates under severe limitations 
and can be only a partial aid in coordinating matters of foreign policy...A committee 
cannot be a very effective decisionmaking [sic] instrument… The result is often a heavily 
compromised agreement.”257 It recommended that the President should scrap the NSC 
system and essentially adopt something akin to Rockefeller’s First Secretary Concept.258 
Gordon Gray thanked Fulbright for forwarding the report to the White House, made a 
few comments on the report, and was done with the matter.259 There were no further 
repercussions. 
Other attempts from within Congress also bore little fruit. Humbert Humphrey’s (D-MN) 
staff participated in an informal study group on national security reform comprised of 																																																								
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members of RAND, the Brookings Institution, and representatives from the Pentagon, the 
NSC, and the Legislative Reference Service.260 Though that group met for several months 
and came up with some policy proposals, their ideas were never implemented.261 
Humphrey had no better luck when he and Jacob Javits (R-NY) released a plan in 1959 to 
form an “Advisory Council on National Security” to supplement the NSC. It would be 
made up of all the living former presidents—Eisenhower must have groaned at the 
thought of giving Herbert Hoover another bully pulpit—and twenty-five distinguished 
civilians. When Javits and Humphrey introduced the bill it received wide press coverage 
and considerable public interest.262 The bill, however, languished in the Armed Services 
Committee, several Executive Branch departments dismissed it out of hand, and the 
White House claimed no such committee was needed since “such advice was already 
available to the President.”263 Henry Jackson and the White House did not agree on 
much, but one of Jackson’s aides admitted to Charles Haskins that the Javits-Humphrey 
idea was “a ‘grim piece of legislation.’”264 Even Nelson Rockefeller, who wholly 
embraced the need for national security reform, gently told Javits the idea was terrible.265 
Javits might have consoled himself with the fact that Rockefeller, too, failed to effect 																																																								
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change. Rockefeller, via the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, had commissioned a multi-
volume study of American foreign and domestic politics. The volumes that dealt with US 
foreign and military policy, though short, criticized both Eisenhower’s policies as well as 
how the Administration made decisions. The volumes were immensely popular when 
released.266 Given Rockefeller’s previous efforts, the study somewhat disingenuously 
noted, “There is reason to believe…that there is serious concern in both the executive and 
legislative branches as to whether the federal government is properly organized to 
conduct the nation’s business in the foreign policy field.”267 It even called for a joint 
Executive-Legislative study on the organizational and procedural aspects of foreign 
policy.268   
One, then, can understand why the trio of Fulbright, Russell, and Johnson 
possessed doubts. What could Jackson do that these far more prominent groups had failed 
to accomplish? Moreover, a series of Senate Committees—including Symington’s 1956 
investigation and Johnson’s own subcommittee investigation launched after Sputnik—
seemed to have already answered many of the questions Jackson wanted to ask.269 
Jackson was a junior senator encroaching on the territory of his superiors including, 
Johnson feared, the Texas senator’s own ambitions for higher office. Fulbright and 
Russell tried to dissuade Jackson by sending him down a procedural rabbit hole. 
Fulbright insisted that Jackson secure the agreement of Russell, head of the Senate 
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Armed Services committee, before starting any investigation.270 Russell, promptly, 
refused.271 Fulbright then claimed the matter was out of his hands and that Jackson 
should stay away from the field of foreign affairs, in part to avoid “the harassment of 
Executive Branch officials by duplicating Senate studies,” until after his own 
investigation was concluded in early 1960.272  
 Jackson struck back at Fulbright, and in doing so won a major procedural victory. 
In a strongly worded memo to the Senate Rules Committee, Jackson claimed Fulbright’s 
study “relates to the machinery for the formulation and administration of foreign policy 
only.” The SNPM, by contrast, would study “the integration of foreign, defense, and 
domestic policy…If [Fulbright] plans to have [his study] go beyond the field of foreign 
policy machinery, then [he] is exceeding [his] jurisdiction.”273 In a significant win, the 
Rules Committee sided with Jackson. If they had sided with Fulbright Jackson would, at 
the very least, have had to rethink his approach. It might have killed the SNPM outright. 
Instead, he could now bring S Res 115 to the Senate floor.  
Lyndon Johnson, however, remained in Jackson’s way. Though Jackson and 
Johnson collaborated on a variety of issues, their personal relationship could charitably 
be called frosty.274 Despite Jackson’s win, Johnson pleaded with him to halt the push for 
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S Res 115.275 Johnson also turned to a new ally in this battle: Dwight Eisenhower. The 
two had conspired before. Eisenhower worked with Johnson in 1954 to stop an 
amendment, brought by the right wing of the Republican Party, that would have curtailed 
the powers of the Executive Branch in foreign affairs. Since Johnson helped him deal 
with mutinous Republicans, Eisenhower seemed happy to help the Texan deal with 
upstart Democrats. Johnson also believed that too forceful an attack on Eisenhower’s 
foreign policy apparatus would make the party seem dangerously partisan and hurt the 
party’s electoral efforts.276 He might have had ulterior motives: on at least one occasion 
he lobbied Eisenhower to attack his then-Democratic Primary opponent John Kennedy.277 
If Jackson mounted a successful set of hearings, it might encourage his own presidential 
ambitions. Watching from down Pennsylvania Avenue, Eisenhower “expressed his 
displeasure at [Jackson’s] efforts…and made, in emphatic terms, an observation that 
there would be no investigation of the [NSC].”278 Eisenhower reiterated his feelings to 
the three Democrats. Russell urged the president to write a public letter accusing Jackson 
of being reckless.279 Eisenhower did just this, even using much of Russell’s own wording. 
He argued that Jackson’s investigation would “thrust Congressional investigative 
activities deeply into the Nation’s highest national security and foreign policy 
deliberative process which traditionally as well as Constitutionally have remained within 
the province of the Chief Executive[.] [I]n the interest of our national security… further 																																																								
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action on [S Res 115 should] be indefinitely withheld.”280 To follow this up, the White 
House’s Congressional liaison spent two hours in Jackson’s office trying to reason with 
the senator.281 At the same time, the White House worked on a backup plan. Gordon Gray 
acknowledged that, while “all reasonable effort [should] be made to avoid the adoption of 
[S Res 115]…it is recommended that the Executive Branch be prepared to cooperate in a 
limited way with the Jackson Committee.”282  
 Jackson, however, seemed to bow to the pressure. Publically he changed his tone 
considerably, now saying that S Res 115 was not an investigation but a “non-partisan, 
undramatic and unsensational study.”283 He did not anticipate any hearings and said that 
he expected the study would be “constructive help, not destructive.”284 Moreover, 
Jackson reached out to a series of Republicans, promising to review their own proposals 
for improving the NSC and giving a bipartisan sheen to his efforts.285 The White House 
remained suspicious of Jackson’s motives and explanations. Even as Jackson claimed in 
writing that he planned no hearings, the White House noted that he called for them in his 
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public statements.286 Yet, the White House admitted that the actions of Johnson and 
Russell seemed to calm Jackson. Eisenhower thanked the two for their help.287  
The President, however, sought to put the final nail in Jackson’s coffin. He agreed 
to let S Res 115 pass if Jackson accepted a series of rules governing the study.288 During 
the first half of July 1959, Jackson, his staff, and White House officials worked to shape 
these guidelines. The White House, curiously, seemed happy to adopt many of Jackson’s 
own suggested rules.289 In large part, they did so because their modifications seemed to 
declaw Jackson’s efforts: Jackson would conduct a study, not an investigation, and 
members of the Executive Branch would not be compelled to testify about substantive 
policy, only “purposes, composition, organization, and procedures.” The White House 
also demanded that any sensitive testimony be taken in Executive session and reserved 
the right to strike any sensitive testimony from the public record.290 In essence, the 
guidelines sought to accomplish two goals: prevent current officials from talking about 
policy and focus any testimony almost entirely on organization and structure. Eisenhower 
perhaps hoped that forcing Jackson to look exclusively at organization would simply bore 
everyone to death. Government officials testifying about org charts would not make for 
gripping news. 
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 In essence, the guidelines sought to accomplish two goals: to prevent current 
officials from talking about policy and to focus any testimony almost entirely on 
organization and structure. This was Eisenhower’s way of reversing the strategy he used 
on the Hoover Committee five years earlier. In that case, compelling the committee to 
focus on policy, not organization, proved highly effective in limiting its influence. If right 
wing ranting about government overreach killed Herbert Hoover’s crusade in 1955, 
Eisenhower hoped that forcing Jackson to look exclusively at organization would simply 
bore everyone to death in 1960. Government officials testifying about committee 
organization would not make for gripping news. 
 Yet the guidelines hewed to a distinction that, at best, appeared hazy. They said 
the Executive Branch officials could talk about “their own policies or activities but 
without reference to substantive considerations of such matters by the [NSC].”291 How 
could an official discuss his policies without discussing the Administration’s policies or 
events of the time? That contradiction became even clearer several months later. When 
Jackson asked to test the NSC machinery by running a hypothetical paper through it, the 
White House staff asked “how far you could go with a hypothetical example[?]” Even a 
superficial discussion might involve “the substance of current policies as well.”292 
Another official commented that Jackson’s guidelines “did not appear to offer [Federal] 
agencies much protection.”293 For whatever reason, the White House dismissed these 
legitimate concerns. It seemed convinced Jackson could not outmaneuver the obstacles in 																																																								
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their agreement or, if he did, it would not matter. But the White House failed to 
understand that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent Jackson from 
discussing organization separately from policy. Jackson deliberately built in this 
loophole. After only a week or two of negotiating, Eisenhower clearly felt he had bested 
the Senator from Washington when Jackson agreed to the guidelines. Once Eisenhower 
gave his permission, Lyndon Johnson expedited the vote on S Res 115. On July 14, 1959 
the GOC formed Jackson’s Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. Eleven says 
later it held its first meeting. In addition to Jackson, the GOC seconded Hubert Humphrey 
and later Edmund Muskie (D-MN) to serve at Jackson’s side. Karl Mundt (R-SD) served 
as the ranking minority member. 
 The Administration prepared to work with Jackson, but kept an eye on the 
Senator. The White House assigned Charles Haskins from the NSC staff to liaise with 
Jackson. If the SNPM held hearings, Haskins had the right to veto discussions of 
sensitive subject matters, both during the live testimony and in editing the transcript of 
the Executive Sessions. Eisenhower expected Haskins to be an active adversarial 
presence, though warned him to “not challenge [Jackson] but…to point out where 
he…thought they were getting close” to discussing restricted information. Despite this 
message, the President seemed unusually confident that this would not be necessary. He 
told Haskins “Of course, nobody is going to get into the substance of national security 
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matter; that is out of bounds…NSC discussions is advice given to the President and as 
such is privileged.”294  
In addition to Haskins, other Republican eyes would watch Jackson. Karl Mundt 
served on the SNPM from its creation while Jacob Javits joined in January 1960. Some 
aspects of Mundt’s background fit the mold of a conservative Republican by standards of 
the 1940s and 1950s. Until late in the Second World War his views on foreign affairs 
might best be described as belonging to a pure strain of Taftian thought.295 He served on 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities in the late 1940s. When he arrived in 
the Senate he requested a variety of committee appointments. Most of those were turned 
down and he, too, ended up on the GOC.296 There he became one of Joseph McCarthy’s 
closest allies during the McCarthy hearings. 
Despite his hard-line appearance, he became an early advocate of several 
internationalist causes. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the UN, being one of the 
major American champions of UNESCO, and also wanted the body to have greater 
powers to stop war.297 He even tried to have UN headquarters established in Rapid City, 
South Dakota.298 He played a major role in the formation of the US Information Agency, 
the Voice of America, and educational exchange programs with Latin American 
nations.299 He unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a peace between the Army and McCarthy 
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and, very reluctantly, took over as chair of the Army-McCarthy hearings.300 Mundt could 
be considered a reliable and loyal Republican. But he was no attack dog. John Kennedy 
apparently jokingly referred to him as the “Leaning Tower of Putty.”301 Jackson and his 
staff often went out of their way to ensure Mundt felt included in the deliberations.302 
Even if Mundt rarely acted in an overtly partisan manner, Jackson worked hard to 
neutralize the Senator from South Dakota.  
  Mundt, to his credit, attempted to hold the line against Jackson once the partisan 
nature of the hearings became clear. He spoke out in the Senate in support of Eisenhower, 
and did his best to work with the White House to mitigate any damage. Yet, Mundt was 
distracted by a close race back in South Dakota against George McGovern, necessitating 
frequent trips back home. Mundt’s eventual victory in November was hardly a forgone 
conclusion during the SNPM’s hearings.303 Of the twenty-eight hearings held by Jackson 
between February and July 1960, Mundt only attended ten. As he admitted, “These past 
few months have been particularly busy for me.”304 
 The Republican cause was not helped much when the membership of the SNPM 
was suddenly expanded in January 1960. Jackson got the help of Edmund Muskie, who 
attended most of the Subcommittee’s hearings and proved an able ally to Jackson. 
Mundt’s Republican reinforcement proved less helpful. Jacob Javits, while a fine Senator, 
brought little to the proceedings. He acted as the Republican representative during 																																																								
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Mundt’s absence, but was far less active outside of the hearings. In large part Javits was 
also an awkward ally for Mundt. Javits’ own doubts about the NSC system were well 
known. Indeed one of Javits’ own staff members noted that Jackson’s War College 
speech “brought out exactly the points [Javits] had been making with regard to general 
policy.”305 At one point Javits even complimented Jackson saying, “I think our chairman 
has done a great service in being the spark plug which brought about [the SNPM].”306 
While Javits played some role, the SNPM was not his main focus. In hindsight, finding 
reliable allies was the least of Mundt’s concerns. Well before any testimony took place, 
Jackson worked to put the Republicans at a disadvantage. 
 
Scoop’s Troops 
Even before S Res 115 passed the Senate, Jackson was setting the stage for the 
upcoming investigations. At the first meeting of the SNPM, Jackson reiterated that his 
objective was to conduct a non-partisan study “without going into substantive matters.” 
He expected the study would last roughly a year. If he held hearings, he noted, they 
would not take place before February 1960.307 Jackson also laid down the ground rules: 
over the next several months the Subcommittee staff would conduct interviews and 
commission a series of staff studies. With this bipartisan lip service out of the way, 
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Jackson and the committee set about creating a staff for the SNPM. In a matter of 
minutes Jackson, without a single objection from Mundt, stacked the deck in his favor.   
 In the 1950s and 1960s, Senate staffs were small. While important, they had a 
more limited role. Jackson, however, always depended heavily on his staff and developed 
a large one by the standards of the day. He leveraged this to his advantage. The SNPM’s 
Republicans and the Democrats could each appointment staffers to work on the 
subcommittee’s studies. In a reflection of his view of the SNPM, Mundt believed all he 
needed was one staffer. The White House recommended Edward Pendleton, a 
Washington lawyer. Though Pendleton seemed to have a firm legal mind, had 
government experience, and was knowledgeable on matters of national security matters, 
it would be a stretch to call him an expert. Moreover, Pendleton only worked on a part-
time basis until January, 1960.308 He expected to be full time from January to June, after 
which he would leave the committee.309 He would not be needed longer since this would 
not be a drawn out affair.  
By contrast, Jackson brought on three highly experienced staffers: J. Kenneth 
Mansfield, Robert Tufts, and Dorothy Fosdick. Pendleton proved outmatched in the face 
of such opposition. Tufts and Fosdick combined real world experience with solid 
academic credentials. Like Paul Nitze, both found themselves expelled from State’s 
Policy Planning Staff after Eisenhower took office. Tufts, an OSS veteran, left PPS 
during the 1952 election to work for Adlai Stevenson. After Stevenson’s loss, Tufts 
found himself unemployed. Stevenson, however, got him a job at Oberlin College. Tufts 																																																								
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did not lose his anger at Dulles and Eisenhower, observing from Ohio that the State 
Department’s morale was “low and sinking.” He missed policy matters, though.310 Tufts, 
a rather low-key individual, ended up being the principal draftsman for many of the 
SNPM’s written work.  
The historic record paints J. Kenneth Mansfield as a bland functionary. Even 
White House staffers, suspicious of the entire Jackson enterprise, commented that 
Mansfield seemed interested in just the facts.311 In reality, he combined insider 
knowledge of Congress due to a long stint in as a staffer, with organizational skill. In 
many respects, he was the brains behind the investigation.312 Jackson used Mansfield’s 
insight and experience to fight off both the White House and Senate Democrats.313 
Moreover, Mansfield gave Jackson an advantage that other investigations like the SNPM 
lacked: Mansfield had in-depth technical knowledge of nuclear weapons from previous 
work. That, in turn, allowed Jackson to introduce a serious discussion of science and 
technology into the proceedings.314 This line of attack proved crucial in the shadow of 
Sputnik and debates over the Missile Gap.  
By far the most intriguing of Jackson’s staffers was Dorothy Fosdick. If Tufts 
drafted many of the memos, and Mansfield served as the political brains, Fosdick acted as 
Jackson’s alter ego. She easily ranks as one of the most influential women in American 
foreign policy in the postwar years. There were others, but in the ’50s and ’60s the club 																																																								
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was small. Her time with Jackson not only included the SNPM but years later she 
mentored the first generation of neoconservative thinkers, several of whom worked on 
Jackson’s staff. Much of Fosdick’s day-to-day role remained buried in the shadows. Her 
choices, however, showed a clear logic. Behind the scenes, she could exercise a 
tremendous amount of power without drawing attention to herself. Fosdick did not 
always follow Louis Brownlow’s advice that a good staffer should have a passion for 
anonymity: she was happy to get into a fight if needed.315 She always relished her role as 
Jackson’s main foreign policy staffer. 
 Fosdick joined the State Department in 1942, rising quickly through the ranks and 
gaining notice along the way.316 Early on, she played a key role the American effort to 
plan for the UN.317 Her reputation and experience also helped her survive a stint in 
State’s Bureau of European Affairs. Never a “self-conscious feminist,” Fosdick described 
her new assignment as “a tough, man-controlled, anti-feminist environment.”318 Fosdick, 
however, thrived, quickly being promoted to George Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff. He 
brought her on as a UN expert, though Fosdick suspected that “he also seemed to think it 
was time to have a woman there.”319 Kennan, in Fosdick’s words, “was the prince” of the 
PPS staff and she his confidante. When times got bad, Kennan subjected Fosdick to 																																																								
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lunches where he would “pour his heart out” to her.320 When Paul Nitze took over the 
PPS, however, “we were all equals.”321 Fosdick was part of the most influential staff in 
the most influential foreign policy section of the American government. She was the 
woman with the most power in the preparation of policy.322 When asked how other 
women might emulate her success, she admitted that her own rise would be hard to 
replicate: “It’s hard to say. In fact, I don’t know. Work, I suppose, is the key to any 
success. But, I guess there isn’t any sure way.”323  
 During the 1952 election, Fosdick became both Adlai Stevenson’s advisor and 
paramour.324 After his loss, and their breakup, Fosdick decided she had to leave the State 
Department.325 In part this was because she did not like John Foster Dulles. Though he 
had connections with Fosdick’s family back to the 1920s, she had a negative opinion of 
the incoming Secretary and could not stand the idea of serving with “that odd 
man…Dulles.”326 After two years in the wilderness, she met Henry Jackson in 1954. 
Jackson quickly hired her. Both were wonkish workaholics, laboring for long hours with 
little respite.327 Jackson’s views on foreign policy were very similar to those of Fosdick, 
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whose Christian realism called for America to confront the Soviet Union and uphold 
democracy. Fosdick also combined academic credentials with real world experience and 
her time in PPS provided direct connections to the elite of the foreign policy 
establishment. For Fosdick, Jackson was a rising star and an entré back into the policy 
field. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, Fosdick reveled being “in the arena.”328 When 
a staffer later asked her why she never returned to academia she said it paled in 
comparison to being involved in policy matters.329 As Henry Jackson’s wife later 
commented, Fosdick “preferred shaping policy to just studying it.”330 
She quickly developed an outsized role on Jackson’s staff, organizing it into a 
group playfully called “Scoop’s Troops.” Richard Perle, later a staffer, said “under 
[Fosdick’s] command [w]e learned that you don’t go home until the job was done and the 
job wasn’t done until no one could think of any way to do it better.”331 In part this was 
due to her incredible energy: one acquaintance described her as “a dynamo” while 
another called her “a little ball of fire.”332 While she had a jovial streak (see Figure 2, p. 
114), she played her cards close to the vest. Delineating exactly how she influenced 
policy can be difficult.333 Behind the scenes, Fosdick acted as a liaison with many of her 
former colleagues and members of the foreign policy elite. For instance, she solicited 
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opinions from Paul Nitze during the debate over S Res 115.334 Fosdick, however, was 
aware that her gender made her vulnerable. She was a woman working in a world 
dominated by men. When a staffer new to Jackson’s office and who knew little of 
Fosdick, offered to help “Mrs. Fosdick” move some material she stopped him: “You may 
call me Dickie or you may call me Dr. Fosdick.” Though she made this request in a 
friendly tone, it served a direct purpose. Dickie designated her an insider, a member of 
the club. Dr. Fosdick spoke to her intellectual authority and credentials. “Mrs.” was not 
only incorrect, given her education, but also marked her out as an other.335 
Why do these three people matter? In an era of small Senate staffs, Jackson 
stocked the SMPM with a series professionals who were experts in their field, many with 
an axe to grind against John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower’s policy machinery. Jackson 
and the staff worked long hours—one of the staffers said the SNPM resembled a graduate 
level seminar—interviewing over 100 people including business leaders, diplomats, 
academics, military officers, and government officials.336 Twice that number received 
surveys asking for their opinion.337 The SNPM’s interviews and questionnaires did not 
come across as nakedly partisan. Yet, the very broadness of their questions—asking for 
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the recipients’ “spontaneous view on the strengths and weaknesses of the present 
machinery…and [their] proposals for specific changes”— invited critical thought.338  
Through their efforts, it quickly became clear just how many Democrats and 
Republicans doubted the wisdom of Eisenhower’s system. That word quickly spread. 
Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew Ridgway, already an Eisenhower critic, was 
contacted twice by Jackson’s staff.339 Ridgeway then took the material he wrote for 
Jackson, and sent it to friends, including the current Army Chief of Staff.340 Ridgway 
claimed that this was mainly advisory in nature, “for your personal files (including, of 
course, the waste-paper bucket).”341 In doing so, he not only expressed his displeasure 
with the Eisenhower Administration, but helped legitimize Jackson’s ideas and mission 
among influential colleagues. One retired general wrote back, “The President should see 
[your] letter.”342  
Jackson also took his message on the road, for both public and private audiences, 
during the fall and winter of 1959. He pitched his ideas, with the help of Fosdick and 
Mansfield, to an approving audience at the Council on Foreign Relations.343 At this 
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dinner Ferdinand Eberstadt, the prime author of the National Security Act of 1947, even 
remarked that NSC was flawed and “it seemed…its provisions had not been carried 
out.”344 Jackson later used the annual convention of the American Political Science 
Association to meet with luminaries in the national security field.345 Simultaneously, and 
no doubt in covert coordination with Jackson and the SNPM staff, Paul Nitze faced off 
with Gordon Gray on a panel discussing the utility of the NSC.346 It did not go well for 
Gray, who admitted that “had I known [in April about the SNPM], I probably would have 
not accepted the invitation.”347 In addition to speeches, Jackson reached a larger public 
audience when, late February 1960, he appeared on Meet the Press to discuss the 
SNPM’s investigations. It was a busy fall.348 
Despite all the behind-the-scenes work, the SNPM thus far had little to show for 
its efforts. 349 The staff released a seven-page report in October and a slightly longer 
version in January.350 Neither were stinging indictments and neither of caused any panic 
in the White House. This seemed to confirm that Eisenhower’s strategy was working. 
Officials continued to expect that Jackson would produce a dull report, a belief that lulled 
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Edward Pendleton, for instance showed little concern. He believed their work was “a 
very fair statement, concentrating on substantive problems and without yet committing 
the staff to any particular point of view. The main purpose seems to be to raise questions, 
rather than answer them.”351 After meeting with Robert Cutler, Pendleton wrote Mundt 
that “With witnesses like him available, the Subcommittee will have to go a long way to 
ignore the facts.”352 Pendleton also believed that Gordon Gray was building an ironclad 
defense for the Administration, writing that Gray “demonstrated rather clearly that the 
machinery is operating well and leaves little area for criticism.”353 Others agreed that the 
SNPM’s initial findings seemed to be non-partisan. The CIA commented that Jackson’s 
interim report was, despite its brevity, “intelligent and comprehensive.”354 Even Robert 
Culter approved, writing: “Perhaps I am losing my grip, but…the entire climate is 
different...They [Jackson’s staff] talk now unfavorably of making…statuary changes to 
the National Security Act. They talk about [it] as we would, I think. [Jackson] seemed 
intelligent, friendly, and disposed to live up to the ‘agreement,’ I would say.”355 Only 
Karl Harr warned that, “a large part of [J.K.] Mansfield’s efforts had been aimed at 
disarming” the White House.356 
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Jackson embraced the image of the well-intentioned senator. He seemed to 
vacillate on whether he even planned to hold hearings.357 Either by omission or 
commission, Pendleton and Haskins had little to add to this murky picture.358 When, in 
mid-February 1960 Jackson finally announced that he would hold hearings, and issued a 
list of witnesses, only Haskins expressed concern. But the White House took little to no 
action.359 The White House seemingly remained convinced Jackson could not make any 
of his investigations newsworthy or interesting. With the benefit of an historian’s 
hindsight, however, we can see that the SNPM staff spent the fall and winter of 1959 
preparing the ground for an attack on the Eisenhower Administration. Indeed, as early as 
July 1959 the SNPM’s Democratic staff outlined all the changes they hoped (or planned) 
to recommend, seven months before they even held their first hearing.360 Jackson 
probably knew more about the inner workings of the Eisenhower White House than many 
people who worked there. After all this work, Jackson now prepared for a public forum to 
display of the SNPM’s work.  
 
Legislative Investigation at its Very Best 
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Two scholars have theorized that congressional investigations take one of two 
forms: those that fight fires (respond to specific events) and “police-patrolling” 
investigations that monitor policy and agencies.361 Jackson’s committee falls squarely 
into the “police-patrolling” category. Even here, however, it stands out. When one 
considers the two other major organizational investigations in the post-1960 period, the 
Tower Commission after Iran Contra and the 9/11 Commission, both were more of the 
firefighting type: responding to specific events. Other notable police-patrolling 
investigations might include Fulbright’s hearings on the Vietnam War or the Church and 
Pike Committees’ investigations of the CIA. In some respects, Jackson’s investigation 
makes complete sense in the context of the Church and Pike Committees. It was, after all, 
an attempt to review and recommend improvements to the nation’s policy machinery. 
Yet, as can be seen with the Tower and 9/11 Commissions, most organizational 
investigations take place after a major event. This puts the SNPM in a unique position. It 
did not take its mandate from one specific event or series of events. Nor was it engaging 
with one specific federal agency or organization. It sought to be all encompassing.  
Jackson selected Robert Lovett to be the SNPM’s first witness precisely because 
he had been involved in so many aspects of America’s national security bureaucracy. 
Robert Lovett almost personified the development of the national security state. The 
impressive list of posts he held included assistant to the Secretary of War, Secretary of 
War for Air, Undersecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of 
Defense from 1951 to 1953. Though a registered Republican, he served in Democratic 
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administrations. By 1960, he was happy to be in civilian life—government service had 
wrecked his “glass insides” —but he remained worried about Eisenhower’s foreign and 
defense policies.362 Like others, Lovett grew concerned about an overreliance on nuclear 
weapons and an atrophy in conventional capabilities.363 On the other end of the spectrum, 
he considered the CIA’s covert action agenda counter-productive. As early as 1956 he 
warned Eisenhower about this, but to no avail.364 In this environment, Lovett gravitated 
towards Henry Jackson. Not only did Jackson say the right things—his National War 
College Speech, for instance, echoed many of Lovett’s own thoughts—but his 
connections to prominent Democrats gave him further cachet. Jackson’s logic in choosing 
Lovett as the SNPM’s first witnesses is clear: his background and sterling bipartisan 
credentials were just what the committee needed.365 Lovett accepted, and worked on the 
testimony for several weeks and previewed it to a trusted handful of individuals.366 
 The White House and Congressional Republicans, meanwhile, seemed blissfully 
unaware. At a meeting on the SNPM on January 7, 1960—its first since August 1959—
Jackson let slip two important facts. First, he admitted that the SNPM’s study, originally 
slated to take twelve months, would certainly last longer. Second, he revealed a plan to 
have several months of hearings. On February 12, Jackson’s office issued a press release 
announcing that the SNPM would soon hold its first round of hearings. After a briefing 
by CIA director Allen Dulles, Lovett would testify on February 23, followed by three 																																																								
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other witnesses over the next two days.367 Neither Mundt nor the White House expressed 
much concern over any of this.  
 Lovett’s testimony started inauspiciously: three of the five members of the SNPM 
could not attend. When Humphrey, busy campaigning, asked that the hearing be moved 
to the evening of February 23, Jackson refused, citing the busy schedules of those 
testifying.368 Perhaps this was true, but Jackson was chasing headlines. He packed the 
hearing room with TV cameras to record the hearings for the nightly news.369 After a 
glowing introduction by Jackson, Lovett dove into his prepared remarks. Lovett prefaced 
his statement by stating that his views would focus on the “fields of Government 
operations in which I served some years ago” and that “it should be clear that none of 
these observations [are] intended to be critical of any individuals or operational 
decisions.”370 He added that “government has now become gigantic at the very moment 
in history when time itself is not merely a measure, or a dimension, but perhaps the 
difference between life and death.” Lovett then listed a litany of issues: the Pentagon had 
become a politically partisan institution; its officials generally made poor decisions; there 
was too much turnover in key positions; cooperation between the Pentagon and State 
Department was poor; NSC bureaucracy had minimized the power of the Secretary of 
State (who was often overwhelmed with minutia anyway); an obsession with 
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organization hurt decision-making. As Lovett noted, “no organizational chart is a 
substitute for a sense of common goals.”371 
Lovett took care to note that organization and machinery were not inherently bad. 
Indeed, he felt much of the existing government organization could work with only minor 
tweaks.372 To win the Cold War, however, the country needed more than minor tweaks. It 
needed a set of goals. It needed better morale. It needed to make sacrifices—specifically 
higher taxes—to keep up with the Soviets. While he did not directly attack Eisenhower, 
Lovett noted that “I feel that [today] we are doing something short of our best.”373 
 Instead of pontificating, Jackson used his question time to let Lovett elaborate on 
his main points. Mundt asked Lovett just how he proposed the nation pay for a bigger 
defense budget. Lovett said taxes needed to be higher, while noting “Senator Mundt, I 
loathe taxes.” Mundt shot back, “That does not put you as a member of a very exclusive 
club.”374 Lovett struck back at the South Dakotan and asked if the nation could fund 
greater military expenditures not by raising taxes, but by cutting agricultural subsidies. 
Mundt seemingly gave up. In Executive Session later that day, Lovett continued his 
attacks. He concluded his remarks saying of the NSC, “I…have grave doubts about its 
ability to operate…I think it would inhibit frank discussion. I think it would be an 
embarrassment as regards [to] the vigor with which a man might want to defend his 
position. I think it would limit the quality of the debate which the President ought to 
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hear.”375 In the Truman era, Lovett claimed, meetings ran “for whatever number of hours 
were necessary in order to exhaust a subject and not just exhaust the listeners.” Once a 
decision was made there was no need for an elaborate monitoring mechanism: “That was 
that. You had your orders. You went out and did your job.”376 Minority Counsel Edward 
Pendleton the only Republican present, mounted only a limited defense of the 
Administration.  
 The next day Robert Sprague and James Baxter—both Gaither Committee 
alums—continued the assault. Both argued that Eisenhower had ignored that group’s 
recommendations and, in doing so, made America vulnerable. Sprague warned that “one 
of our basic problems today stems from the failure of most Americans to realize that we 
have actually been at war since 1946.”377 Sprague argued that “barriers to communication 
in the Government are high and complicated” and that these barriers often kept decision-
makers from getting important information. Sprague also accused Eisenhower of 
withholding critical information from the public. Sprague, a self-confessed “conservative 
Republican,” also argued Americans should embrace higher taxes to fund defense 
spending.378 When Mundt asked Sprague if prominent citizens like him bore some 
responsibility for communicating the size of the Soviet threat, Sprague answered: “I think 
there is one man in [America] who can do this effectively, and that is the President.” 
Sprague added, “I believe…that the danger is more serious than the President has 
expressed himself to the public. I do not know whether he feels this or whether he does 																																																								
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not. But I do not believe that the concern I personally feel has as yet been expressed by 
the President to the…public.”379 Towards the end of the question period Jackson 
prompted Sprague to reiterated the major findings of the Gaither Committee.  
Later that day James Baxter, a diplomatic historian and president of Williams 
College, continued the attack. Compared to Sprague, Baxter spoke glowingly of 
Eisenhower. But Baxter also warned that America could expect a bleak future if it did not 
increase the size of the defense budget. He cautioned that, if confronted by the Soviets, 
“judging by [America’s] emphasis on… nuclear [weapons] as compared to conventional 
weapons, both the British and ourselves would either have to use nuclear weapons or lose 
the game.”380 Baxter lamented “I am not advocating we waste anything, for that is not in 
the nature of a New England Yankee. I am willing to pay more taxes if it is necessary to 
do the things we need to do, and I believe that our entire people would feel the same way 
if they realized all that was at stake.”381 
The next day Thomas Watson, CEO of IBM, took his turn in front of Jackson. 
The participation of another CEO in this hearing speaks to an important point: 
Eisenhower’s many advisory panels were stocked with CEOs, investment bankers, 
scientists, and academics. In contrast to Kennedy’s White House, which embraced its ties 
to the intellectual community, these panels served as both advisory commissions and 
avenues by which Eisenhower could perform outreach to businesses, scientists, and 
universities. The testimony before the SNPM showed how that could backfire. Watson, 
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though not a member of the Gaither Committee, ran one of the most important 
technology companies in the nation. Instead of endorsing Eisenhower, he reiterated the 
message of Sprague and Baxter, focusing on what he perceived as the growing scientific 
and technological gap between the US and the Soviets. Speaking as a successful CEO, he 
also took a swipe at Eisenhower’s national security bureaucracy: “The responsible 
leaders must have complete authority and responsibility…They must be able to stop 
study and discussion at any point…Study and review beyond a certain point in the 
decision-making process of a business merely delays the decision and confuses the 
issue.”382 Unlike Sprague and Baxter, however, Watson believed the Cold War could be 
good, as seen in this exchange with Jackson: 
Watson: I would think that the need to compete with the Soviets, if we accept the 
challenge, could be one of the greatest things to happen to [America] in a long time. 
 
Jackson: Rather than abhor this competition, we might welcome it with the realization 
that we could be a stronger and a richer and a better country for it.   
 
Watson: Yes, sir.383  
 
Throughout all this Mundt and Javits did little to contain the damage. Perhaps this was 
malpractice, on their part. Or, perhaps, neither wanted to closely align himself with the 
foundering White House. Whatever the case, their questioning never managed to trip up 
the witnesses in any meaningful way. The all-Republican line-up of Lovett, Sprague, 
Baxter, and Watson used impressive credentials to deliver a crushing message. Moreover, 
they represented a diverse set of backgrounds—government service, big business, 
academia, and the scientific community. All suggested that the Soviets were stronger and 																																																								
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more dangerous than people realized and highlighted America’s vulnerability. All hinted 
that Eisenhower bore some responsibility, and most argued the extensive NSC system 
was hurting, rather than helping the nation. Whether one agreed with the assessment or 
not, their claim was hard to dismiss out of hand. 
 The White House was furious, with Lovett getting the most direct anger. Gordon 
Gray quickly contacted Lovett to get a better explanation of his comments. Lovett told 
Gray that, as his preface stated, his testimony was supposedly drawn from notes he wrote 
eight years before.384 Lovett gave a similar explanation when Mundt wrote him 
demanding a clarification. Lovett noted, “my use of the expression ‘the President’ meant 
‘a President”, or ‘any President’, not specifically [Eisenhower].”385 Though he pled 
ignorance, Lovett added: “in view of the public interest [in the SNPM], it is not 
surprising to find some agencies or individuals who feel that the shoe might fit. I know of 
no way to keep them from trying it on for size.”386 That type of answer did little to calm 
anyone in the White House. Eisenhower was angry. He spent weeks talking to Gray about 
the issue.387 The minutes are vague about what exactly Eisenhower said during these 
meetings. Like with so much of his presidency, Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” is 
sometimes hard to discern. Even if we cannot know his exact reactions, the memos of 
Gray, Haskins, and others convey the impression they were unhappy. It seems entirely 
																																																								
384 Gray to Lovett, 3/15/60, WHO: Staff Secretary Records, Subject Series, Alpha Subseries, Box 17, 
Lovett Testimony [February-March 1960] (3), DDE. 
385 Mundt to Lovett 3/30/60 and Lovett to Mundt 4/4/60, KM, RGIII, Box 570, Gov Ops Committee, Misc, 
1957-1962, FF6, DSU. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Memorandum of Meeting with the President 3/9, 3/15, and 3/21 WHO, Office of the SANSA, Special 
Assistants Series, Pres Subseries, Box 4, 1960-Meetings with the President-Volume I (5), DDE. 
 	
105 
reasonable that their displeasure was caused by, and perhaps mimicked, Eisenhower’s 
own displeasure.  
What really upset the White House, however, was the press coverage. The print 
media had a field day with the combined Lovett/Sprague/Baxter/Watson testimony. 
Edward Pendleton compiled a four-page digest of purely negative press quotations.388 
The New York Times wrote extensively about Lovett, reprinted two extensive excerpts of 
his testimony, and called called Jackson’s hearing “legislative investigation at its very 
best.”389 The Washington Post claimed “No one can accuse Robert A. Lovett of playing 
partisan politics” and applauded the SNPM’s “extremely thoughtful and nonparsitan 
job.”390 Walter Lippmann’s column on Lovett’s testimony implied that Eisenhower’s 
extensive national security bureaucracy made decisions for the president.391 The Times 
and Post were not alone in covering the hearings.392 NBC recorded the testimony and 
broadcast portions of it with the nightly news. Jackson’s appearance on Meet the Press, 
where he furthered his critique of the Administration, took place only a few days after 
Lovett’s testimony. Jackson came out of all this looking evenhanded and avoiding the 
partisan critiques that had doomed Symington years earlier. When the Brookings 
Institution, for instance, wanted to have something placed in the Congressional Record, 
they considered reaching out the Jackson since he was “objective.”393 
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That was just the beginning. The SNPM’s hearings ran for four more months. 
Jackson accumulated damaging testimony from twenty-eight more witnesses. During a 
series of hearings on science and technology, even a more optimistic witness admitted 
that “the USSR does not seem to be lagging much behind us and it is ahead of us in many 
regards.”394 A group that testified on the retention of talent in the Federal government 
painted a picture of a system that, if not broken, did little to keep bright individuals in 
government service. In June, Jackson unleashed a veritable who’s who of anti-
Eisenhower foreign policy intellectuals: W. Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Paul 
Nitze, and Maxwell Taylor. All provided damning assessments of a broken system. 
Throughout this entire process other Gaither Committee alums—like Nitze, Baxter, and 
Sprague—testified, allowing Jackson to continuously re-examine that Committee’s 
findings and grievances.  
While the intense press interest in the SNPM slackened, it became something of 
an investigatory ulcer for the White House. No matter what it tried, it could not stop the 
bleeding. Some junior members of the Administration seem to have been truly surprised 
“by the misconceptions which had been reported in the press.”395 One staffer noted before 
the hearings that “there have been continuous changes to the NSC   
machinery….Therefore, anyone who does not have up-to-date personal experience with 
the NSC…cannot be thoroughly familiar with the present procedures and processes.”396 																																																								
394 Testimony of Eugene P. Wigner, 4/27/60 in Organizing for National Security Vol. I. 
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That comment points to the problem. The NSC system was too difficult to describe to the 
public. That did not stop the White House from making strange choices. It took a frantic 
request from Mundt before the White House provided him with a list of “non-partisan, 
non-Administration witnesses…to testify along lines which will be favorable to the 
Administration.”397 Mundt’s staff tried to do their best, but with so little help they seemed 
to be grasping at straws. His chief of staff suggested the White House could ghost-write a 
piece for Mundt that could introduce into the Congressional record. “It then is [a] 
Document with a look of officialdom [which] could set [forth] the Administration’s 
position most clearly.”398 Mundt also made at least two speeches on the Senate floor 
defending both Eisenhower and the NSC system.399 Somewhat surprisingly, Mundt 
seemed mildly shocked by Jackson’s actions, telling a friend that “Jackson…seems to be 
using the subcommittee as a forum to advance the argument that [America] is lagging 
in…military preparedness.”400 Mundt, however, clearly agreed with some of what he was 
hearing. For example, he approvingly sent three friends a copy of James Baxter’s 
testimony.401  
  Instead of sending “non-partisan, non-Administration witnesses,” the White 
House first dispatched former SANSAs Robert Cutler and Dillon Anderson. Cutler, 
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especially, felt certain he could “set the record straight.”402 They failed. The White House 
sent the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
front of the SNPM for little gain. Charles Haskins tried to limit the damage: sending high 
profile figures to testify before the SNPM did little to clarify the issues and returned 
coverage to page 1.403 Jackson cut down several other pro-White House witnesses with 
questions they simply could not answer well. As Edward Pendleton noted, the White 
House’s witnesses “seemed unable to present progress and accomplishments of [the] 
Administration.” Perhaps, he somewhat bizarrely theorized, this was because of the 
witnesses “excessive modesty.”404 About the only positive point was that the White 
House managed to plant a few positive stories in newspapers and that the TV channels 
stopped covering the hearings.405   
For Charles Haskins, the process was Sisyphean in nature. Each day he had to 
watch the testimony, write a summary of it for his White House superiors, then re-read 
the transcript to make sure no one violated Jackson’s agreement with Eisenhower. He had 
to sit and watch a respected bipartisan group criticize his bosses and the system they had 
worked to create. In large part, however, the White House created its own problem.406 
They were unwilling to acknowledge any issues with the system.407 Deep down, many 
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clearly believed the system, however broken, could work.408 Yet they proved unable to 
convey this adequately in public. The contradiction can be seen clearly in one of Charles 
Haskins’ memos. Haskins, in critiquing George Kennan’s testimony, notes “Mr. Kennan 
seems…to overlook the fact that it is the President [not the NSC] who [sets policy].”409 
That was true. But neither the public nor many experts would have been able to divine 
that simple point from the testimony of Administration officials.  
As if the White House did not have enough to worry about, on May 1, 1960 the 
Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ U-2. Jackson jumped on the U-2 incident and 
incorporated this dramatic policy failure into his line of questions. Lyndon Johnson 
praised Jackson on the Senate floor for his actions.410 John McClellan demanded that the 
NSC be abolished since, as he argued, it was clearly ineffective.411 The SNPM returned 
to the front page. One columnist suggested that the U-2 incident proved what Jackson had 
been saying all along: Eisenhower’s Administration was broken.412 In light of the U-2 
incident the SNPM staff quickly drew up a report critical of Eisenhower’s handling of 
intelligence. The committee’s Republicans, equally frustrated with the White House, 
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joined with Jackson and the Democrats in a unanimously agreed-upon statement against 
the Administration’s handling of intelligence matters.413 
Sitting in the EOB, Charles Haskins readied his superiors for the U-2 memo. He 
knew it was coming. Edward Pendleton had warned him that something was up, but 
“honorably [chose] not to divulge to me the content of the paper in question.”414 Haskins 
wryly added: “It goes without saying that the paper can be expected to be critical of the 
Administration, possibly (1) with respect to its actual policies; (2) as regards the current 
operation of the national policy machinery; or (3) as to some phase of the way in which 
the U-2 incident was handled.”415 He was correct on all three counts. Pendleton left the 
SNPM staff in June and returned to his day job as a Washington lawyer. As he left he 
wrote Gordon Gray a letter thanking Gray and the NSC staff for their “fine cooperation” 
in his job as minority counsel.416 He added “I want to commend Charles Haskins who has 
been a pillar of strength in this joint endeavor.”417 Perhaps that made Haskins feel better. 
But after almost a year of monitoring the SNPM, one suspects it was cold comfort. 
 
Conclusion 
To demonstrate the impact of the Jackson hearings, one must only look at how 
historians have rehabilitated Eisenhower and his administration. They have advanced the 
notion that Eisenhower employed a “hidden hand” management style to counter the 
previous image that the President was a golf obsessed executive with little interest in the 																																																								
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office. If Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles rattled the nuclear sabre, they also kept the 
country from engaging in a nuclear war. Evaluations of Eisenhower’s reputation have 
risen dramatically over the last two and a half decades.418 Eisenhower’s reevaluation is 
warranted. Even if some praise is overly laudatory, it serves as a necessary corrective to 
the historic record. If Eisenhower’s personal decision-making has enjoyed newfound 
popularity and respect, the same cannot be said for his national security management. 
Some view the later years of Eisenhower’s Pentagon in a favorable light. But the early 
years, under Charles Wilson, remain a source of contention. More importantly, his NSC 
system remains under a cloud. With a few exceptions, historians have largely discredited 
it and no Presidential administration after Eisenhower decided to re-adopt it. In very large 
part, this is because of Henry Jackson’s work in 1960. His hearings effectively tore down 
the façade of functionality that Eisenhower constructed. Whatever his motivations, 
Jackson identified real issues. Even if the White House did not agree with him, had they 
been honest with themselves they would have admitted Jackson had a point. After all, the 
White House and PACGO spent years analyzing the system since they knew it could 
function better. But it was bad politics to admit as much. 
Jackson’s hearings continue to shape the legacy of these organizations. Jackson 
was hardly the only person to attack Eisenhower’s NSC and Pentagon. The Hoover 
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Committee’s 1955 report, the Senate Foreign Relation Committee’s 1958 reports, and a 
host of others all pointed to flaws. Jackson’s, however, received the most attention 
because it was the most public and the most dramatic. In no small part we can credit this 
to Jackson’s impressive stage management, “Scoops Troops,” and the Senator’s own 
performance. His critiques set the standard assessment of Eisenhower’s national security 
establishment for decades and can still be felt today.419  
But that was the important point: Jackson was a stage manager, not a showman. 
He created a tableau that took in a wide audience. In early 1960, he understood this, and 
instead of taking the stage himself, let others do the talking for him. The impressive list 
of Administration insiders seemed completely unable to deflect Jackson’s assault. The 
botched response of the White House, and the near silence of many congressional 
Republicans, only added fuel to Jackson’s argument, supported by a long list of 
Republicans, Democrats, scientists, diplomats, government insiders, business leaders, and 
a host of others who expressed deep concern about how Eisenhower made decisions. Of 
course, Jackson’s primary aim was to embarrass the Administration, but his 
choreography hid the more politically biased elements of the investigation. Even without 
regard to the administration, the Jackson hearings demonstrated just how little support 
remained for the NSC itself. Jackson’s critique was that people, rather than machinery, 
were the key to good foreign policy. For Jackson, this meant reinvesting power in the 
Secretary of State as opposed to White House committees.  
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In 1959 Jackson’s idea seemed foolish and was opposed by both the White House 
and his own party’s leadership. A little more than a year later, that had all changed. 
Jackson burnished his reputation as an important thinker on foreign and defense policy. 
The same leaders who had earlier questioned him now went on the Senate floor to 
denounce the NSC and Eisenhower’s national security and defense decisions. Perhaps as 
important, Jackson’s new reputation catapulted him to the upper echelons of Senate 
Democrats. He was rumored to be on John F. Kennedy’s short list for Vice President. 
Jackson’s keen mind, good staff work, and some luck brought him this success. The most 
searing critiques in the SNPM did not come from Jackson. As the committee’s organizer, 
however, he reaped the political benefit. He could sit back and look like a dispassionate 
judge of the situation, gaining the public praise as others leveled the criticism. For a man 
who often found it difficult to share the spotlight with his larger than life senate 
colleagues, the first half of 1960 proved to be a very public victory for the Senator from 
Everett, WA. 
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Figure 2 
An Ode on the Occasion of Our Chairman’s 48th Birthday  
The titans of the nation’s GOP 
Come to tell him where they think we ought to be 
And forecast what will surely be our fate 
If we should settle for the second-rate 
 
Through hearings fine and wholesome 
With Greenewalt, Perkins, and Folsom, 
His subtle spectacular sallies to seek 
And destroy every groan, every creak 
 
With able help from Reston (Scotty) 
Antidote for coverage spotty 
With steadfast purpose, clearcut goals 
He leads his band around the shoals 
Of White House gags and guidelines vague 
With Lovett, Baxter, Watson, and Sprague 
 
With motive pure for all to see 
He devastates the NSC 
The chips have fallen where they may 
Most notably on Gordon Gray 
 
Our peerless leader we herewith salute 
Non-partisan, objective his repute 
Determined to outplan and outperform  
The evil genius of the Cominform 
His future we can well surmise 
If he could only organize  
 
5/28/60-D Fosdick probable author. HJ, Accn 35603, Box 256, SNPM General 
Correspondences, 1960, UW. 
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Chapter 3: Henry Jackson’s Pyrrhic Victory 
When historians examine Henry Jackson’s work, it is commonly seen as an 
inflection point between two different phases—Eisenhower’s large bureaucracy gave way 
to the small, presidentially empowered NSC staff that inhabited the Kennedy White 
House. In many respects, that is a fair assessment. Yet it is a teleological view that misses 
the very real fact that in 1960 it remained entirely unclear how John F. Kennedy would 
manage his national security team. Jackson’s investigation had discredited Eisenhower’s 
system, and Jackson spent the summer of 1960 tearing down its most plausible 
replacement, Rockefeller’s First Secretary concept. When Jackson finally published the 
findings of the SNPM in late 1960 and early 1961, it had some concrete 
recommendations, but even the best were general in nature. After the election, Democrats 
had plenty of policy ideas they hoped to implement, but party officials at times seemed 
ambivalent about how they would be executed. They did not want Eisenhower’s system, 
that much was clear, but like Jackson’s findings the replacement often lacked details and 
specifics. Even the transition work done by Clark Clifford and Richard Neustadt did not 
answer many of the questions left now that Eisenhower’s methods were so thoroughly 
discredited.  
 Jackson seemed to believe the Democrats stood a good chance of winning in 
1960, and thought that either he or his allies would play a key role in the new 
administration. Publically Jackson ended 1960 on what seemed to be a high note: he was 
chair of the Democratic Party, appeared to have a close connection to the new President, 
and was in a position to effect significant change to both who ran American foreign 
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policy and how it was run. All of that, however, masked more problematic realities. 
Jackson lost some influence over the course of 1960. What looked on the surface to be a 
successful six months for the senator from Washington and his ideas instead masked the 
struggle Jackson, Richard Neustadt, and others faced as their chance to both reform and 
wield the levers of power approached.  
 
The Very Public “Death” of the First Secretary 
 By June 1960, Eisenhower’s national security organization still stood, but it 
seemed mortally wounded. With the foreign policy elite from both parties turning against 
Eisenhower’s management of the NSC and Pentagon, the lame-duck President had been 
painted into a corner. Of course the Administration deserved some blame. The White 
House’s inability to craft a clear rebuttal contributed to the morass. For the Pentagon, the 
White House had a far stronger argument. People might disagree with Eisenhower’s 
military strategy, but the Administration could muster a coherent argument based on 
reasonable assumptions, to defend “The New Look.” For the NSC, they could not even 
do that. The irony, however, is that Eisenhower did have a plan to save the NSC: the long 
gestating First Secretary concept. In July 1960, he had perhaps the perfect chance to 
present that plan to Jackson. The White House, however, failed to take advantage of this 
opportunity. As a result, it lost the last, best chance, to save its national security 
reputation. In missing this opportunity, it also sacrificed Nelson Rockefeller in front of 
Jackson’s committee and may have hurt Richard Nixon’s campaign, as well. 
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Nelson Rockefeller officially quit PACGO in 1958. Despite his new job as 
Governor of New York he did not leave the foreign affairs scene. While he burnished his 
domestic credentials in Albany, Rockefeller launched his own study of US foreign policy. 
He did this through the Rockefeller Brothers Fund by convincing his brothers that their 
family foundation would be a good platform by which to study the domestic, economic, 
and foreign policy problems facing the United States. The study claimed to examine 
“midcentury” America. True, the ’60s marked “midcentury,” but the title was as much a 
shot at Eisenhower—president for most of the middle decade of the 20th century—as a 
look towards the future. Certainly, the study offered little praise for the President. While 
it did examine upcoming challenges, it spent as much time reviewing current issues 
facing the US.  
Whereas Jackson had to work hard to establish a group to testify before the 
SNPM, Rockefeller easily assembled leading thinkers for his study. A variety of experts 
contributed to the six volumes of the report. Not only did Rockefeller want to prove he 
was a serious thinker, but he also hoped to learn from the endeavor. This type of review 
was standard operating procedure for Rockefeller. One observer quipped that if there 
were two words that perfectly described Rockefeller, they were “task force.”420 
Rockefeller who suffered from dyslexia, used these opportunities to “learn by listening” 
and distill what he considered actionable ideas from complex recommendations.421 It was 
not a perfect solution. One columnist observed with some snark that Rockefeller’s 
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statements sometimes “read as though they came out of the Life-Time-Fortune 
factory.”422 But it worked for Rockefeller and he was pleased with the results.423  
 The Foundation released its first report in January 1958. In a television 
appearance, Rockefeller promised free copies of the studies to anyone who wanted them. 
Over a quarter of a million people requested copies, and another 600,000 copies were 
sold.424 Not only were the studies widely read by the public, but they became important 
documents for the incoming Kennedy Administration. This had as much to do with their 
content as it did with the fact that many of those who participated in writing them joined 
the Democrat’s administration in 1961.425 While the studies contained some new ideas, 
others bore a similarity to those Rockefeller previously pitched to Eisenhower. The full 
set came out over a two-and-a-half-year period. Through this Rockefeller became 
associated with some of the greatest minds in America, and managed to keep his name in 
the news in the run-up to the 1960 election.426 Most importantly, these studies also added 
to the idea that large swaths of the political spectrum disagreed with Eisenhower’s 
policies, and this experience helped demonstrate just how much the public was interested 
in matters of reorganization and reform. 
Jackson and Rockefeller bore striking similarities and dramatic contrasts. Jackson 
had to play his political cards exactly right to even get the SNPM formed. Moreover, he 
was lucky that he could tap into a group of highly disaffected Republicans to even out his 
core of Democratic party stalwarts. Rockefeller, by contrast, just called his brothers. 																																																								
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Officials almost lined up to join his study. Both the Senator and the Governor, however, 
worked within the system to advance their causes and both encountered considerable 
pushback. Both successfully brought their arguments into the public sphere, yet one was 
on the rise and the other was on the decline. Jackson was a rising star in the Democratic 
Party. It was a party that embraced his enthusiasm for fighting the Cold War. While it did 
not agree with everything Eisenhower did, it was also one that worked with the President 
to beat back the attempt of Congressional Republicans to restrict the powers of the 
Executive. Rockefeller, by contrast, was already a waning star in his party. Though he put 
up a spirited campaign in 1960, Richard Nixon won the contest. The study might have 
burnished his credentials, but it did little to help him at the ballot box. Moreover, he came 
from a party with an evolving fringe increasingly distrustful of the very institutions he so 
championed. That these two national security reformers faced each other during the 
SNPM’s final hearing in 1960 lends a certain drama to the proceedings.  
 Rockefeller, ironically, might have been the last best hope for the Eisenhower 
Administration. They might have used Rockefeller to explain the work of PACGO and 
their own internal debates over the NSC structure. This would have shown a White 
House that learned from its mistakes and wanted to increase efficiency. It also would 
have forced the White House to admit that it had held major doubts about the NSC 
system since 1956, and did little to effect major structural changes. Time and again, 
Administration witnesses proved unwilling to make that argument and in doing so played 
into Jackson’s hands. Given the circumstances, using Rockefeller to change the narrative 
might not have been the worst idea. After all, Rockefeller was a passionate and articulate 
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spokesman. That the White House chose not to, however, is equally understandable. In 
pushing his pet projects, Rockefeller had been a nuisance to Eisenhower. The Rockefeller 
Brother’s Study Series further highlighted the White House’s missteps. When 
Rockefeller made a major address in June 1960, Eisenhower grumbled to Republican 
Congressional leaders about Rockefeller’s “readiness to plunge into foreign affairs” and 
twisting of facts.427 Rockefeller’s statements proved so damaging Richard Nixon was 
forced to join him in criticizing Eisenhower’s defense budget and military strategy.428 
Therefore it is not surprising that, before his testimony, Eisenhower did not reach out to 
Rockefeller, nor did Rockefeller reach out to the White House.429 Indeed, the White 
House seemed to treat Rockefeller as a potential enemy in the matter. Gordon Gray wrote 
that “it had continued to be open season on the NSC…In this connection I pointed out to 
[Eisenhower] that Governor Rockefeller was scheduled to appear before the [SNPM] and 
asked [Eisenhower] whether [Rockefeller] had cleared with him the question of surfacing 
the First Secretary scheme.”430 Despite the fact that six months prior  Eisenhower had 
trumpeted the First Secretary idea to Republican legislative leaders, by the summer he 
only meekly admitted he “had indeed first suggested the concept.”431 
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Perhaps Eisenhower would have been more enthusiastic had he known even some 
of Jackson’s most fervent allies had considered First Secretary-like concepts. At the 
Council on Foreign Relations dinner hosted by Jackson earlier that year, two participants 
argued for the creation of a similar post.432 Even Robert Lovett said that a “Minister of 
Foreign Affairs” might be a useful organizational invention.433 Yet, when Nelson 
Rockefeller took his seat on July 1, 1960, one would never have guessed that Lovett, the 
patron saint of the SNPM, had said anything kind about the First Secretary idea. 
Rockefeller attracted at least as much, if not more, interest than Lovett had five months 
previous. A “hearing room the size of a basketball gymnasium” was “jam-packed.”434 
The New York Times noted that Rockefeller “drew considerably more spectators and 
newsmen and Senators seeking to question him than any previous witness before the 
subcommittee.”435 Some of the SNPM’s hearings had as few as two senators in 
attendance. Eleven showed up to watch Rockefeller, the most in the entirety of the 
SNPM’s investigations.  
Rockefeller’s appearance did not only focus on the NSC or the First Secretary, he 
also spent time going over many of the recommendations made by PACGO. The 
Governor took time to praise Eisenhower, while admitting, “The critical need is for a 
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revamped structure of government.”436 He warned that “excessive government by 
committee can be anything but constructive. In the field of executive action, it can reduce 
the level of Government action to the least bold or imaginative—to the lowest common 
denominator among many varying positions.”437 Without much prodding from Jackson, 
Rockefeller admitted that the nation could do more to defeat the Soviets. Indeed, 
Rockefeller and Jackson seemed to be in lock step over the need to raise taxes and 
increase the defense budget. With all his criticism, Rockefeller’s testimony often seemed 
to be a toned-down version of Lovett’s. In fact, Rockefeller’s ideas seemed to lean so far 
left, he took to the press to defend his criticism and dismiss rumors he might become 
Secretary of Defense in a Democratic administration.438 Like Lovett, Rockefeller could 
hide behind platitudes towards Eisenhower while still leveling criticism. As one paper 
noted, Rockefeller paid deference to the President while simultaneously highlighting the 
fact that Eisenhower seemed to imperil the nation by willfully ignoring important 
organizational reforms.439 
Where Jackson and Rockefeller differed, of course, was on the First Secretary 
idea. When Jackson asked “If you have a strong Secretary of State and a strong First 
Secretary, it will take a superstrong President to keep them both strong.” Rockefeller shot 
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back: “That is what our country needs.” Jackson might not have been convinced, but 
admitted “That is a good reply.” He, however, pinned down Rockefeller on another point. 
As he noted “The workability [of the First Secretary Plan] would certainly depend on the 
personalities.” When Rockefeller rejoined that the system would surely work, Jackson 
responded “We all agree that the key to any organization is the people…If you just 
change the chart and you do not get good people, you are not going to solve much.”440 
Jackson was not the only one to question the First Secretary concept. Karl Mundt did as 
well. Edmund Muskie suggested a First Secretary should not be forced on the President 
and also that it unnecessarily confused an already crowded chain of command.441 Only 
Jacob Javits sprung to Rockefeller’s defense. He praised the First Secretary idea and said 
it “is a most provocative suggestion. I will make it my business to see that it is before us 
in legislation. I hope to have the privilege of offering it.”442 
Rockefeller’s testimony before the SNPM did not single handedly kill the idea of 
the First Secretary. It did, however, demonstrate just how few supporters existed for the 
concept. Besides Javits, only fellow New Yorker Kenneth Keating (R-NY) praised the 
idea that day.443 At the very least it showed a division in the Republican ranks. Even if 
they did believe in the idea, they clearly thought defending it before Jackson’s committee 
was a waste of time. For the Democrats it showed more a unified front on the matter, if 
not necessarily an intellectual consensus. When one Democratic senator seemed to be 
finding some merit in the idea, Jackson jumped in with questions that forced Rockefeller 																																																								
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back onto the defensive, leading the senator to remark “I guess this is not going to be a 
profitable field for further development.”444  
Rockefeller often seemed to be his own worst enemy in the discussion. At several 
points Rockefeller’s testimony and answers devolved into discussions of Constitutional 
law or complex organizational matters. Those were not inherently bad. After Rockefeller 
apologized for one long soliloquy, Jackson said the Governor should not act so contrite, 
“We ask questions that are not suggestive of one-sentence answers” and Rockefeller 
himself came across as an impressive speaker to those in attendance.445 On paper, 
however, Rockefeller’s solution to the confusion in the White House comes across as 
plausible, but hardly more streamlined. Despite the interest on Capitol Hill, Rockefeller’s 
testimony did not generate many headlines.446 While most of the major newspapers had 
some coverage, it generated far fewer comments than one might have anticipated. 
Perhaps this was because reporters expected more from Rockefeller than carefully 
worded political statements.447 The only editorial of note came from the Chicago Daily 
Tribune. The conservative paper took a shot at the centrist governor when it opined: “The 
best that can be said of Mr. Rockefeller’s proposal is that it is plausible until you start to 
think about it.”448  
The idea of the First Secretary was a novel one. If it had been adopted it would 
have been the most major modification to the White House since the National Security 																																																								
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Act. The idea of creating an office in the White House specifically for the management of 
foreign policy was significant. People had performed similar roles in the past, but nothing 
so formal, and nothing with such direct and codified authority over other members of the 
government. The decidedly mixed track record of the National Security Act—its grab-
bag of security bodies had been markedly thinned by a decade of service—and 
Eisenhower’s bloated executive staff seemed to inveigh against more bureaucracy. 
Before the idea had been made public, a PACGO staffer worried, “I am convinced that 
[the First Secretary idea] will not have much of a chance—largely because the manner of 
presentation will play into the hands of those who either actually do not understand it or 
are determined to misrepresent it.”449 Despite Rockefeller’s inability to communicate the 
plan effectively, it had a brief afterlife. In August, Javits enthusiastically sponsored a bill 
to implement the First Secretary idea. Not surprisingly, it received little support.450 He 
followed the same course in January, 1961, again to no effect. 
Rockefeller’s concept did make an appearance on the 1960 campaign trail. 
Richard Nixon said that he expected his Vice President to have an expanded role in 
foreign policy, hinting at something akin to the First Secretary.451 In June, 1960, a 
committee of congressional Republicans released a report advocating that the Vice 
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President essentially assume the First Secretary role.452 A few months later, officials 
included a statement in the 1960 Republican Platform saying the party would seek the 
establishment of a First Secretary position if they won the election.453 Despite these nods, 
no Republican, other than perhaps Javits, actively advocated for the First Secretary 
concept. Mundt’s reaction shows that Republicans were, at the very least, less than 
enthusiastic about the idea.454 Whatever the damage caused by Jackson, Nixon cited his 
role on the NSC as proof of his experience in the first presidential debate.455 For those 
following the SNPM, Eisenhower’s famous quip about Nixon’s contributions— “If you 
give me a week, I might think of one”—only reinforced whatever doubts they may have 
had about the system.456 It did little to provide reassurance in either the man or the 
intellectual value of an institution in which the President, supposedly, regularly consulted 
with his advisors.  
 One might be tempted to frame Jackson’s opposition as a brake to the power of 
the president. Most of the newspaper accounts emphasized that Rockefeller wanted a 
“Superstrong President,” actually Jackson’s phrase.457 Perhaps, in some respects, 
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Jackson’s showdown with Rockefeller was a challenge to the imperial presidency. But 
Jackson’s overall argument seemed to come across as less an assault on strengthening the 
White House’s powers than a stand against unnecessary bureaucracy. What Jackson 
wanted was to turn the clock back to the government under Truman. One did not need to 
create new methods to manage national security. One just needed to clear away the 
excess, and revert to tried and true methods of addressing these issues. Jackson cannot be 
viewed as purely partisan on this matter. The summer of 1960, with the failure of the 
Paris Summit and the U-2 incident, seemed an especially low point in presidential-
decision making.  
Rockefeller’s testimony ended six months of SNPM hearings. Jackson originally 
claimed the SNPM would need roughly a year to run his investigation, and secured an 
extra eight months to run the study, meaning that the SNPM would technically expire in 
late January 1961. Jackson worked, and seemingly easily secured, another twelve-month 
extension for the SNPM, meaning it would now expire in January 1962.458 The 
subcommittee was easily reauthorized, though it took a nine-month break in its hearings. 
Even on break, however, it stayed in the headlines. Both Henry Jackson and the SNPM 
now aimed to shape the 1960 presidential election and, he hoped, the transition that 
would follow in the event of a Democratic victory. While the SNPM had been an 
effective pulpit for both the man and his cause, he searched for ways to cement both his 
political gains as well as the SNPM’s findings.  
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The Triumph of Good People 
One can attribute the SNPM’s unusual pause to the 1960 election. Three of the 
five senators on the committee were otherwise occupied. Hubert Humphrey and Karl 
Mundt were standing for reelection. Henry Jackson was also campaigning to be John F. 
Kennedy’s Vice Presidential pick. On the surface, he was in a perfect positon. He was a 
young, bright, Cold War hawk who was on good terms with Kennedy. Public signals in 
the form of press reports and private communications from members of the Kennedy 
campaign, suggested that Jackson stood an above-average change of securing the 
nomination.459 Robert Kennedy promised several Democrats that Jackson would, in fact, 
be the nominee.460 While some might view the Vice President’s job as a political dead-
end, Jackson by all accounts relished the idea.461 How much electoral help Jackson would 
have provided in 1960 is, of course, open to debate. Jackson lacked Johnson’s Senate 
power and electoral upside.462 But, Jackson, apparently, at least made it to the final round 
of potential picks.463 After selected Johnson to be his running mate, Jackson was 
appointed chair of the Democratic National Party as a consolation prize. While it gave 
him another venue from which to spread his message, he found himself frozen out of 
campaign planning, and was blamed for a poorly attended campaign stop in Seattle.464 
While Jackson’s biographer presents this in a positive light, Columbia Professor Richard 
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Neustadt had a different opinion.465 Two years later, while taking to McGeorge Bundy, 
Neustadt said that the Kennedy campaign had “chosen Scoop to be a patsy [but did not 
realize], he hadn’t understood.”466 Bundy himself did not realize that Jackson had wanted 
to run the party, not just be a figurehead. His own response to hearing of it was simply to 
say “Oh, dear.”467 In Bundy’s words, however, the SNPM was “about the only good thing 
that ever happened between Scoop Jackson and the President, as far as I can make 
out.”468 If Bundy’s response was overly harsh, it was further evidence of the growing gap 
between Kennedy and Jackson. 
While Jackson was otherwise occupied Dorothy Fosdick, Robert Tufts, and 
Kenneth Mansfield began to summarize the SNPM’s findings. They aimed to publish 
these in the hope of influencing the incoming—hopefully Democratic—administration. 
All told, the SNPM published seven pamphlet-sized reports between the fall of 1960 and 
the fall of 1961 covering a range of issues.469 Altogether, the seven pamphlets totaled 
only sixty-seven pages of recommendations. One could be forgiven for thinking that after 
a year of study and six months of hearings, this was a very small return. Whatever the 
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faults of Jackson’s approach, his reports were read. Politicians at the time and historians 
since still refer the reports.470 They do not talk about the reports issued by Fulbright’s 
NSC review or many of the other independent reviews that took place around the same 
time. By contrast, a review by House Republicans, issued during the SNPM’s 
investigations and led by Gerald Ford (R-MI) had no impact at the time and faded from 
memory. It also took a critical view of Eisenhower’s security machinery, and suggested 
changes.471 That Jackson’s report survives and these others did not speak to his success.  
Before the release of the reports, Jackson brought on Richard Neustadt, as a 
consultant. Several years later Neustadt seemed to disparage the SNPM when he referred 
to it as Jackson’s “funny little committee,” but in 1960 the professor seemed enthusiastic 
about Jackson’s endeavors.472 Several ideas for reports ended up on the cutting room 
floor. At least one was secretly passed to Kennedy’s transition team.473 The Republicans 
on the SNPM staff had little say in any of this: Jackson, Fosdick, Tufts, and Mansfield 
managed to cut them out almost entirely of the drafting process. Thought Mundt was 
unhappy with some of the findings—which he learned about only days before their 
release—he also refused a request to append a minority report.474 Javits proved little help 
in any of this, giving Mundt little support when he did object.475 One of Mundt’s staffers, 
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out of frustration, simply complained that the SNPM had a “record of making trite 
statements about momentous and important matters.”476  
Some of the SNPM’s finding were relatively innocent. They, for instance, 
believed that more should be done to integrate science into national security debates, 
advocating for the establishment of an Office of Science and Technology in the 
Executive Office of the President.477 As could be expected given the absence of a 
Republican voices, however, many of these final reports often took on partisan tones. For 
example, the SNPM staff devoted, an entire report to discrediting Rockefeller’s ideas, in 
what Mansfield called “an ‘anti’ paper — a trash removal operation, so to speak.”478 A 
more nuanced example is the report on the NSC. Despite all the criticism the body 
received, the draft report begins with the line: “The NSC is basically a sound 
organization which has not been used to [its] best advantage.”479 Indeed, comparing this 
document to the final one issued by the SNPM suggests just how much Jackson’s staff 
struggled over the idea of presidential power. The early draft lays out a structure like that 
recommended at times by Rockefeller and close to what was developed under McGeorge 
Bundy.480 The SANSA’s role would change, from running the NSC system to helping the 
President. While it clearly disagreed with much of the Eisenhower system, it did not 
actually recommend any of it be disbanded. The system was flawed, but not irreparably 
so. By contrast, the final published report reads more like an attack on the Eisenhower 																																																								
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Administration, including jettisoning much of the NSC, with some helpful pointers 
tacked on: “[T]he President must rely mainly upon the Secretary of State for the initial 
synthesis of the political, military, economic, and other elements which go into the 
making of a coherent national strategy. He must also be responsible for bringing to the 
President proposals for major new departures in national policy.”481  
Many of Jackson’s points, however, came down to people. As Jackson observed 
in his final report, “The heart of the problem of national security is not reorganization—it 
is getting our best people into key foreign policy and defense posts…More often than not, 
poor decision are traceable not to machinery but to people—to their inexperience, their 
failure to comprehend the importance of information crossing their desk, to their 
indecisiveness or lack of wisdom.”482 In part, Jackson and the SNPM staff blamed this on 
excessive personnel turnover, which was not a particularly partisan point.483 Under 
Truman and Eisenhower alone there had been seven secretaries of defense, nine deputy 
secretaries of defense, five secretaries of state, eight undersecretaries of state, six 
SANSAs, and five directors of the CIA. Jackson worried that such high turnover often 
meant that officials had little time to become proficient at their jobs.  
In some respects, this is a problematic line of argument. Ferdinand Eberstadt had, 
in essence, designed the system to function this way. The “dollar-a-year men” he had in 
mind would only spend a few years helping the nation. Moreover, long service did not 
always mean good service. Jackson disagreed with many of the decisions made by 
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Charles Wilson, Eisenhower’s long-serving first Secretary of Defense. Nor did Jackson 
think highly of six-year incumbent John Foster Dulles. The perpetually exhausted Robert 
Cutler had a combined tenure of three and a half years, all the while promoting a system 
Jackson hated. Their replacements, all of whom had shorter tenures, also brought 
improvements to these posts.484  
One of Jackson’s more interesting recommendations was the idea that Congress 
needed to take a more active role in shaping foreign and defense policy. He argued that 
“[o]ne major problem is fragmentation….The authorization process treats as separable 
matters that are not really separable…There is no place in Congress, short of the floors of 
the Senate and House, where requirements of national security and the resources needed 
on their behalf, are considered in their totality.”485 He argued that Congress needed to 
develop better ways to review national security programs in total.486 The House 
Republicans, in their report, reached similar conclusions.487 These were both admirable 
conclusions, but hard to implement, as noted by William Y. Elliot. Commissioned by 
Rockefeller to examine the issue for the Mid-Century Study, Elliot acknowledged that 
something like Jackson’s idea had merit, but thought “it is entirely unrealistic.”488  
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The SNPM’s gist can be summed up in one quote: “Good people can triumph 
over faulty organization, but good policy machinery can never substitute for outstanding 
officials.”489 Moreover, in Jackson’s estimation, the government was full of good people 
since the Civil Service “are dedicated to their jobs; they are thoroughly skilled in their 
professions. They will hope and expect to put their knowledge and skill to work for the 
new administration, and their understanding and loyalty can be confidently expected.”490 
Eisenhower failed because he surrounded himself with bad people, and his organization 
froze out what good people remained. It also points out one of the major drawbacks in the 
SNPM’s reports. Good people might be able to triumph over bad organization, but that 
triumph would be more difficult. Jackson’s reports were clear that people, not 
organizations, make policy. As such, the organizational discussions took a back seat. The 
reports make clear that the Eisenhower Administration was over-organized, and that the 
First Secretary was not a good option. But the SNPM’s actual advice on what should take 
its place was often vague. It seemed their recommendation was to give all the power 
accumulated by the White House back to the Secretary of State, or bring back Dean 
Acheson. The vagueness of their recommendations—except for what to get rid of—left 
plenty of ambiguity about how a future administration might organize and deal with 
competing personalities. That probably hurt the incoming Kennedy Administration. Often 
taking a page from the SNPM’s findings, its transition advisors often seemed to be clear 
on what should not be done, but problematically fluid on what should be done. Richard 																																																																																																																																																																					
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Neustadt, for one, warned Kennedy that Jackson, in his memos, “ducks the concrete 
question: What are you supposed to do about the NSC?”491 Neustadt was correct, but he 
too bore some responsibility for the situation Kennedy faced when he entered office. 
 
“This can wait until later” 
 Much of this debate took place against the background of the 1960 election, 
during which the issues discussed by the SNPM made an appearance in both the Nixon 
and Kennedy campaigns. In addition to Nixon’s aforementioned dalliance with the First 
Secretary concept, Jackson used his position as Party Chair to stump for Kennedy and to 
reiterate his message of Eisenhower and Nixon’s general weakness on all matters of 
foreign and defense policies. Kennedy campaign literature also highlighted the NSC’s 
problems. In The Strategy of Peace, a collection of Kennedy essays and interviews 
published in 1960, Kennedy ruminated on the problems with the NSC.492 How this all 
played out in the election is, of course, difficult if not impossible to quantify. At the very 
least the SNPM added to the perception that during the Eisenhower-Nixon years 
American foreign and defense policy had been badly run. Democrats could also point to 
Republicans who endorsed Kennedy, like McGeorge Bundy and the Republicans of the 
Gaither Committee. That bipartisan support, on some level, must have been valuable. 
Perhaps the most value, however, came from Jackson himself. One could view the SNPM 																																																								
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as a year of practice where he sharpened the arguments he later deployed as Party Chair. 
After Kennedy’s victory the problem now fell squarely into the court of the Democrats. 
After criticizing the system, they now had to replace it. 
 Two people shaped the intellectual atmosphere of the Kennedy transition by 
drawing on their experiences in the Truman Administration. One, Clark Clifford, 
approached the problem from the perspective of a party veteran and a master of practical 
solutions. The other, Richard Neustadt, came from a background of theory and history. 
Clifford took his job seriously, though he occasionally bent the rules to fit his mandate. 
He divided his time between memo writing, helping vet potential members of the 
Administration, and leading a policy review group for Kennedy. Clifford also served as 
Kennedy’s representative in the White House during the waning days of the Eisenhower 
Administration.493 When the Brookings Institution set up a bipartisan advisory committee 
on transitions, Clifford joined.494 Clifford, perhaps more than anyone, had a good grasp 
of how policy and organization would mesh after the inauguration.  
When it came to just how Kennedy should organize his White House, Clifford 
suggested a return to the Roosevelt/Truman style. Appealing to Kennedy’s action-
oriented nature, Clifford advised that “[a] vigorous President in the Democratic tradition 
of the Presidency will probably find it best to act as his own chief of staff.”495 He argued 
for cutting the number of people in the White House, and that “[t]he organization of the 																																																								
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staff should be simple, and its membership should be versatile.”496 He remained vague on 
both the role of the SANSA and the organization of the NSC. For the Special Assistant, 
he merely commented that the person “serves as the liaison between the President and the 
[NSC] and he supervises the staff of the N.S.C.”497  As for the NSC, he noted: “Attention 
must be given to reorganizing this entire setup, but this can wait until later.”498 
 Neustadt joined Kennedy’s stable of celebrity academics via an introduction from 
Henry Jackson. Jackson, as Party Chair, had Neustadt pull double duty in late 1960. In 
addition to drafting the SNPM reports, the Senator commissioned the professor to write a 
series of memos directly for Kennedy. When Neustadt was finished, Jackson brought him 
along to a meeting with the President-elect. Kennedy was so impressed he essentially 
stole Neustadt from Jackson.499  
 Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power became the intellectual textbook of the 
Kennedy White House and one should not underestimate just how much its concepts 
permeated the Administration. Neustadt’s book was hardly a polemic but, like the SNPM, 
its non-partisan argument took indirect aim at Eisenhower’s Administration. On the face 
of it, Neustadt’s argument is rather simple. While we might think that presidents have 
significant powers inherent in the office, in fact they do not. As Neustadt wrote, “powers 
are no guarantee of power.”500 The president’s “services are in demand all over 
Washington. His influence, however, is a very different matter.”501 Neustadt observed 																																																								
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that many people, including party officials, members of congress, other Executive branch 
bureaucrats, foreign allies, and private citizens, called on the president for his “power.” 
“Lacking his position and prerogatives, these men cannot regard his obligations as their 
own…As they perceive their duty they may find it right to follow him…or they may not. 
Whether they will feel obliged on their responsibility to do what he wants done remains 
an open question.”502 The President “does not obtain results…merely by giving 
orders….no orders carry themselves out.”503  
That Neustadt would attach so much weight to Truman’s words speaks, in part, to 
his own past as a special assistant in the Truman White House. During those years, 
Neustadt served as a jack-of-all-trades. While technically focusing on legislative issues, 
he also worked as a speech-writer, and a gatherer of political intelligence. Sometimes, he 
even executed policy.504 Truman’s small professional staff—the number fluctuated 
between seven and ten over the course of the Truman years—compelled each staffer to 
take on numerous duties.505 Truman’s White House was, of course, based in large part on 
Roosevelt’s own organizational set-up. Roosevelt might have had a “second-class 
intellect but a first-class temperament,” but he had serious ideas on what the president 
could and could not do.506 He believed that “[t]hat Presidents don’t act on policies, 
programs, or personnel in the abstract; they act in the concrete as they meet deadlines set 
by due dates—or the urgency—of documents awaiting signature, vacant posts awaiting 																																																								
502 Ibid, p. 21. Emphasis in the original.  
503 Ibid, p. 23 and 29. 
504 For instance, Neustadt had a role planning and executing the 1952 government nationalization of the US 
steel industry. Matthew Dickinson “Practicum on the Presidency, 1946-1952” in Guardian of the 
Presidency M.J. Dickinson and E.A. Neustadt eds. (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 27-29. 
505 J.C. Heinlein Presidential Staff and National Security Policy (U. of Cincinnati, 1963), p. 23 
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appointees, officials seeking interviews, newsmen seeking answers, audiences waiting for 
a speech, intelligence reports requiring a response, etc., etc.”507 It would be hard to blame 
Neustadt for thinking this type of organization was ideal given the track record of these 
two administrations. Ferdinand Eberstadt essentially applied the same logic when he 
drafted the National Security Act.   
 Neustadt argued that Kennedy needed to be his own chief of staff. Using one 
person to funnel information to Kennedy would be too restricting. He believed that 
eliminating that job would distance Kennedy’s administration from the memory of 
Eisenhower Chief of Staff Sherman Adam’s gruesome political demise.508 He also 
believed that the President needed a close group of assistants he could trust.509 The group 
needed to be made up of people with a broad range of responsibilities and backgrounds. 
One of Neustadt’s main theories was that “generalists” were far more useful than 
“specialists.” Neustadt wanted Kennedy to keep his generalists “general” by giving them 
a rotating series of assignments.510 This was also an idea that Jackson and the SNPM 
endorsed in their reports.511  
 All these points lay out an assault on the Eisenhower Administration that echoed 
Jackson’s own critique. First, overly-complicated committees would not work. If a 
president’s power is at best highly fluid, such an elaborate set-up would make any order 																																																								
507 Neustadt, Preparing, p. 55 
508 Neustadt, Preparing, 25. 
509 Quoted in Presidential, p. 49-50 
510 Ibid, p. 55. In part, this kept the staff honest: the more they moved around, the less they might be 
tempted to become independent power brokers in one particular area. He also warned that titles fixed 
people into jobs and made it more difficult to shift them later. Ibid, p. 71.  
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easy to ignore and harder to follow. Second, one had to be careful about people in the 
White House gaining too much power—they should remember that they work for the 
president, not for themselves or in a cavernous committee and that personal responsibility 
matters. Lastly, Neustadt again raised the argument of the value of generalists over 
specialists. Eisenhower’s elaborate organization favored the specialists. Yet these people 
lacked big picture views of the problems they addressed. Specialized knowledge was not, 
by itself, bad. One of Truman’s advisors wrote: “[W]e were generalists who came from 
different areas of experience and brought, perhaps, a bit of extra perspective or depth of 
knowledge from our special area but generalists we rapidly became, and generalists we 
stayed while we were on the Truman staff.”512 This type of generalist knew enough about 
trees, but could still see the forest.  
 Neustadt’s recommendations to Kennedy not only shaped the President’s 
management techniques, but also informed McGeorge Bundy’s approach to operations. 
Neustadt told Kennedy he needed a small group of “jacks-of-all-trades, with a 
perspective almost as unspecialized as the President’s own, cutting across every program 
area, every government agency, and every facet of his work, personal, political, 
legislative, administrative, ceremonial.”513 While Neustadt championed this 
“Rooseveltian practice” he admitted it came at a cost.514 He cautioned Kennedy of the 
need to “oversee, coordinate, and interfere with virtually everything your staff was doing. 
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A collegial staff has to be managed; competition has to be audited. To run a staff in 
Roosevelt’s style imposes heavy burdens.”515  
Kennedy enthusiastically embraced these ideas. While he cut the White House 
staff by almost a third—from around thirty at the height of the Eisenhower years to 
roughly twenty-one—the number of un-tasked Special Assistants roughly doubled.516 
While the White House staff grew slightly over the time, in late 1963 Theodore Sorensen 
still said that presidential assistants “are chosen…for their ability to serve the President’s 
needs and to talk the President’s language,” adding “[e]ven the White House 
specialists…are likely to see problems in a broader perspective, within the framework of 
the President’s objectives and without the constraints of bureaucratic tradition.”517 
Kennedy remained surrounded by the flexible and responsive group of assistants 
Neustadt envisioned. Many took to describing this administrative system in a much more 
simplistic way: Kennedy’s advisors were the spokes that connected him, at the hub, to the 
wheel of government.518  
Historians of foreign relations or the Kennedy Administration have commonly 
said that Kennedy was his own Secretary of State.519 Experts on White House 
organization have commented that Kennedy was his own Chief of Staff. A contemporary 
observer noted that Kennedy had “a wholesome disregard for organization, chain of 
command, [and] niceties…Kennedy has shown a desire to immerse himself in the details 																																																								
515 Ibid, p. 40-41 
516 Heinlein, Presidential Staff, p. 39 and 55. 
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of policy problems.”520 Kennedy wanted his hands on the levers of power and access to 
as many sources of information and direct control as possible. Neustadt’s gaggle of 
Special Assistants facilitated this, but his recommendations had a cost in that they 
encouraged Kennedy to embrace his own micromanaging, especially in the field of 
foreign policy. According to Neustadt, this was the only way Kennedy could ensure his 
orders were carried out, but also prove a dangerous and needless distraction. If Clifford 
remained vague about both the NSC and the SANSA, Neustadt’s ideas were only slightly 
more defined. For the Council itself, he recommended Kennedy use it, but only “as 
vehicles for sharpening differences of view on major policy departures or on new courses 
of action.”521 As for the staff, “that miscellany of staffs and interagency committees could 
be slimmed down, reoriented (and in part repopulated) into a tight group of very able 
general utility assistants to your assistant.”522 
 The actual job of the SANSA, however, showed considerable fluidity in 
Neustadt’s mind. Initially, Neustadt questioned the necessity of the job, noting, “There 
will be no outside pressure for filling this post.”523 He even wanted to strip it of its 
title.524 For whatever reason, he quickly changed his mind and suggested the special 
assistant should be treated as a member of Kennedy’s inner circle.525 In Neustadt’s 
vision, the SANSA could assume the responsibilities of five different members of 
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Eisenhower’s White House staff—actually six, since Neustadt miscounted.526 Neustadt 
believed this could happen easily since Eisenhower’s set up was full of needless 
repetition and duplication. Combining these responsibilities would greatly enhance the 
role of the SANSA, and the person holding that position could potentially accumulate 
significant new powers.527 Neustadt, however, wanted Kennedy to keep an ability to 
change the make-up of his staff at a moment’s notice. As such, Neustadt advocated that 
foreign policy duties should actually be split among all the assistants since it was “the 
most important segment of government policy.”528  
Neustadt did include a nod to the SNPM when he wrote: “The Jackson 
Subcommittee favors using the [S]ecretary [of State] not just as a department head but as 
a principal assistant in the whole sphere of national security policy.” 529 The very 
suggestion, however, further indicates Neustadt’s doubts about the SANSA’s role in the 
national security field.530 Though he was certain about many things, his wavering on the 
role of the SANSA demonstrates just how fluid this position was. That said, it is difficult 
to be too hard on either Neustadt or Clifford. The Brookings Intuition, which released a 
report on the transition around the time Neustadt and Clifford were writing their memos, 
admitted that the exact role of the SANSA depended on too many organizational 
decisions to be neatly summed up. It was a decision best left until after the 																																																								
526 Ibid, 149. 
527 Ibid, 78. 
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Administration took power.531  
 Given that Clifford punted on what the SANSA should do and Neustadt waffled 
as well, one should not be surprised that rank-and-file Democrats struggled with what to 
do with the position. The full-throated defense of the Eisenhower system mounted by his 
NSC staffers badly mischaracterized the actual responsibilities of the job.532 How much 
enthusiasm could potential office holders really muster for a position had a dubious 
future and an unappealing past? As Neustadt later said, “Kennedy did not know he was 
creating the precursor of [Henry] Kissinger’s office.”533 Despite these questions, 
Kennedy decided the office needed an incumbent.  
A quick review of some of the names floated for the job reveals a noticeable 
similarity: with one exception, all were professors. Some were pure intellectuals.534 One 
was from business.535 Others were veterans of the Policy Planning Staff, still considered 
by many the intellectual hub of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Included in this category 
were two Jackson allies: Paul Nitze and Robert Tufts. If Jackson did not actively 
encourage this recommendation, it was one he surely agreed with.536 This indicated there 
was no consensus on what the SANSA should be or how it should function. They were 
certainly accomplished, but they were not the types of names that would ever come up in 																																																								
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discussions of who should be the Secretaries of State or Defense. In fact, Neustadt 
specifically suggested Tufts over Nitze because the job “seems to be ‘anonymous’ pure 
staff work, perhaps too confining for Nitze’s personal force and public standing.”537 
Kennedy seemed to want personality over anonymity, and he offered the job to 
Nitze. Actually, he offered him three jobs: SANSA, Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Nitze recalled in his memoirs that 
Kennedy gave him thirty seconds to choose which job he wanted, and Nitze chose 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, discovering afterward that the position had been promised 
to someone else. He ended up with a lower ranking Pentagon job instead. It seems that 
Nitze believed the SANSA job would be powerless and largely administrative, especially 
because he believed the Secretary of State should play a larger role.538  
It is hard to criticize Nitze for this decision, given what he knew. The eventual 
occupant, McGeorge Bundy, came with glowing reviews, and his eventual appointment 
received almost entirely positive coverage. One profile talked about his “steel trap mind” 
and described him as “keenly analytic and one of the best speakers Harvard has had 
anywhere, anytime.”539 Another said two adjectives best described him: aggressive and 
brilliant.540 Learned Hand called him “the brightest man in America.”541 For Bundy, the 
transition was hardly an enjoyable time: “I had a long and painful process—as everybody 
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did that I know of, perhaps with the exception of Bob McNamara—while the President 
made up his mind how he was going to organize his Administration, because he first 
offered me a job which turned out not to be there, and there was quite a lot of gimmery 
and crackery before it got sorted out.”542 Indeed for Bundy, the job search seemed to be a 
race to the bottom, not to the top.  
Bundy had long been recommended for some type of government service. 
Members of the Eisenhower Administration briefly considered bringing him on in an 
advisory role in 1957.543 A registered Republican, though one openly disenchanted with 
the GOP during the Eisenhower years, he later admitted that, had it been a choice 
between Kennedy and Nelson Rockefeller instead of Nixon, his decision to side with 
Kennedy would have been much harder.544 In the end, however, his friend Arthur 
Schlesinger convinced Bundy to support Kennedy. Having the Republican Dean of 
Harvard join the administration would be a boon for Kennedy. He seemed to fit the bill 
for what Kennedy was looking for: an “Action Intellectual,” with sterling establishment 
connections who was more hawkish than Adlai Stevenson but not tied to the 
Truman/Acheson wing of the party. Thus, he possessed a certain independence that 
Kennedy appreciated. When he threw his support behind Kennedy, various Democrats 
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suggested a wide range of jobs for the professor, everything from Under Secretary of 
State to Secretary of the Army.545  
Yet, Kennedy first offered him two jobs in the State Department, far from the 
White House. While this might indicate the President-elect’s initial enthusiasm for Foggy 
Bottom, Bundy was depressed that he seemed to be saddled with more administrative 
posts.546 He regretfully turned down the President-elect. Kennedy, desperate to keep 
Bundy, finally offered him the SANSA job. Bundy accepted, though admitted the job 
itself remained vague.547 He later admitted he got the job because “bringing in a Harvard 
dean-type, who was an ex-Republican, [looked better than] other people who might have 
been better qualified.”548 None of this is to say Kennedy did not see something in Bundy 
he thought would be useful.549 Despite all the fanfare that accompanied his appointment, 
he was one of the last senior officials appointed. Kennedy and Democrats wanted Bundy 
in the administration. He was not the first choice for SANSA. That he ended up in the 
White House seems to have been a happy coincidence for those planning the transition 
rather than the result of deliberate thought. There was a job opening that needed to be 
filled and he needed a job in the realm of national security. In late 1960, the job of 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs proved hard to fill. Its future seemed 
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uncertain and, as Paul Nitze knew, it was not the obvious choice for someone with 
ambition.  
  
Conclusion  
The American presidential transition is a rushed process: a candidate has roughly 
twelve weeks—seventy three days in 1960—to form an entire administration and then 
has a few hours to transfer power.550 In many respects, the 1960 transition was the first 
modern transition. The Hoover-Roosevelt transition, thirty years before, bore little 
relevance to the world of 1961. The Roosevelt-Truman transition was sudden, and little 
changed between presidents. The 1952 transition was widely seen as poorly managed and 
“irrelevant” to the problems of 1960.551 In 1960, however, officials feared what might 
happen during the transition. A consultant working with the Brookings Institution wrote 
that the transition was “[p]robably the most vulnerable transition of Administration in 
U.S. history for the reason that the continental U.S. has never been more exposed to 
enemy attack as she will be in early 1961.”552 Others feared that the Soviets might use the 
																																																								
550 Memorandum 1, 10/26/60, Study of the 1960-61 Presidential Transition. Entry 26, Box 44, File 5, 
Brookings Institution Archives; Richard Neustadt, Notes on the White House Staff Under President 
Truman, 6/53, p. 51, Laurin Henry Papers Box 1, Supporting Tabs or Memos (Neustadt, Belsley, Henry, & 
Gange) (1), DDEL.  
551 Richard Neustadt, Notes on the White House Staff Under President Truman, 6/53, p. 51, Laurin Henry 
Papers Box 1, Supporting Tabs or Memos (Neustadt, Belsley, Henry, & Gange) (1), DDEL. Perhaps the 
two exceptions to this were the efforts between the Treasury Department and their Eisenhower 
replacements and Robert Cutler, who spent a fair amount of time in the White House, to the approval of 
Truman’s staff, before Eisenhower was inaugurated. Ibid and Meeting of Advisory Committee on the 1960-
61 Presidential Transition, undated, Entry 86, Director’s Correspondence August-October 1960, Brookings 
Institute Archives. 
552 “Notes for Transition Study” 10/9/60, Entry 86, Director’s Correspondence August-October 1960, and 
Donovan Yeuell to George Graham, 10/10/60, Entry 86, Director’s Correspondence August-October 1960, 
Brookings Institute Archives. 
 	
149 
turmoil created by the change in the administration to act against the US.553 One 
Democrat even suggested that the danger was so grave, that Kennedy “could and should 
take…part in decisions before the inauguration.”554 Richard Neustadt had a much 
grimmer prediction: 
We deal as we have done in terms of cold war, of an arms race, of a competition 
overseas, of danger from inflation, and of damage from recession. We skirmish on 
the frontiers of the Welfare State and in the borderlands of race 
relations…Everything remains unfinished business…There even has been 
continuity in the behavior of our electorate; [a] “stalemate” in our partisan 
alignment…[W]hat distinguishes mid-century can be put very briefly: 
emergencies in policy and with politics as usual. “Emergency” describes mid-
century conditions only by the standards of the past. By present standards what 
would once have been emergencies are now commonplace…In an era of the Cold 
War we have practiced “peacetime” politics. What else could we have done? Cold 
War is not a “crisis”; it becomes a way of life.555 
 
 One newspaper columnist wrote, “This country cannot afford an interregnum in the 
handling of its foreign policy.”556 Arthur Schlesinger later complained of this period that, 
“the obsession with crisis, the illusion of world leadership, the obligations of duty so 
cunningly intertwined with the opportunities of power carried forward the process…of 
elevating ‘national security’ into a supreme value.” That, in turn created a “mystique of 
national security.”557 The obsession with crisis and the mystique of national security, 
propelled the thinking of the incoming administration. 
 By contrast to these pronouncements, Henry Jackson seemed to have a much 
happier second half of 1960. As the party’s chair, he oversaw the election of John F. 																																																								
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Kennedy. The SNPM cast him as one of the leading foreign policy lights in the 
Democratic Party. Moreover, that body’s work had swayed the opinion of Democrats and 
many Republicans that massive changes were needed in the management of national 
security. Behind Jackson’s public victories, however, were at least three critical losses. 
The first was Jackson’s loss of the vice presidency. Second, the transition team plundered 
several members of Jackson’s staff for duties in the new Administration. He lost one of 
his most trusted lieutenants and several other aides to the incoming Administration. Like 
Nitze, however, few of Jackson’s allies ended up in positions of high power in the 
Administration. Robert Tufts received no appointment, and Dorothy Fosdick, briefly 
courted for a White House job, decided not to leave Jackson’s staff.558 This cost Jackson 
influence in the White House. Lastly, Jackson suffered a loss of leverage. He might have 
felt Kennedy was a close friend, but that friendship grew more distant once Kennedy 
entered office.  
 More importantly, but perhaps unwittingly, Jackson oversaw not only the 
destruction of Eisenhower’s system, but also the dismemberment of the most concrete 
attempt at reform. Of course, some of this was a self-inflicted wound by Eisenhower’s 
staffers themselves. The Democrats, Jackson included had an idea of how national 
security should be managed, but it remained vague—not that anyone expected a complete 
plan in place before Kennedy took office. Even Eisenhower’s system took time to 
coalesce. But at this moment, when the Cold War threatened to go hot, the underpinnings 
of the management of national security had been ripped out. Even to those high in power, 
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it seemed unclear what would take their place. Surveying the political wreckage of 1960 
Richard Neustadt wrote, “Truman…and Eisenhower…were the first two who had to 
fashion presidential influence out of mid-century materials. Presumably they will not be 
the last.”559 Neustadt was right, but the learning curve was steep. 
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Chapter 4: McGeorge Bundy’s “Transitionitis” 
 
 If McGeorge Bundy had a rough time getting a job in the Kennedy 
Administration, the first few months of 1961 were hardly kinder to the former Harvard 
dean. A little over two weeks after agreeing to serve, McGeorge Bundy arrived at the 
EOB for a series of meetings with Gordon Gray and OCB Executive Secretary Bromley 
Smith. Gray explained how the NSC system operated and took pains to emphasize that 
the system did, in fact, work. He warned Bundy against abolishing the OCB by asking 
Bundy how he would respond to calls to abolish the Faculty of Arts and Science at 
Harvard? Bundy laughed and replied he would answer, “What have I been doing for the 
last several years?”560 The interaction between Gray and Bundy is representative of the 
early months of the Kennedy/Bundy NSC operations. Publically, they tore down the 
structures that supported and sustained Eisenhower’s NSC. Privately, they kept most of 
the overall functions, but transferred them to a more informal system. It was a sprawling 
system and Bundy struggled with his own role in it. This was both the function of getting 
used to a new job and because, on Richard Neustadt’s suggestion, Kennedy had 
combined in Bundy’s job the responsibilities of six members of the outgoing 
administration.  
 To wrap so many jobs into one was a decision easily made given Henry Jackson’s 
findings and the recommendations of Richard Neustadt and Clark Clifford. But managing 
the remaining constellation of foreign policy figures was a more complex issue. Neustadt 
and Clifford both, in their own way, punted that question. Jackson, via his own 																																																								
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suggestions and the SNPM’s studies, slowly rolled out his own vision. Kennedy was 
confronted by the problems of a short transition period and having to organizing on the 
fly. Moreover, despite all the talk of organization, he cared less about academic debates 
over theoretical concepts of organization and more about finding a system that worked. 
The Administration gambled on an organizational set up that was found wanting in the 
decision to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion. Years later, Bromley Smith said that Bundy 
suffered from “transitionitis” during this period.561 If so, it was a disease that afflicted 
many other members of the White House, State Department, CIA, and Pentagon, 
hobbling even the most talented members of the new Administration.  
 
Deconstructing the NSC 
 The four hallmarks of the Eisenhower NSC system were the PB, the OCB, the 
NSC itself, and Eisenhower’s relationship with his SANSAs and other national security 
assistants. Kennedy made significant changes, but did not raze this setup completely. As 
Richard Neustadt admitted, many of these interagency committees were merely “driven 
underground” instead of being abolished.562 This gives a relatively clear view of what 
Kennedy believed to be the lessons of both the Eisenhower years and Jackson’s study. It 
also shows a president far more cautious about both destroying what came before and 
unduly empowering the White House. Eisenhower’s SANSAs played a range of roles in 																																																								
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that administration: from Robert Cutler’s manager to Gordon Gray’s policy executor. 
Each of them, however, could not do their job without knowing what the President 
thought. In the first four or five months of the Kennedy Administration, however, Bundy 
saw the President infrequently. Part of this was because Bundy was still something of an 
outsider in the close-knit Kennedy group. More practically, however, Bundy sometime 
could not find the President. Kennedy’s schedule fell into disarray from the start since 
many officials had been granted permission to come in whenever they pleased. In warmer 
weather Kennedy avoided the constant interruptions by working in the White House 
garden.563 While Kennedy still read Bundy’s memos, those did not take the place of 
personal contact with his SANSA.564  
  In addition to meeting infrequently with his SANSA, he held fewer meetings of 
the NSC proper. Neither Kennedy nor Bundy enjoyed large, formal meetings, and 
Kennedy’s packed daily schedule gave him an excuse to let the time between meetings 
grow after the first meeting on February 1, 1961.565 Whereas Eisenhower met with the 
NSC approximately every week, Kennedy met with the NSC roughly every month, 
though more frequently in his first year in office.566 Kennedy believed his frequent, 
smaller, meetings with advisors made up for fewer large meetings. Because Eisenhower 
made many decisions with smaller groups of advisors outside the council, Kennedy’s 
operating style does not actually seem that unusual. If one views the NSC as a way for 																																																								
563 Bundy to Kennedy, White House Organization, 5/16/61 FRUS Vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign 
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566 Eisenhower had 343 meetings over 416 weeks. Kennedy had 45 meetings over 148 weeks. He had 25 
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Eisenhower to disseminate information and orders to the cabinet, Kennedy replicated that 
via a series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM). Not that Kennedy always 
hated longer meetings. During the Cuban Missile Crisis he used the Executive Committee 
of the National Security Council, or ExCom, to advise him. The ExCom continued to 
meet until March 1963, at which point Bundy wrote Kennedy that these big meetings 
“have not proved effective at all, except during the extraordinary week of October 16-22 
[sic].”567 
 Kennedy also buried the PB and OCB. The PB never suffered the same level of 
hatred as was directed at the OCB, but it had few enthusiastic defenders. Current and 
former members of the PB staff admitted to incoming officials that it did not function as 
intended.568 Bundy first replaced it with an informal weekly luncheon group called the 
Planning Group. Like the PB, the Planning Group discussed events and contemplated 
contingency plans, just in a more informal atmosphere.569 Bundy lost interest in it after 
about six months.570 He was not alone. One staffer wrote, “these meetings seem awfully 
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disorganized. Though pleasant, are they really worth the candle?”571 While the Group 
survived at a very low level, the archival record supporting its existence is threadbare.572  
Walt Rostow, then in the State Department, tried to revive the idea in late 1963, but 
Bundy shot it down. He worried it would become just “another large scale NSC type 
paper mill exercise which would inevitably waste a lot of time.”573  
 If there was one thing that Jackson, Nelson Rockefeller, and many members of 
the Eisenhower Administration could agree on, it was that the OCB seemed useless in its 
current state. Not surprisingly, Kennedy formally abolished it soon after entering office. 
Yet as he held fewer NSC meetings and Bundy all but abolished the PB, many in the 
Administration seemed to want an OCB-like coordinating body. At the very least, this 
suggests that Eisenhower’s belief in the principles of the organization was correct, even if 
his unwillingness to change it in light of its dysfunction was questionable. The fact is that 
by 1961 the sprawling organs dealing with foreign affairs proved difficult to oversee, let 
alone coordinate. That was not all: Kennedy found the job of the president overwhelming 
in general. With so much riding on each decision, and a feeling that decisions were 
necessary at every minute to keep the nation afloat, Kennedy teetered on the “edge of 
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irritability.”574 As Neustadt detailed in Presidential Power, the President’s word alone 
was rarely enough to get the job done.  
During the transition period Rostow, serving as Bundy’s deputy, encouraged 
Kennedy to devolve the OCB’s functions of policy coordination and implementation to 
the State Department. This fit quite well with Jackson’s belief that the State Department, 
rather than the White House, should handle most foreign policy issues. In the early 
months of the Administration many topics, like Latin America, Berlin, and Laos, were 
overseen by State Department run “Task Forces.” These fit a familiar pattern for many 
Administration officials. During the transition period, Kennedy’s team organized topic-
specific “task forces” to summarize issues for Kennedy.575 These task forces served two 
purposes. First, they screened possible job candidates, and twenty-four task force 
members eventually took posts within the administration.576 Many of these officials had 
also participated in Nelson Rockefeller’s similarly organized study task forces just a few 
years earlier. Second, they provided Kennedy and his incoming team of advisors a 
detailed analysis and critique of current US policies. Over 100 people contributed to these 
reports, and while their reviews had critics—a few State Department officials criticized 
them as being neither factual nor realistic—they none-the-less gave Kennedy an appraisal 
of what he would be confronted with in January 1961.577 In fact, this process might be 
seen as Kennedy’s equivalent of Eisenhower’s “Project Solarium” on an even grander 
scale, given that Kennedy employed six times as many consultants in his reviews 																																																								
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compared to Eisenhower’s 1953 study. In that process, Eisenhower had wanted to 
develop a top down strategy for the management of foreign policy. Kennedy, by contrast, 
used the task forces to develop a bottom up approach that more properly fit his 
management style. These task force reports allowed administration officials to calibrate 
America’s response to various problems, with tools ranging from information activities 
and foreign aid to military involvement. It may not have been an imposing singular 
statement developing an overarching national strategy, like an NSC-68 type exercise, but 
it helped administration officials frame their initial approach to foreign policy.  
By employing these, there was a continuity of service: officials who had worked 
on the transition task forces often found themselves working on the same subjects in 
State’s task forces. Bundy described these groups as “not [ones] in which everything is 
decided by vote, and still less a place in which unanimous concurrence is required for 
every action. [They] should be an instrument of cooperation and coordination.”578 
Because each committee was led by a chairman, Bundy hoped to avoid another problem 
seen during the 1950s. The proliferation of committees often seemed to rob anyone of 
real power or, more importantly, responsibility. Bundy, therefore, proposed that “the man 
in charge should be the chairman and his decisions should stand unless they are 
successfully challenged through appropriate channels to the Secretary of State or the 
President. The office would have authority to coordinate action in the field.”579 [See 
Figure 3, p. 188] 
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 Who would these chairmen be? Kennedy said that he expected the State 
Department, specifically the Assistant Secretaries, to oversee these groups.580 Kennedy 
added that “[w]e of course expect that the policy of the White House will be the policy of 
the Executive Branch as a whole, and we shall take such steps as are needed to ensure 
this result.”581 Kennedy and Bundy envisioned that orders would be outlined in NSAMs 
with coordination done via the Task Forces. For Kennedy, even the name was important: 
both NSAM and Task Force felt far more purposeful than Eisenhower’s “boards” and 
“committees.”582  
 The idea seemed to address the most significant issues within the old OCB. Yet it 
had no more success. The Task Force idea eventually failed for three reasons. First, one 
of the critiques of the OCB was that its subcommittees seemed to stay in existence far 
past their usefulness. By contrast, Kennedy’s task forces were designed to be disbanded 
as soon as the crisis or situation they oversaw ended. Some situations, however, like 
Berlin and Laos, evolved rather than ended. Thus, they stayed in existence as long as 
their OCB predecessors. Second, the task forces, unlike the OCB boards, were supposed 
to be small in size. They rarely were in practice. The Berlin Task Force, for instance, had 
roughly 30 members, judged unwieldy, by 1962.583 Third, some felt that instead of 
cleaning up the chain of command, the task forces instead made a muddle of 
management. Former TVA chief David Lilienthal, for example, turned down a job offer 																																																								
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582 Smith, p. 21. 
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for this reason. In early 1961, Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles asked Lilienthal to 
become Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. But, Bowles added, Lilienthal 
would not run the Latin American task force. That would fall to Adolf Berle. Lilienthal 
questioned Berle’s role, saying that “this would be a most difficult administrative set 
up…. As for the administrative problem of having Adolf Berle as Coordinator somehow 
‘over’ me, this is a serious fogging on responsibilities.”584 At the very least the task force 
concept shows the limits of institutional learning. It tried to address most of the critiques 
of the OCB and a major tenet of Jackson’s investigation: that the State Department 
should run foreign policy. The initial results of the Task Forces clearly demonstrated that 
true reform was more complex than even the experts anticipated. 
Bundy constantly worked “to hold [State] or the other departments responsible to 
force them to coordinate and come forward with policy.”585 Responsibility is the key 
word in this sentence. Several weeks before the Bay of Pigs, Bundy wrote to Kennedy 
complaining that, when it came to coordinating policy, “[w]e [have] working groups with 
nobody in particular in charge, but we [do not have] clearly focused responsibility.”586 He 
told Robert Kennedy that, ideally, he believed the State Department should coordinate 
policy between the departments unless there were compelling reasons not to do so.587 The 
problem was that Bundy felt “State is only beginning to seek good organizational forms 
for this responsibility, and it has nowhere near the group of topflight men it would need 
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to do the job.”588 He wondered if State could ever fulfill this mission.589 This attitude was 
nothing new: in fact Bundy’s father had expressed the same concerns during a 1948 
review of the State Department.590 Bundy outlined his reservations to Kennedy. He told 
the President he felt that many State Department officials were too busy with conflicting 
obligations. He also believed that the excessive bureaucracy of the Eisenhower years 
made them unused to “the acceptance of individual executive leadership…[and that] no 
one person felt a continuing clear responsibility.”591 In fact, Bundy thought the two most 
effective Task Force leaders were Adolf Berle and Dean Acheson, men long retired from 
government, but temporarily brought back to the Department in an advisory capacity.592 
The Task Forces would, for the most part, be a victim of the Bay of Pigs: a novel concept 
in theory, but one that failed in practice.593 
 
Dean Rusk, Chester Bowles, and the State Department 
If one were to boil Henry Jackson’s philosophy down to two sentences, they 
would read something like this: “The excessive and counterproductive meddling of the 
White House mangled American foreign policy and national security. The easiest 
solution was to have a strong, competent, Secretary of State and State Department both 
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advise the president and manage policy.” In retrospect, Dean Rusk does not seem a good 
fit in light of these sentiments. Though he was the second longest serving Secretary of 
State in US history, the contemporary assessments of him do not make him seem like a 
particularly successful or powerful figure.594  
There is, however, significant evidence that Kennedy wanted a strong Secretary 
of State and State Department. The President, of course, still wanted to make many of the 
important decisions, but that did not mean he wanted a weakened Foggy Bottom. In 
January 1960 at the National Press Club Kennedy stated that, “It is the president alone 
who must make the major decisions of our foreign policy.”595 While one could interpret 
this to mean Kennedy wanted to design his own foreign policy—at the expense of his 
Secretary of State—this statement might be read in two other ways. First, it is an obvious 
statement of fact: even John Foster Dulles would have admitted as much. Second, it can 
be read as a response to Eisenhower’s form of decision-making: the President, not a 
committee, made the ultimate decision. Whatever the case, Kennedy privately told his 
brother that he wanted his Secretary of State to be someone “wise in counsel, persuasive 
on the Hill, and effective in modernizing what he regarded as an unduly passive and 
conservative foreign service.”596 
Rusk, admittedly, was not Kennedy’s first choice as Secretary of State. Kennedy 
initially hoped to appoint William Fulbright. But Fulbright’s support for segregation 
destroyed his chances. Kennedy apparently also considered Bundy, Averell Harriman, 																																																								
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and Chester Bowles. He decided that Bundy was too young, Harriman too old, and 
Bowles too far to the left. Dean Acheson pushed for Paul Nitze—though both quickly 
agreed that Nitze was not ready for the job—but then recommended Rusk.597 Other 
prominent foreign policy experts, including Robert Lovett, Bowles, and Adlai Stevenson, 
not only supported Rusk’s candidacy but believed he would be a strong Secretary of 
State.598  
 Kennedy had only two short meetings with Rusk before the inauguration, but it 
seems fair to say that the President had confidence in Rusk.599 Charles Bartlett, a reporter 
with a close relationship with Kennedy later commented, “Rusk presented himself as a 
substantial man who was noncontroversial and was respected. He came from a good 
background [and] he knew the State Department.”600 A reporter noted that those skeptical 
of Rusk said others would take advantage of a vacuum in the field of foreign policy 
before noting, “Rusk is no vacuum.”601 Rusk modeled himself on George Marshall’s 
secretary-ship, hardly known as a period of passivity at Foggy Bottom.602 Arthur 
Schlesinger questioned “whether he has the inner confidence and security to make a fully 
effective Secretary” but considered him a sound addition to the administration.603 
Whatever Rusk’s later faults, he seemed a good choice in December 1960. Indeed, when 																																																								
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one considers Rusk’s earlier tenure in State, as liaison to the UN and then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean War, he entered office with 
far more actual Cold War experience than either Bundy or Robert McNamara.604 In 
addition to this experience, Rusk had run the Rockefeller Foundation during the 1950s 
and served on Nelson Rockefeller’s study group, where he dealt with issues of both 
foreign policy and government organization. Even if Kennedy’s enthusiasm for Rusk 
waned over the course of his presidency, there is no concrete evidence that Kennedy ever 
seriously considered replacing him.605 
 In an April 1960 Foreign Affairs, article Rusk laid out how he saw the 
organization of foreign policy. He believed the President must be in charge and that, 
while the Secretary of State should take an active role, the buck stopped at the White 
House.606 In part this was a response to what he saw as John Foster Dulles’ overly 
aggressive interpretation of the Secretary’s job, though he did not name Dulles since the 
two had been close. Rusk probably did not mean that the Secretary of State should not 
have power. But it suggests that he, like many Democrats and Republicans, believed a 
lack of Oval Office leadership created a dangerous vacuum in the policy process.  
 As important as the relationship between the President and the Secretary was, 
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equally important was how the new Secretary would reinvigorate the State Department. 
The 1950s had not been an easy decade for the State Department. Dulles might have been 
one of the more commanding Secretaries of State in US history, but his passion for the 
issues did not extend to the administration of the Department.607 Dorothy Fosdick wrote a 
1955 New York Times Magazine article that called attention to some of the issues facing 
the Department. While she did not overtly attack Dulles for his style of management, she 
did criticize him for empowering a McCarthy ally who ran the internal security division 
of the Department.608 Aggressive security measures, supported by Dulles, drained the 
morale and confidence of the staff.609 In particular, the Far Eastern Bureau, manned by 
“China Hands,” suffered savage attacks at the hands of Joseph McCarthy. The Bureau 
received no support from higher-ranking officials. Its long-standing expertise evaporated 
as personnel resigned under McCarthy’s condemnations. These attacks also caused many 
potential candidates to question whether they wanted to be Foreign Service Officers 
(FSO). As one State Department employee mused, “[i]t is still prudent for anyone who 
enters the Foreign Service also to know another trade.”610  
Others in the Department suffered from the “Lavender Scare” as McCarthyites 
turned their focus to gays and lesbians working in the government. When Stewart Alsop 
asked a cab driver what was wrong with the State Department the driver responded, 
“Fruits and treachers [sic]. That’s what this place is full of.”611 Indeed, while the 
“Lavender Scare” might not have been as well publicized as the “Red Scare,” far more 																																																								
607 Stuart, p. 246. 
608 Dorothy Fosdick, “For the Foreign Service—Help Wanted” New York Times Magazine, 11/20/55, p. 13. 
609 Ibid, p. 13-14. 
610 Ibid, p. 14 and 18. 
611 Stewart Alsop, “The Trouble with the State Department” Saturday Evening Post, 3/3/62. 
 	
166 
Department employees seem to have been purged on suspicion of homosexuality than on 
suspicion of Communist sympathies.612 Though historians often focus on the high-
ranking victims of these purges, most of those dismissed were lower-level staff. These 
two witch-hunts caused State Department officials to worry about its public image. With 
mixed success, they attempted to project a more masculine image for the Department.613 
Employee morale during the Dulles years suffered for other reasons, as well. 
Reform attempts effectively destroyed the difference between the Home Service—
officials who spent their careers in Washington—and the Foreign Service. Long time 
Department FSO Charles Bohlen felt this further undermined collective morale, forcing 
some Home Service members to leave the Department while others were obligated to 
take overseas positions for which they had neither the training nor the desire.614 In 
addition, in some of the geographic bureaus, the veteran personnel who had served 
through the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s began to retire.615 Others simply left: in the first 
year of the Eisenhower administration alone 142 FSOs retired or resigned, and by 1954 
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the number of FSOs was at its lowest point in five years. 616 Debates even raged over 
what basic training an FSO should receive. As Fosdick noted, they “emphasized the need 
for specialists—economic, labor, agriculture, commercial, promotional, area-language, 
and administration. But no narrow specialist could possibly be an acute observer of the 
ways of other countries, or communicate effectively with other Governments on complex 
political issues or give proper advice on such issues.”617 In a telling anecdote, long-
serving State official U. Alexis Johnson recalled his efforts to recruit staff members in 
1961. He felt that “we could not locate a single Foreign Service Officer who was 
qualified for” the State Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs.618 This 
underscored Fosdick’s own criticism that the Department lacked the “generalists” who 
could think in wider terms. The State Department still contained a vast wealth of 
knowledge: Kennedy had no problem calling low ranking country Desk Officers when he 
had questions, and Bundy recruited some of his most trusted staff from the Department’s 
ranks.619 But a decade of mismanagement, criticism, and attrition had taken a toll. 
Into this milieu stepped Rusk and his new deputy, Chester Bowles. Bowles’ post 
was a consolation prize for the New Dealer. Though Bowles initially believed that 
Kennedy would prove too conservative a candidate, he eventually gained enthusiasm for 
and endorsed the Senator from Massachusetts.620 While Kennedy denied him the post of 
Secretary, which Bowles fervently wanted, serving as Rusk’s second-in-command 																																																								
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seemed like a decent prize. Initially, Rusk gave Bowles wide authority over a variety of 
issues. One of Bowles main efforts was to oversee the appointment of ambassadors. He 
recommended 70% of those in office in 1961 be replaced.621 In part this was a response 
to criticism of the ambassadors selected during the Eisenhower Administration, a group 
made up of political donors and outsiders instead of professionals.622 Replacing some 
ambassadors upon changes in administration was nothing new, but Bowles’ choices 
proved controversial among some Department veterans. Bowles’ recruits were a diverse 
and qualified group, largely selected from the lower ranks of the Foreign Service or 
outside of government and with little regard for Department seniority.623 Bowles had 
little sympathy when certain FSOs objected to the youth of some of the incoming 
ambassadors.624 While Bowles justified his actions as recruiting based on talent, this 
proved to be the last straw for at least some long serving FSOs and hurt Department 
morale.625   
Overall, however, many looked positively on Rusk’s appointment. Rusk was seen 
as someone sympathetic to the Department and its personnel.626 The New York Times 
reported that “[t]hose who have worked with him or know him have been frankly ‘biased 
in his favor’ for Secretary of State.”627 Representatives from all over the world praised 
his appointment, with one saying that Rusk and his team “was the strongest ever to take 																																																								
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office in any country.”628 The Times admitted Kennedy would try to insert himself in the 
foreign policy process, but felt Rusk up to the challenge of balancing the President’s 
interest while maintaining his own powers. It noted that he was “a figure of tremendous 
ability, character and intellect, an excellent choice,” explaining that “the toughness of 
character that Mr. Rusk is reputed to have may be put to the test.”629  
But the first few months of Dean Rusk’s tenure did little, at least at the highest 
levels, to change perceptions of the Department. Specifically, Rusk’s relationship with 
Bowles quickly deteriorated, damaging the Department. In large part this stemmed from 
the fact that Bowles never properly understood how Rusk expected him to function. 
Bowles expressed considerable enthusiasm for tearing down the restraining bureaucracy 
of the Dulles years and for rebuilding the Foreign Service and the Department 
generally.630 Although he did engage in policy formation, management was his main 
activity.631 Rusk bristled at Bowles’ method of operation and Bowles objected to Rusk’s 
more timid approach to new policy ideas. The two even disagreed on Bowles’ mandate to 
organize the Department: Bowles believed a good department produced good ideas, 
organization be dammed. Rusk believed a good department was organizationally 
efficient.632 Neither man fostered a collegial atmosphere in the Department during these 
early months and the disharmony was clear at several levels: Rusk even reassigned the 																																																								
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Department’s spokesperson after less than a year, citing poor performance.633 George 
Ball, usually a Rusk defender, admitted the Secretary was a hard man to work for early in 
the administration.634 As for Bowles, it probably did not help that he occasionally went 
behind Rusk’s back in his hiring practices. Twice, for example, he attempted to recruit 
David Lilienthal for service in the administration, but both times mentioned that 
Lilienthal should keep the ideas private because Bowles had not discussed them with 
Rusk.635 The feud ended only in the fall of 1961 when Kennedy reorganized the 
Department and made Bowles a roving ambassador. The largely meaningless position 
removed him from Washington, but the Department remained mired in discord. Richard 
Neustadt commented, “it [is] depressing to hear [people] worrying this month about the 
State Department organization and personalities in almost the same terms we used last 
May—and last February, for that matter.”636 
Whatever Rusk’s other issues, it seems fair to say that Rusk and Bundy got along 
reasonably well. Rusk, a restrained man even at his most casual, did not feel Bundy was 
trying to take his job, figuratively or literally.637 Rusk joined the near-universal 
agreement that Bundy, despite his handling of the NSC or relations with Johnson and 
Kennedy, remained an honest broker.638 Bundy felt Rusk was able, if sometimes too 
cautious, but respected Kennedy’s relationship with the Secretary.639 The poor 
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relationship between Rusk and Bowles derailed any attempts by either to impose order on 
or to reform the Department in the first nine or so months of the Administration. Whether 
a better-run State Department could have saved the Administration from the Bay of Pigs 
is unclear. But a better-managed Department could only have improved its efforts to 
advise Kennedy. 
 
The System in Action-The Bay of Pigs 
McGeorge Bundy might have ignored almost all of Gordon Gray’s advice, but he 
heeded one part: he kept NSC’s covert action committee, the so-called 5412 Committee, 
intact. Gray apparently begged Bundy—saying, as Bundy recalled, “I want you to 
promise me just one thing”—to keep the committee. He claimed, “if there’s one group 
that can save your President from grief, this is the group that can do it.”640 Like so much 
regarding the NSC, Kennedy’s approach masked a more conservative attitude to 
reorganization behind the facade of dramatic action. Kennedy initially disbanded 
Eisenhower’s committee. He then created another committee, unofficially called the 5412 
Committee, with a similar membership.641 The main difference was that Kennedy played 
a key role on this committee: Eisenhower rarely met with his 5412 group since it allowed 
him plausible deniability. Kennedy, by contrast, played a far greater role in discussing 
operations.642 Gray’s lofty promises, however, proved hollow. Kennedy’s experience 
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with the reformed 5412 Committee highlight the limits of Eisenhower’s belief in 
organization. Committees alone will not save you.  
 Eisenhower’s covert operations followed a similar pattern: use the CIA to arm and 
organize local forces. Then, with varying degrees of operational support, turn those local 
forces loose. In Iran and Guatemala, it worked. In Tibet and Indonesia, it failed. The 
plans for a Cuba operation began in this vein. Train a group of guerillas to sneak into 
Cuba to fight Castro. The plan, however, evolved from a small group to a full-scale 
conventional invasion. While the White House knew the attack would be large, they 
apparently still thought of it as, primarily, a guerilla assault. Nor were they aware that the 
CIA doubted whether its own plan would succeed.643 No one on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) thought to tell the White House that they were so convinced of the operation’s 
failure, that they essentially washed their hands of the operation and turned over full 
control to the CIA.644 Despite the Latin American Task Force, the 5412 Committee, and 
other interagency groups, White House officials failed to grasp the military’s worry, the 
CIA’s skepticism, or the plan’s inherent problems.  
One cannot blame this all on recalcitrant soldiers or useless committees. Many 
State, Defense, and White House officials endorsed the operation despite their own 
doubts.645 Kennedy agonized over the decision and expressed uncertainty even when 
confronted by near unanimous support for the operation. Those officials who argued 
against the invasion might have contributed to the President’s angst over making the 																																																								
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decision, but that certainly did not win the argument.646 Even if their advice did weigh on 
Kennedy, it is possible he himself might have found it hard to back down given the 
resources already allocated to the operation. Defeat may be an orphan, but the defeat at 
the Bay of Pigs still had many fathers. Attorney General Robert Kennedy seemed 
especially intent on discovering who was at fault. Chester Bowles observed that the 
President “was really quite shattered” and, for the first time, “faced a situation where his 
judgment had been mistaken, in spite of the fact that week after week of conferences had 
taken place before he gave the green light.”647 Many of the other advisors displayed what 
Bowles said was “an emotional reaction of a group of people who were not use to set 
backs [sic] or defeats and whose pride and confidence had been deeply wounded.”648 Yet 
groups like the 5412 Committee and the Latin America task force were designed to 
highlight disagreements and bring them to the president’s attention. The Bay of Pigs was 
both a human failure and an organizational failure. 
The response to the debacle addressed both issues. Richard Neustadt later 
confessed that he feared his organizational recommendations deprived Kennedy of 
valuable information prior to the Bay of Pigs saying, “[w]e aimed at Eisenhower and hit 
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Kennedy.”649 Bundy and others feared that dismantling the NSC had been premature.650 
Kennedy brought in retired general Maxwell Taylor to help conduct a review. Taylor, 
like Eisenhower, thought better organization could solve most things.651 Taylor’s 
suggestion bore a striking resemblance to Nelson’s Rockefeller’s PCG ideas from seven 
years earlier. What was needed was a new committee, led by a new presidential assistant, 
to oversee all aspects of the Cold War.652 They would be assisted by a 24-hour nerve 
center in the White House called the “Cold War Indications Center” which would liaise 
with the rest of the government. Taylor said Kennedy’s preference for ad hoc groups led 
to a situation where “committees…come and go without building up experience…and 
accumulating knowledge.”653 He also suggested that Kennedy needed to think more 
deeply about a unifying national strategy as well as his own powers. The strategy critique 
was, in some respects, not new. Eisenhower’s lack of a national strategy was a common 
refrain from Jackson, Paul Nitze, Taylor and others. While they could all agree Kennedy 
was a change for the better, Taylor felt he could do more. As Taylor wrote, the US must 
“recognize that we are in a life and death struggle which we may be losing, and will lose 
unless we change our ways and marshal our resources with an intensity associated in the 
past only with times of war.”654 Taylor also recommended that Kennedy reexamine the 
“emergency powers of the President as to their adequacy to meet the developing 																																																								
649 Daalder and Destler, In the Shadow, p. 21-22. Quoted from author’s interview with Neustadt. 
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situation” and that Kennedy should “link these remarks to…the need to set up a 
governmental machinery for better use of our Cold War assets.”655 The general thought it 
crucial that, once “any Cold War operations [was started, they] must be carried through to 
conclusion with the same determination as a military operation.”656 
Kennedy did not dismiss these ideas out of hand. He even moved a large 
organizational chart based on Taylor’s recommendations to his bedroom, where it stayed 
for several months.657 Three years later, Bundy commented that Taylor’s larger concepts 
were probably unacceptable to Kennedy no matter how the general sold them. More 
committees with more staffers seemed pointless when so many committees had just 
failed. Bundy derisively referred to one proposed Taylor aide as a “Vice President for the 
Cold War.” He also noted that Taylor’s other problem was that his proposal contained 
three words Kennedy did not like: “Cold”, “War”, and “Strategy.”658 Kennedy asked 
former OCB staffer Karl Harr if better organization would have saved him. Harr admitted 
that Eisenhower’s set up would not have prevented such a problem.659 As Bromley Smith 
acknowledged, the “[l]ack of a formal national security system had little to do with 
[Kennedy’s decision]” and instead blamed what he termed “Transitionitis.”660 Bundy 
later agreed with this assessment.661 
In the short term, Kennedy felt there needed to be a culling of people, rather than 
simply a reorganization. The CIA was dangerously inexperienced at mounting such a 																																																								
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large and complex amphibious invasion. This could have been remedied by a greater 
involvement by the JCS, but the JCS had decided to defer to the CIA. The entire process 
was hamstrung by Kennedy’s obsession with plausible deniability, practically impossible 
with an operation of this size and complexity.662 Kennedy himself took the blame 
publically, while also exacting a high bureaucratic body count. Allen Dulles and his top 
aide at the CIA both resigned within a year. Of the four members of the JCS, two were 
gone by December 1961, another by December 1962, while Taylor became chairman. 
Kennedy also rearranged the State Department in November 1961 in the “The 
Thanksgiving Day Massacre.” The most public victim was Chester Bowles. After Bowles 
publically criticized the invasion, Kennedy removed him from Foggy Bottom and into a 
sort of exile via his symbolic roving ambassadorship.  
The discussions of organization and personnel changes, however, all mask a 
larger trend. Within the White House there was a feeling that the rest of the government, 
either by omission or commission, had betrayed the new President. Bundy defended his 
own actions. As he later told a reporter, “[w]e were just freshmen, and as a freshman you 
don’t just go in and say, ‘Dammit, Mr. President, you’re not getting the right 
information.’”663 Kennedy and Bundy also made moves to bring the control of covert 
operations under the White House. The 5412 Committee, now called the Special Group, 
began to assert tighter management over programs, and its authorization was needed to 
commence any covert action. Robert Kennedy played a key role in the group, looking out 
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for his brother’s best interests. In the end the Group did prove much more conservative in 
what it authorized, approving less than 20% of the covert operations recommended.664   
Kennedy also reactivated the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
(PFIAB), an Eisenhower era-group of civilian officials who monitored intelligence 
matters for the President on a part-time basis. Though it lay dormant for the first few 
months of the Administration, the catastrophe in Cuba accelerated the reactivation.665 
Kennedy even recruited Gordon Gray to serve.666 Clark Clifford, a member, observed 
that its membership balanced technical experts with generalists, and served Kennedy well 
in its role as an intelligence ombudsman.667 Lastly, Kennedy took power away from the 
CIA overseas, putting ambassadors in charge of covert operations previously run by CIA 
Station Chiefs. Kennedy might have had doubts about the State Department, but clearly 
felt more comfortable with diplomats running the show.668 Kennedy never lost his 
fascination for covert operations. One has only to look at the escalation in covert 
operations in North Vietnam during the Kennedy years to see this. Yet his push for the 
expansion and development of Special Forces demonstrates that this was a sphere he 
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believed should be run primarily by the military with strict civilian, ideally White House, 
oversight.669  
Much of this, however, was window dressing. The question in the White House 
was how to recover from a situation where the White House felt it had been the victim of 
hidden doubts or outright lies. One should be careful not to attribute all of this to 
paranoia. Taylor’s report, after all, demonstrated that even if many people believed in the 
spirit of the operation, very few believed it would succeed. The White House, of course, 
bore responsibility, too. Bundy might have suggested that, as a “freshman,” he was not 
solely responsible for telling the President to call off the operation. Kennedy’s “spoke 
and wheel” advisory system might have made Bundy feel some justification for his 
reticence: after all, despite his title, he was merely one among many who advised the 
President on these matters. But even Bundy admitted the system was broken and said so 
in a letter to Kennedy.670 As Bundy noted, he did not even see the President on a daily 
basis. The SANSA understood that he had to do something. This system, which had 
started with such promise, had been implicated in a disastrous mistake. If the CIA or the 
military could not be fully trusted, and the State Department seemed unable to overcome 
its organizational issues, the White House would need to fill the void.  
Bundy’s own survival in this matter is also remarkable. While many press 
accounts at the time, and historians since, have rightfully described Bundy’s role as one 																																																								
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of Kennedy’s confidantes, he did not play a prominent role in the early months of the 
Administration. Bundy was merely one foreign policy adviser among many during the 
first months of 1961. He was smart and driven, but was hamstrung in his ability to do 
much with such a poorly defined role. It was the inability of others to earn Kennedy’s 
trust, or to suggest a structure that would better manage policy, as much as Bundy’s 
ability, that convinced the President to keep Bundy in Washington. Perhaps not 
surprisingly for a President whose White House ran on informal organization, Bundy was 
a beneficiary of circumstance, luck—Bundy himself took pains to emphasize how luck 
played a role in all this—skill, and Kennedy’s whim.671 As late as October 1961, 
Neustadt doubted whether Bundy would be SANSA much longer.672 
One might wonder how this would have been different if some of Kennedy’s 
transition advisors had forced him to closely define the roles of his staff before April 
1961. That he never did caused havoc with the process of making foreign policy by 
confusing lines of responsibility. Thomas Hughes, a member of the foreign policy 
transition team, commented that “McGeorge Bundy’s role was not preordained.”673 That 
was part of the bigger problem. Even after reforms, Kennedy remained interested in the 
minutia of foreign policy, sometimes to a distracting degree.674 But it is conceivable that, 
had someone like Neustadt or Clifford more heavily weighed in on the role of the 
SANSA, Bundy might have felt more empowered in the months leading up to the 
invasion. That may not have made much of a difference: Bundy, after all, supported the 																																																								
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plan. Kennedy’s system was, to a large degree, diffuse and distracted. Many eyes might 
be looking at a problem, but few seemed to be asking the right questions. As Neustadt 
commented, “The problem is how…you can avoid ‘sparing’ him details…which 
he…might find significant from where he sits in ways the rest of you…don’t appreciate 
from where you sit.”675 Moreover, there seemed to be few lines of communication 
leading back to the White House. The President needed someone who had the time and 
inclination to think seriously about these issues and to trouble shoot on his behalf. 
 
Conclusion 
While Bundy was considering his future, and the White House was assessing its 
weaknesses, Henry Jackson defended Kennedy in the Senate while simultaneously 
continuing to promote his own ideas. As Jackson had promised in late 1960, he continued 
to call witnesses and publish the last few reports issued by the SNPM. The witnesses 
Jackson planned to call were all members of the new Administration. Karl Mundt wrote 
to Eisenhower complaining that Jackson planned to use these witnesses to show “that the 
new Administration has been moving vigorously to handle ‘inherited problems.’”676 
Mundt asked Eisenhower who the committee should call to “counteract the propaganda 
sure to be entered into the record by the witnesses favorable to the present 
Administration.”677 How Eisenhower responded, or if he did, is unrecorded.  
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Regardless, Mundt now displayed a verve he lacked during the SNPM’s initial 
hearings. As Jackson exploited the U-2 incident, Mundt tried the same with the Bay of 
Pigs. Mundt referenced the SNPM’s condemnation of Eisenhower’s actions of June 1960 
when he told Jackson that the SNPM should, “on our usual non-partisan basis,” 
investigate the fiasco. Mundt highlighted that this was especially important since the 
Kennedy Administration seemed to have ignored some of the SNPM’s suggestions.678 
Mundt and Javits also argued that recently retired Admiral Arliegh Burke should testify 
before the committee.679 Burke, Chief of Naval Operations in August 1961, might have 
been a potent witness for the Republicans. He not only clashed with Kennedy, but also 
was a members of Maxwell Taylor’s Cuba review committee. He also believed that 
Kennedy, in refusing air support to the anti-Castro Cuban forces, had effectively 
condemned them to defeat. In suggesting Burke as a witness, Mundt perhaps aimed to 
inflict on Kennedy the same damage that the Gaither Committee alums exacted on 
Eisenhower.  
Jackson, a loyal White House ally, frustrated these efforts. Discussions of Cuba 
stayed out of the SNPM’s investigations with only scattered references appearing months 
after the invasion. Indeed, when Jackson reconvened the committee in July 1961, he all 
but glossed over Cuba when he mentioned, “The Berlin crisis and the rising tempo of 
Communist activity in Asia, Africa, and next door in Latin America.”680 Jackson avoided 
Mundt’s other requests by, among other ways, ignoring Mundt’s letters for two 																																																								
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months.681 Mundt’s angry insistence that Jackson respond to his queries did nothing to 
advance the Republican agenda.682 The only witness Mundt suggested whom Jackson 
seemed interested in inviting was Eisenhower himself.683 Perhaps Mundt sensed Jackson 
laying yet another trap. It is hard to imagine Eisenhower, an uneven public speaker at the 
best of times, doing better with the same questions that frustrated his subordinates. Once 
again, Jackson stole a march on his Republican colleagues and Mundt quietly dropped the 
idea.  
The SNPM’s final eleven hearings allowed the Kennedy Administration to defend 
its record. Robert McNamara appeared to address the Administration’s defense program. 
Dean Rusk spoke about the State Department’s new approach to foreign policy. Other 
officials gave evidence that Kennedy was attempting to rectify the mistakes of the 
Eisenhower years. Former PACGO member Don Price, perhaps unintentionally, shielded 
Kennedy from charges he should resurrect Eisenhower’s system. As he had in the late 
1950s, Price suggested that the President should have freedom to set up any organization 
he wanted, and that large staffs hurt, not helped, the policy making process.684  
If publically Jackson provide a shield for Kennedy, he privately expressed 
concerns over the Administration’s organization after the Bay of Pigs. He combined these 
critiques with an attempt to place some political allies in positions of power. On May 31, 
																																																								
681 Mundt to Jackson, 5/19/61, Accn 35606, Box 67, Mundt, Sen. Karl, 1959-1961, UW; Summary of 
Correspondence, N.D., Accn 35606, Box 67, Mundt, Sen. Karl, 1959-1961, UW. 
682 Mundt to Jackson, 5/19/61, Accn 35606, Box 67, Mundt, Sen. Karl, 1959-1961, UW. 
683 Jackson to Mundt, 6/19/61 and Mundt to Jackson, 6/20/61 both in RGIII, Gov Ops Committee Misc 
1957-1962, FF8, DS. Jackson to Mundt, 6/19/61, RGIII, Gov Ops Committee Misc 1957-1962, FF8, DS. 
684 Price Testimony, 8/17/61, in Organizing for National Security Vol. I. 
 	
183 
1961, he met with Robert Kennedy and delivered a list of recommended changes.685 
Jackson’s message was mixed. He returned to one of his favorite phrases when he 
suggested that a “[d]rastic overhaul of the national security set-up is not indicated. The 
present structure is basically sound; the problems cannot be solved by organizational 
tinkering but by [good] people.”686 Yet, in getting these “good people” into place, he 
thought some changes were needed. Jackson recommended augmenting the foreign 
policy staff of the White House with special assistants to focus on intelligence and 
military issues. He recommended a new director of policy planning in the State 
Department as well as a new Under Secretary of State. He also hinted at the need to 
replace Allen Dulles.687 Like Taylor, Jackson also felt that the US required an over-
arching Cold War strategy, specifically calling for a new NSC-68.688 The continuing 
crisis in Laos, Soviet threats over Berlin, and a newly empowered Castro all seemed to 
demand that the administration draft some sort of overall Cold War strategy lest a 
piecemeal approach to crisis management doom the US to defeat in detail.  
Jackson submitted these recommendations with his own list of “good people.” 
The names on the list include some who had testified before the SNPM, as well as some 
of its staffers and consultants.689 Not surprisingly, Jackson championed Paul Nitze for a 
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promotion, initially suggesting Nitze be CIA head, but eventually downgrading that 
recommendation to a post in the State Department.690 He also suggested that Robert Tufts 
take over the Policy Planning Staff.691 Jackson recommended that White House aide 
Ralph Dungan, who had no previous intelligence experience, become the President’s 
Intelligence assistant, and privately planned to push Richard Neustadt as Dungan’s 
replacement.692  
Robert Kennedy did not suffer fools lightly, especially during this early period of 
his government career. The younger Kennedy, however, forwarded Jackson’s 
recommendations to his brother. Compared to Taylor’s elaborate suggestions, Jackson’s 
recommendations fell more in line with both John Kennedy’s own thinking and the 
current organization of the Administration. Jackson’s memo made it to the Oval Office 
and it seems that the President discussed these ideas with the Senator.693 Yet the 
President discounted almost all of Jackson’s recommendations. Only one of Jackson’s 
recommendations seems to have survived, and that was his idea for Kennedy to retain a 
military assistant who was “thoroughly familiar with the Pentagon and State and with the 
political aspects of unconventional warfare…to make sure the right questions are asked 
about political-military operations.” This job went to Maxwell Taylor, though only after 
he refused to take over the CIA. For several months he served as the sort of “President’s 
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Military Representative” Jackson wanted.694 This posting lasted until Taylor became 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and might be the only legacy of Jackson’s pitch.  
What Jackson privately thought is not recorded. The Administration took no steps 
toward reinvigorating the Policy Planning Staff, writing a new NSC-68, or, prior to the 
“Thanksgiving Day Massacre,” addressing the issues in the State Department. At least 
one Jackson confidant was happy, however. Writing to his friends on the SNPM staff—
and possibly unaware of Jackson’s efforts—Richard Neustadt applauded Kennedy’s 
efforts. While he admitted there had been rough patches, he said the president was wise 
to “eschew Bobby’s organizational gimmickry…. Bobby’s reactions are those which 
reasonably ought to be expected from a frustrated new President. This makes his 
brother’s resistance more impressive to me.”695  Neustadt also believed Kennedy took a 
fresh look at issues that “the Achesons and Ascolis [had] long since made up their minds 
on” and had restored “to policy-making the ingredient of human judgment by visible, 
responsible officials.”696  
Whatever Neustadt’s claims, though, the fact is that the Kennedy Administration 
suffered a major blow at the Bay of Pigs. The President no longer trusted the unfiltered 
advice of the JCS or CIA. The State Department was consumed by infighting at the 
highest levels and hobbled by a decade of neglect. While the President increasingly 
turned to his brother as counsel and troubleshooter, the Attorney General could not 
effectively function as the President’s day-to-day foreign policy advisor, just as the 																																																								
694 “Changes in the National Security Area” 6/9/61, HJ, Accn 356006, Box 83 Folder 19, National Security, 
UW; Kinnard, p. 56-57, and Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy (Mariner Books, 2002), p. 448-449.  
695 Neustadt to Douglas Carter, 12/15/61, HJ, Accn 356006, Box 1 Folder 30, Neustadt, Richard 1961-
1962, UW. 
696 Ibid. Ascoli refers to Max Ascoli, the left-leaning publisher of the newsmagazine The Reporter. 
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micromanaging President could not oversee the entire government. The President had to 
find other ways to manage foreign policy.  
 All of this pointed to another major issue. The Administration was full of 
Jackson’s “good people,” some might say the best and the brightest. Jackson might have 
been right that good people could overcome bad organization but, just as in the 
Eisenhower Administration, there were penalties for bad organization, borne out over the 
first few months of 1961. Whether the assemblage of good people prevented worse 
catastrophes is, of course, impossible to know. Yet we can know this: as in Eisenhower’s 
Administration, organization had, accidentally, suppressed dissent. Kennedy’s hope that 
he would have access to “independent judgements [and] realistic…fully developed 
alternatives, on which [to] make a final judgement…rather than merely a consensus 
rising from the secondary staff level” remained unfulfilled.697 Just because a President 
was handed such dissenting opinions did not mean he would heed them.  
 In some respects, however, the frustration of Kennedy, Bundy, and others, is 
remarkable. In 1958, a CIA attempt to overthrow the government of Indonesia was 
uncovered in a manner similar to what happened at the Bay of Pigs: the spectacular 
failure of a coup attempt. The capture of a CIA contractor further linked America to the 
disaster. The U-2 incident, like the Bay of Pigs, highlighted a flawed decision-making 
process and a poor response. The Bay of Pigs, of course, had components those other 
incidents lacked: an army of anti-communist freedom fighters was seemingly sacrificed 
on America’s doorstep. Yet those previous two incidents, among other failures of the 																																																								
697 Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, p. 210. 
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Eisenhower years, had not produced the same soul-searching. Eisenhower understood 
there were problems with his system that might have contributed to these failures, yet 
made few if any meaningful changes. One might correctly fault Kennedy for blaming the 
failure so heavily on organization while acknowledging so few of his own poor decisions. 
Kennedy knew that some people, including hawks like Dean Acheson, felt that the 
invasion was folly. But it still went forward. It is equally true that Kennedy did not know 
the extent of dissent in government. Kennedy’s frustration with the organizational set-up 
should not be surprising, but the frustration was based on an acceptance and avoidance of 
problems that had been festering since the early Eisenhower years.  
Whether it was as an attempt to assuage guilt or not, Kennedy and Bundy decided 
that, to avoid another Bay of Pigs, changes had to be made. Richard Neustadt argued that 
if the State Department did not work, the Administration should focus on building up 
those parts of the government that did.698 While Neustadt felt that State might eventually 
work its way through its problems, he also advocated that now was the time to turn to 
“[p]rocess-building, not department building.”699 There had to be a better way, both for 
the President to get information from the depths of the federal bureaucracy and 
simultaneously to make sure that the President’s orders were executed. Their framing of 
this problem, however, was one that set the White House against the rest of the 
government.  
 
																																																								
698 Richard Neustadt to David Bell, 10/18/61, HJ, Accn 356006, Box 63, Neustadt, Richard, 1960-1968, 
UW. 
699 Ibid. 
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Just like in the Eisenhower system, many day-to-day foreign policy issues were handled by the Special 
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assistants, other government officials, or private citizens. The SANSA, in theory, drew some of his 
recommendations from his work with the Planning Group, like Eisenhower’s old Planning Board. 
When the president had decided on a policy he wished to pursue, he would issue an NSAM. This would 
inform the government of his objectives. The Task Forces, largely administered by the State Department, 
drew their general policies from this document, similar to how NSC directives set policy for the OCB 
during the 1950s. 
 
The President would also consult with his NSC and manage covert operations within the 5412 Committee. 
This is, perhaps, where we can see the most significant differences between the two presidents. Kennedy 
met with the NSC proper less, though made up for that with more frequent meetings with smaller groups of 
advisors. Eisenhower had these meetings as well, though he supplemented them with the larger NSC 
meetings. While Eisenhower’s SANSA ran the 5412 Committee during his Administration, Kennedy 
played a much more active role in the decisions of that body 
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Chapter 5: Robert Komer’s Cure 
In March of 1963, Newsweek published a story on McGeorge Bundy describing 
how, in addition to being a Presidential advisor, he ran the NSC “and…its high-powered 
staff.”700 Listing the key staffers, the article noted that the job of this so-called “Bundy 
Group” was to act as a “miniature State Department…[and] to ride herd…by frequent 
checks with the responsible officers in State, Defense, or [the CIA].”701 Notably missing 
from the list of members of the group was the name Robert Komer. Komer, a CIA 
veteran, held a portfolio of responsibilities wider than any of the individuals mentioned. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr, dubbed him “Blowtorch Bob.” Lodge said an argument with 
Komer was like having a blowtorch aimed at the seat of your pants. Komer, sitting in his 
EOB office, decided he could not let the Newsweek slight go unanswered. He wrote 
Bundy a memo displaying both humor and a bit of hubris asking, “My wife, my 
secretary, and my limited public all wonder if Newsweek is its usual reliable self in 
ranking your braintrust…. Have I lost out in a political power struggle? Am I in the dog 
house? Or was I really right in all my self deprecation in the past? As for me, my only 
embarrassed query is whether you are the source.”702 Bundy sent a handwritten note back 
on the same memo stating that he had not been the source of this information, and that it 
was not based on what he actually thought, adding “I love you,” which he underlined 
twice.703 
																																																								
700William Tuohy, “JFK’s McGeorge Bundy-Cool Head for Any Crisis.” Newsweek, Vol. LXI No. 9 
(March 4, 1963), p.20. 
701 Ibid, p. 23. 
702 Komer memo to Bundy, 2/27/63, NSF, Box 322, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 1/63-2/63, JFK. 
703 Ibid. 
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The growth of the NSC staff during the Bundy years is not a new story. Newsweek 
perhaps gave one of the few contemporary insights into the workings of the staff, but in 
the past two decades a number of scholars have revaluated Bundy’s role, shining much 
needed light on the transformation of an important if little understood job.704 During the 
first six months of the Kennedy Administration, Bundy struggled with his responsibilities 
as a SANSA. During the next six months, Bundy transformed not only his job—taking 
him far closer to what we know think of as the job of National Security Advisor—but 
also fundamentally transformed the role of his staff. As with Newsweek article, those 
staffers have received varying degrees of attention. 
What has received less attention is how those staffers helped Bundy develop his 
role. Bundy’s own power was important but in many respects was little different from 
previous foreign policy advisors. Colonel House, Harry Hopkins, and other former 
presidential counselors would have identified with many aspects of Bundy’s position. 
What made Bundy different was his cultivation and development of the NSC staff. For 
the first time, the president officially had a permanent, personal, foreign policy group 
working in the Executive Branch. While the Bay of Pigs sped up this transformation, the 
evolution of the NSC staff began long before and lasted long after that event. Like his 
confusion over his own responsibilities, it seems that Bundy had few definite ideas about 
																																																								
704 Another contemporary article mentioned “Bundy’s ‘Little State Department’” but did not even name any 
of the staffers. “Name in the Game” Time, 3/15/63. The best examples are Andrew Preston The War 
Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Harvard UP, 2005) Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: 
McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy-Brothers in Arms (Simon and Schuster, 1998) Kasper Grotle 
Rasmussen The Men Behind the Man: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC Staff, and the Making of American 
Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 PhD Dissertation, Aarhus University, 2012 and Christian Nünlist, Kennedys 
rechte Hand: McGeorge Bundy Einfluss als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater auf die amerikanische 
Aussenpolitik 1961-1963 (CSS ETH Zurich, 1999). 
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how to shape his staff. For the first half of 1961, Bundy viewed their role as ancillary to 
his advisory efforts. As with the NSC machinery generally, Bundy seemed more hesitant 
to make changes than historians have commonly assumed. Komer took a leading role in 
advocating for these changes, yet his contributions remain largely unrecognized.705 
Besides Bundy, Komer may have been the most important person in envisioning the 
staff’s powers and prerogatives. In some respects, however, Komer’s suggestions might 
also be viewed in a larger context. He might not have fully realized it, but he represented 
the foreign policy bureaucracy in striking back against an institution they, for over a 
decade, felt was poorly managed.  
The transformed staff interpreted information for the president, recommended 
policy changes, and monitored the implementation and execution of policy. This change 
permanently altered the way the White House shaped and management of US foreign 
policy. Additionally, we can learn much about the NSC staff and how Bundy intended 
them to function from Bundy’s hiring patterns. Far from filling the ranks of the NSC with 
outsiders, the vast majority of NSC staffers were either Bundy’s long-time friends or 
highly-recommended government employees. While he took a chance in adopting 
Komer’s recommendations, Bundy continued to display an attitude that was largely 
cautious—and conservative—in his changes to the NSC system. To understand Komer’s 
role in the NSC, one has to understand his background in the CIA. Between 1947 and 																																																								
705 Only recently has Komer received much attention. Frank Leith Jones’ Blowtorch: Robert Komer, 
Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2013) has a chapter on Komer in 
Bundy’s NSC, but only a very brief reference to his organizational role and lacks the larger background. 
See Jones, Blowtorch, p. 49. Despite Jones’ considerable scholarship Robert Rakove’s Kennedy, Johnson, 
and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge UP, 2013) has probably the best atmospheric description of Komer 
as a person. Rakove, p. 36-41. 
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1960, Komer faced several organizational challenges that mimicked the early months of 
the NSC. These early experiences directly led to the advice he gave Bundy in 1961. 
 
The Trials and Tribulations of ONE 
Robert Komer was present at the creation of the national security state. In 1947 he 
joined the CIA as a low-level analysist in its Office of Research and Estimates (ORE). 
ORE employed a large staff to create long-range predictions of political, military, and 
economic trends. Critics, however, questioned the staff’s intellect and the very value of 
their reports.706 The onset of the Korean War, unanticipated by ORE, caused the CIA to 
disband the unit and form a new group called the Office of National Estimates (ONE). 
Much of ORE’s staff was purged, though Komer survived, becoming the youngest ONE 
staffer.707 
CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith drafted William Langer and Sherman Kent, 
both OSS veterans, to lead this new team.708 Though Langer and Kent took on a few 
survivors of ORE, most of their new hires had university and academic backgrounds.709 
Langer wanted to keep the staff small, roughly twenty-five analysts, believing that fewer 
																																																								
706 L.L Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-
Feburary 1953, (University Park, PA, 1992), p. 120-123; Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of 
the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA, 1999), p. 191; 
707 F. Jones, p. 19. 
708 It took the personal intervention of Harry Truman to convince the Harvard board to grant Langer a leave 
of absence. William Langer, In and Out of the Ivory Tower (New York, 1977), p. 220; Barry M. Katz, 
Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942-1945 (Cambridge, 
MA: 1989), p. 5. 
709 Raymond Sontag, former chair of Princeton’s History Department, was among the hires. Like Bundy’s 
NSC, Ivy League degrees in ONE were more common then not. Raymond Garthoff, A Journey Through the 
Cold War (Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 40.  
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staffers would allow for better coordination.710 To facilitate cooperation, there was no 
formal hierarchy outside a few senior officials, termed “generalists,” who oversaw ad-hoc 
teams assembled by Langer to address specific intelligence questions.711  
Despite the new name, ORE and ONE had similar aims. They both produced 
annual updates on a wide variety of subjects and specific reports requested by policy 
makers. It was hard work on the analysts. One noted that the experience was like a 
“journey to hell and back” and compiling the drafts was “a combination of a PhD 
examination, a taste of the Spanish inquisition, and a dollop of…torture.”712 Langer and 
Kent demanded perfection. Kent obsessed over word choices and both men routinely 
lectured the staff on their “deadly prose.”713 That attention to detail, however, was 
important: over 250 copies of each report were disseminated throughout the US 
government and occasionally, overseas.714 The widespread dissemination of ONE’s 
product opened up the possibility that these relatively low-ranking analysts could have a 
significant impact on shaping US policy. Despite the hype over ONE’s reports, Komer 
discovered that upper level policy makers rarely saw the unit’s findings. Several years 																																																								
710 Langer, In and Out, p. 220-221 and Montague, Walter, p. 136-137. Langer says he hired between 50 and 
60 staff total, while CIA censors removed the exact numbers of ONE staff from Montague’s account. 
Former ONE staffers, however, told Kai Bird that there were only 25 or so of them working at any one 
point. Bird, Color, p. 157. 
711 Ibid, p. 137. 
712 Chester Cooper, In the Shadows of History: 50 Years Behind the Scenes of Cold War Diplomacy 
(Prometheus Books, 2005), p. 98. 
713 Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington, DC, 1989), p. 
55. One analysts remembered his use of the word “limited” being challenged. When he asked why, he was 
told, “It doesn’t mean anything…Because everything is limited under God!”; Bird, Color, p.158 and 
Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimative Probability” Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: 
Collected Essays D.P. Steury ed. (Washington, DC, 1994), p. 133-146. 
713 Bird, Color, p.158 
714 NIEs (National Intelligence Estimate) were normal analysis. SNIEs, or Special National Intelligence 
Estimates, were usually issued in response to specific crises. For circulation numbers see Komer 
Memorandum for the Board Subject: NIE Survey 5/14/56. Declassified Documents Reference System, 
Gale Digital Connections. 
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into his stint at ONE, Komer wanted to know more about who read their reports and 
commissioned a survey. It revealed that “[O]ur real readership may be at a level 
considerably below the top, even though the gist of key [findings] may filter up.”715 In 
part, Komer learned that these reports were too long to be easily read by top officials, 
who confined themselves to summaries or conclusions, a problem the CIA continued to 
encounter years after Komer left the Agency.716  
 There were also problems in Langer’s free flowing staff concept. A majority of 
the staff felt the office was rudderless, in part due to Langer’s lose organization. Even if 
staffers had expertise with a certain regions or topics, they could not work on material 
from a region unless assigned; many felt the senior “generalists” lacked the necessary 
knowledge for good interpretation.717 Those senior officials in turn grew angry that they 
could not master subjects as they were quickly moved from topic to topic.718 The staff 
rebelled. Langer and Kent responded by giving more responsibilities to individual 
analysts and allowing most staffers to focus on specific regions.719 Kent, at least, believed 
that these changes significantly improved the quality of ONE’s output.720  
 Surprisingly, ONE became, surprisingly, a progressive voice in that it often 
challenged the Cold War orthodoxy, though questioning convention came at a price.721 																																																								
715 Ibid.  
716 Ibid. In the late 1980s a similar CIA survey found almost exactly the same issue: officials praised the 
material they received from the CIA, but often spent little time reading the types of reports they most 
enthusiastically lauded. Author Classified, “Surveying Intelligence Consumers” Studies in Intelligence Fall, 
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720 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton UP, 1966), p. 119 and 129. 
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Several ONE staffers were suspected of being communists by officials in the CIA and 
Joseph McCarthy and this led to critical findings being “buried [in] Cold War boilerplate 
language.”722 At the very least, this frustrated staffers like Komer, who saw their best 
ideas being ignored. Yet, Komer had gained another valuable lesson from his time in the 
CIA: ONE forced its analysts to work widely across government in compiling their 
reports. That interagency role was rare in government, and made him and other ONE 
veterans valuable in Bundy’s service.723 Service in ONE certainly gave them a wider 
understanding of how the policy process worked compared to officials in other parts of 
the government. 
 Long before gaining his “Blowtorch” moniker, Komer came away from ONE 
with a mixed reputation. His bosses believed “…analytical skill was more important than 
congenial manner.”724 His coworkers never doubted his skill, but questioned his 
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temper.725 Years later, Bundy said: “Komer isn’t everyone’s cup of tea, because he can be 
abrasive and impatient. . . . But underneath all this surface stuff [he] is a rare bird: 
extraordinarily hard working, bright, and devoted quite single-mindedly to the U.S. 
national interest.”726 He quickly rose in the ranks, and ended up having an unpleasant 
experience on Eisenhower’s NSC Planning Board.  
 After Kennedy’s election, Komer looked to get out of the CIA. The selection of 
Bundy as his SANSA seemed to be an opening. Komer, on his own initiative, submitted a 
series of memos to Bundy recommending both foreign policy initiatives and NSC 
organizational changes. Bundy asked his brother William, who served in ONE, if he 
could recommend anyone for the White House staff. William responded that Komer was 
one of the best “middle-level doers” he knew.727 Bundy seemed impressed by both his 
brother’s recommendation and Komer’s memos. The CIA analyst became Bundy’s first 
hire and the two quickly developed a rapport.  
 
The NSC Staff on the New Frontier 
 In some respects, Bundy’s rearrangement of the NSC staff mimicked what he and 
Kennedy did to Eisenhower’s overall organization. On the face of it, Bundy had most of 
Eisenhower’s NSC staffers reassigned to jobs outside the White House. This was not a 
simple task: the OCB alone had 71 staffers who needed to be moved elsewhere.728 One 																																																								
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jokester claimed that Bundy’s purge was so thorough that he fired the staff who sorted 
the mail.729 Despite the purge, Bundy kept on six of Eisenhower’s NSC staffers, adding 
Komer to their number.730 These seven did the majority of staff work for Bundy during 
the first half of 1961. The surviving memos from the early months of the administration 
suggest Bundy fully intended to keep these men in service, not just use them as stopgaps 
until new staffers could be recruited.731  
Bundy’s broad concept envisioned himself and his deputy, Walt Rostow, running 
the operations. Rostow was an accidental appointment to the NSC: like Bundy, he ended 
up in the White House after Kennedy promised him another position, only to see that job 
go to someone else.732 Bundy and Rostow, however, complemented each other. One 
staffer observed, “Bundy…was primarily Western Europe, NATO, big Far East things, 
big power politics.”733 Rostow, on the other hand, took “the underdeveloped world [as 
his] beat.”734 Komer and the rump NSC staff would serve as Neustadt’s “utility 
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assistants,” providing support where needed.735 But Bromley Smith, late OCB Executive 
Secretary and later Bundy’s executive secretary, pointed out that Bundy “was so busy and 
active that he really had little time to address himself to organization….No one visualized 
how the new staff system was going to work out.”736 Even Bundy admitted, “I didn’t 
know [Kennedy]…I didn’t know Washington….I didn’t know what the job really 
was.”737  
An early memo to Kennedy shows Bundy’s shaky grasp on his staff’s function: 
NSC staff (your staff, really) will have other jobs than preparing for the [formal 
NSC] meetings… The jobs it can do for you are two: one is to help in presenting 
issues of policy, and the other is to keep in close touch with operations that you 
personally want to keep on top of. Both of these things were done, in theory, by a 
large, formal, paper-producing staff for President Eisenhower. I'm sure you don't 
want that, and what you do want is what I need to ask you before the meeting. I 
have ideas, but I think it will be easier to talk about them than write [them].738  
 
By contrast Rostow wanted to use the staff “to work intimately at the [State 
Department] desk level; to deal with policy makers at least at the assistant secretary level; 
and to argue and propose high policy with grace.”739 Yet he also believed that the staffers 
should be generalists, temporarily assigned where needed.740  
It took Kennedy almost a month to encourage Bundy to bring in “a small group of 
senior officials able to work directly with him.”741 Bundy called up friend and fellow 
Harvard professor Carl Kaysen, saying, “Carl, I’m having a lot of fun and I’m swamped 																																																								
735 Bundy to Kennedy “The Use of the National Security Council” 1/24/61, Doc. 4, FRUS Vol. XXV. 
736 Smith OH, p. 20 and p. 3. For Bundy’s assessment of Neustadt see Bundy to Kennedy “The Use of the 
National Security Council” 1/24/61, Doc. 4, FRUS Vol. XXV. 
737 Bundy OH, p. 24. 
738 Bundy to Kennedy, 1/31/61, NSF Box 405, Memos to the President 1/61-2/61, JFKL. 
739 Rostow to Bundy, “OCB Functions” 1/27/61, NSF 284, Operations Coordinating Board, General, 
1/27/61-7/27/61 and undated. 
740 Rostow to Bundy, 5/4/61, NSF Box 290, White House, Administrative Matters, 3/1/61-5/15/61, JFK. 
741 Bundy to Macy 2/21/61, NSF Box 283, NSC Organization and Administration, 2/1/61-5/4/61, JFK. 
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and need help.”742 Kaysen agreed, and Bundy made him a consultant until he could move 
to Washington full time that summer.743 Bundy also hired Marcus Raskin, a young, left 
leaning, former congressional staffer who had impressed many in the Washington foreign 
policy community. Like Kaysen, however, he required a security screening and could not 
start full time until mid-spring. Pressured by Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy, and Rostow, 
Bundy also hired Henry Kissinger on a part time basis.744 Other than these new hires, the 
core of the NSC staff remained the Eisenhower staffers.  
Despite Administration rhetoric to the contrary, the NSC staff basically 
functioned in these early months as it did during the Eisenhower Administration. As 
Bundy admitted to Kennedy, “How you [implement policy] is merely a problem in 
operations. In this part of the staff we only make plans.”745 While Bundy went off to act 
as a presidential adviser the staff, under Rostow’s direction, went to work reviewing and 
analyzing various US policies, writing lengthy draft reports, and pondering anticipated 
long-range problems.746 They were helpful assistants but they were anonymous 																																																								
742 An Interview with Carl Kaysen, MIT SSP [hereafter Kaysen MIT Interview], p. 6. 
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bureaucrats who lacked influence in the White House or around Washington.747 
Moreover, the “Presidential staff” Bundy promised Kennedy never saw the President 
himself. Komer, for purely personal reasons, even begged Bundy, “sometime—do haul 
me along when you see the man next door. It isn’t me—it’s my kids—they keep asking if 
I’ve met the President (he’s susceptible to this argument, isn’t he).”748 
Bundy seemed to be dissatisfied with this arrangement, and solicited ideas from 
within the NSC—including Komer personally—and elsewhere about possible 
improvements.749 Most of the memos Bundy got back were good, if dry documents.750 By 
contrast, Komer sent back punchy, attention-grabbing notes inspired by what he learned 
from his time at ONE: brevity and style count. Komer complained that Bundy did little 
loop in the staff, writing “Dammit [the NSC staff] cannot function as your left arms 
unless we at least know what’s going on…. I knew more about…activities at the CIA 
than here. Who knows, we may have an idea to contribute, or at least should know what’s 
decided so we don’t grind our gears.”751 Despite the fact they worked for the President, 
Komer complained they were out of the communication loop. After three months of 
working in the White House he noted that he had not even seen a single cable from the 																																																								
747 Komer to Rostow 5/1/61, NSF Box 438, NSC Staff 1961-1963, JFK; Komer to Bundy, 5/16/61, NSF 
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State Department.752 He also advocated firing all the Eisenhower holdovers except two 
since most, “of the old staff won’t fit the new pattern [and are] waiting and hoping [that 
they would not be fired] rather than either pitching in or actively looking elsewhere.”753 
Most importantly, Komer said the staff needed to be more active. He argued:  
In sum, what you seem to want (amen from me) is a small top-notch team of idea 
men, expediters, and high grade liaison types who will work intimately with you 
and the President to see that the right things get done. My long disused [Harvard 
Business School] training tells me that this can be done only by the closest 
teamwork, with full and free interchange of ideas and info. If we don’t measure 
up, fire us.754 
 
Bundy and Rostow considered Komer’s suggestions, but only acted on one: except for 
the two staffers Komer said Bundy should retain, the remaining Eisenhower staffers were 
phased out by the end of March.755  
 A month later, the Bay of Pigs renewed questions about what the staff should be 
doing. The State Department seemed to be flailing. Kennedy seemed to have little 
confidence in the Pentagon’s rank-and-file or CIA. The pressing question was how could 
the White House staff more effectively carry out Kennedy’s wishes while also monitoring 
the rest of the government? One change was the creation of the President’s Daily 																																																								
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Intelligence Briefings, initially a symptom of Kennedy’s micro-managerial instincts and 
now a sacred rite of the president.756 Another was that Bundy moved from the EOB to the 
White House. Bundy’s access changed practically overnight, and he now saw the 
president four or five times a day.757 He also wrote Kennedy a mea culpa, saying he and 
the NSC staff had failed the President by not alerting him to questions over the Bay of 
Pigs operation.758 Kennedy, Bundy said, was “entitled to feel confident that (a) there is no 
part of the…national security area that is not watched closely by someone from your own 
staff, and (b) there is no major problem of policy that is not out where you can see it and 
give a proper stimulus to those who should be attacking it.”759  
 After that, Bundy and Rostow set to work slowly transforming the NSC staff, 
including asking Komer for more suggestions. Komer prepared a memo that reads like a 
blueprint of how Bundy’s NSC later functioned. He reiterated much of what he wrote 
months earlier. In the shadow of Cuba, however, this took on a new urgency and 
relevance. Komer observed that Bundy and Rostow took too much responsibility on 
themselves, with “the rest of us helping out a bit here and there, offering a few ideas, but 
largely only grinding our gears… In short, you’re spread too thin.”760 This was not just 
hurting Bundy and Rostow, but also the staff. Komer added, “Take me for example,” he 
wrote, “[a]fter two months here after the glowing sales job you and Mac did on me…I 
have no feeling yet that I’m a real member of your team.”761 He recommended that the 																																																								
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staff be decentralized and given power to pursue their own policy initiatives. Harkening 
back to his early complaints about ONE he added, “I am also afraid there is no alternative 
to giving out regional and functional assignments. We can’t all be universal scholars.”762 
At the same time, he argued the NSC needed a visible central staff structure. They could 
pursue their own tasks, but there needed to be something to hold them together.763 Bundy 
and Rostow liked Komer’s arguments and asked Komer to draw up a plan to assign areas 
of responsibility to the staff. With minor variations, Bundy followed Komer’s 
recommendations for the remainder of the Kennedy Administration.764 The NSC staff 
became organized in a fashion similar to that of the State Department. While Bundy 
encouraged staffers to comment and help out with problems unrelated to their areas of 
expertise, senior staff members primarily took charge of divisions that corresponded 
roughly to the geographic desks at Foggy Bottom. Komer, for instance, monitored South 
Asia and the Middle East, as well as foreign aid. Rostow kept the Far East, 
counterinsurgency, other aspects of aid, and parts of Africa. Bundy largely kept the 
Europe brief, but split parts of it with Kaysen and, for a period, Kissinger. Of course, 
none of this would have happened without Bundy’s support. Bundy saw the value in 
Komer’s suggestions and moved to adopt them. Despite the credit due to Komer, we 
might instead view him as merely lucky, instead of prescient. Harold Saunders, later one 
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of Komer’s staffers, said that “Policy isn’t made on paper; it’s a continuously changing 
mix of people and ideas.”765 The same could be said of organization.  
It took one other staffer to complete the transformation of Bundy’s NSC. If we 
can view Komer as the high-minded theorist, Bromley Smith was the practical 
administrator. Indeed, Smith personifies Bundy’s handling of the NSC. A former 
Executive Secretary of the OCB he, like so much of the old NSC system, was retained in 
a less public role rather than fired. When things began to go wrong, Kennedy and Bundy 
turned to people like Smith, government insiders, to help solve the problem. The 
President and the SANSA might have outwardly displayed disdain for the over-organized 
Eisenhower White House, but they also realized that career government officials often 
were their best allies in improving the system. Smith’s long experience in the White 
House made him a skilled insider who could carry out the day-to-day activities of the 
NSC.  
Smith began government service as a Foreign Service Officer, later working as an 
assistant to both George Marshall and Dean Acheson, including a stint as Acheson’s 
secret liaison to the press.766 Smith entered the NSC during the last year of the Truman 
administration and served throughout the Eisenhower years, rising to first analyst and 
then Executive Secretary of the OCB. Smith admired parts of the Eisenhower system, but 
understood its workings were not perfect and acknowledged that these shortcomings had 
as much do with Eisenhower’s management style as any particular organizational flaw.767 
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Smith failed in his efforts to convince Bundy to save the OCB, but blamed Neustadt 
rather than Bundy. Smith “had rather a dim view of the Professor ” because he 
“recommended dismantling the NSC machinery [t]hen he took a sabbatical and left all 
the broken crockery around the White House…He was happy in England while we were 
trying to sort out the pieces.”768 Smith’s survival in the system was almost accidental: 
Bundy realized he was losing track of memos, and retained Smith to follow up on his 
paperwork.769 Even Smith’s promotion to NSC Executive Secretary in July, 1961, was 
done more for show than efficiency. Bundy promoted Smith to Executive Secretary of the 
NSC in July, 1961.770 Under Eisenhower, this position had significant statutory powers, 
but Bundy made the appointment simply to make sure no one else got the job.771 
Smith, however, continued to take on more tasks and increasingly oversaw 
Bundy’s communications. Bundy in turn praised Smith’s effort, saying he was 
“completely loyal to this Administration, which is much more to his personal taste than 
the last one.”772 Komer, for one, complained to Bundy that he misused Smith: “[Smith] is 
logically a [cable] customer not a cable screener” and “[is] far too senior to be saddled” 
with an administrative job.773  
But Smith flourished in his new job. If Bundy wanted his staff to oversee foreign 
policy from the White House, the infrastructure needed to exist for them to do so. Smith 
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oversaw this process, including one of the most important innovations of the Kennedy 
years: the White House Situation Room. This simple concept changed how the White 
House conducted policy. Like with so much else, the idea was hardly was new—William 
McKinley had a “War Room” during the Spanish-American War, and Franklin Roosevelt 
had his “Map Room” during the Second World War. Rockefeller had essentially 
recommended a similar concept in 1954. Maxwell Taylor did the same when he 
submitted the Taylor Report. The State and Defense Departments already had their own 
message centers they used to gather information from around the government.774 Bundy, 
Rostow, and other members of the Administration discussed similar ideas shortly after 
the inauguration.775 Bundy initially dismissed the suggestions, perhaps because a 
Situation Room would merely duplicate similar arrangements in other Departments.776 
After the Bay of Pigs, an NSC staffer urged Bundy to reconsider such a plan.777 
Bundy quickly commandeered a former bowling alley in the White House basement and 
supplied it with teletypes.778  Media portrayals of this complex often emphasize it as a 
place where Presidents consulted with their advisors, but Kennedy rarely, if ever, used 																																																								
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the room.779 In fact its communications links proved far more crucial than its use as a 
meeting room. The cables and reports that came off its teletypes were forwarded to the 
appropriate NSC staffers who, in turn, synthesized the staggering amount of material 
received and passed it either to Bundy or directly to Kennedy. Managing the room took 
up almost a third of Bundy’s entire staff, plus a rotating group of seconded CIA 
officials.780 Smith worked closely with the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon, and 
the NSA to define roughly what needed to be sent to the White House.781 Even after 
Smith’s winnowing process, NSC staffer Michael Forrestal found the amount of 
messages overwhelming and claimed that on average, the room sent him seven pounds of 
paper per day.782 He lamented that keeping up with the flow of information was “the most 
burdensome part of the whole job,” quite the statement given that he oversaw US policy 
in Vietnam.783 Forrestal did find one redeeming feature of the Situation Room: Smith 
made sure the White House received a steady stream of updates from news services. 
Forrestal appreciated having such up-to-date news.784 Komer supposedly enjoyed calling 
up State Department staffers and quizzing them on cables.785 This communication link 
gave the NSC staff new access to and a new role in the policy process.786 They saw 
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incoming reports and information and orders distributed to posts overseas—effectively 
allowing the NSC staff to look over the shoulder of the Departments. As Smith said, 
“[f]or the first time the White House was on the main line. The previous attitude was to 
hold down information going to the White House on the grounds that the political types 
would not know how to handle it.”787 It allowed far faster reaction times from the White 
House than previously were possible. Before, State, Defense, and other agencies could 
decide what went to the White House. With the Situation Room, however, the President 
could not only receive messages directly from the field, but also respond in kind. 
For those in the line agencies, it could be a help or a headache. One can only 
imagine the fate of State staffers fieldling a phone call from Komer. Ambassador to India 
John Kenneth Galbraith wanted Kennedy to see his reports which were sent to the State 
Department, but believed Dean Rusk was not passing them on to the White House. Rusk 
hated the personal connection between the Ambassador and the President and felt 
Galbraith should not be communicating his ideas and policy initiatives straight to the 
Oval Office. Galbraith famously quipped “communicating through the State Department 
is like fornicating through a mattress.”788 Galbraith used the Situation Room to his 
advantage, passing cables straight through to Kennedy around the State Department. In 
fact, the NSC staff became the clearing-house for communications with ambassadors, 
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letters to foreign leaders, and other cable traffic.789 After all these changes, Smith truly 
felt that the NSC staff became “The Little State Department.”790  
The development of the NSC staff and the creation of the Situation Room show 
an important aspect of this process of institutional growth. Bundy might have been the 
conduit through which these ideas entered the White House, but neither Bundy, Komer, 
nor Smith can take credit as the creator. These ideas had a long gestation period. The idea 
of the active NSC staff, for instance, went back to the early 1950s. In 1952 Bundy, Arthur 
Schlesinger, and William Elliot did not question the need for a White House foreign 
policy staff, they just wondered how powerful it should be.791 In 1954 Nelson Rockefeller 
and his PCG staffers called for a foreign policy staff. PACGO made similar 
recommendations. Some of these ideas even appeared in Maxwell Taylor’s report. 
Jackson and the SNPM staff also pushed for some sort of White House foreign policy 
group. These officials could observe foreign policy “in the round,” unencumbered by 
departmental issues.792 Being “outside the system” they could be used more effectively to 
spot trouble and be “sensitive to the President’s own information needs.”793 The SNPM 
staff believed that the White House should have a set of “highly able aides who can help 
prepare the work of the council, record its decisions, and trouble-shoot spot 
assignments.”794  
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William Elliot believed that “no department can, of itself, be expected to exercise 
the necessary self-criticism to make a fair assessment of its programs…or to be really 
aware or frank enough about [its own] shortcomings.”795 These staffers should be 
“broadly experienced in high governmental responsibilities [and having] training at the 
top policy posts in several agencies.”796 Elliot wrote “They should be able to assist the 
President first of all in his own formulation, and then in his control and follow-up of 
policies by really comprehensive, critical and simple reporting of the main issues with 
which the President must be concerned.”797 Others made similar recommendations.798 
Komer’s ideas, however, were against the spirit of what Jackson recommended 
via the SNPM. As noted above, Jackson thought the White House should have some staff 
to deal with foreign policy issues, but he worried that a White House foreign policy staff 
would be so removed from every day operations that they might engage in useless “Ivory 
tower thinking.”799 He worried that this would be “the worst of two possible words” since 
the staff would lack “enough power to give the President effective assistance, but [would 
be] sufficiently powerful…to meddle in the affairs of the great departments.”800 After all, 
in Jackson’s view it was State, not the White House, who should run policy. 
Kennedy always wanted more advice. During the transition he told George 
Kennan that “he [thought] he should…have around him…a small staff of people who 																																																								
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worked just for him and did not represent other departments. He said that he did not want 
to be put in a position where he had only one or two people to whom he could turn for 
certain types of advice.”801 Kennan agreed, noting that “it…had been for long…my 
emphatic view that the President should have staff of his own and should not be 
dependent merely on advice that came up through the various departments and 
agencies.”802 It seems unlikely that Kennedy was referring directly to an NSC-like staff in 
this statement, more like the group of Special Assistants recommended by Neustadt. But 
it also demonstrated he was open to the idea, even if took almost a year before he began 
to interact directly with anyone on the NSC staff besides Bundy and Rostow.803 But 
Kennedy’s comments indicate his interest in involving the White House directly in 
foreign policy-making. 
Previously no one had been willing to act on these recommendations. Eisenhower 
had said “no” for a variety of reasons discussed in previous chapters. In early 1961 
neither Kennedy nor Bundy showed much interest in adopting these proposals. It is 
completely possible that, at some point during his CIA service, Komer heard some of 
these ideas, but if so he never referenced them specifically. The same thing could be said 
for Smith. He was, after all, serving in the OCB when Rockefeller suggested his own 
Cold War Situation room in 1955. The constellation of bureaucrats and academics who 
identified these issues and recommended these solutions during the Eisenhower 																																																								
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OH], Carl Kaysen Oral History Interview with Joseph E. O’Connor 7/11/66, JFKL OHP [hereafter Kaysen 
OH] p, 3-5, Komer to Bundy 3/16/61, NSF Box 321, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 3/15/61-
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Administration deserve significant credit, even if Eisenhower proved unwilling to adopt 
them.  
 
Running the World 
 After these initial decisions, Bundy began to develop the staff and put it to work. 
Bundy did not exclude himself from his Bay of Pigs post-mortem; he began to meet more 
regularly with Kennedy, ensuring the President had more information at his disposal and 
time to ask questions. In late June 1961, Bundy wrote a memo to Kennedy describing the 
transformation of his office. While he acknowledged room for improvement and denied 
claims that the NSC staff was supplanting the State or Defense Departments, Bundy said 
that his staff should ensure “that all great issues are controlled and coordinated.”804 
Bundy began to take on a role that bore a striking resemblance to PACGO’s First 
Secretary concept. Though he lacked the statutory powers, he acted as the President’s 
foreign policy coordinator. He asserted that what he called “the White House-NSC 
group” did “not distinguish between ‘planning’ and ‘operations’ and resistance to this 
distinction is fundamental to our whole concept of work.”805 Bundy realized that his own 
efforts would only take him so far if he did not recruit an able staff. Kennedy summed up 
his view of problem solving when he said of Bundy, “you can’t beat brains, and with 
brains, judgment.”806 But Bundy realized you needed more than just brains. He 																																																								
804 Bundy to Kennedy 6/22/61, NSF Box 283, NSC Organization and Administration 5/5/61-7/25/61, 
JFKL. This interesting, and occasionally awkwardly worded, memo seems as if it was partially written for 
submission for Jackson’s Committee. While Bundy’s letter to them (dated 9/4/61) has some of the same 
information, this is a much more honest and open memo.   
805 Ibid. 
806 Tuohy, “JFK’s McGeorge Bundy”.  
 	
213 
remembered that prior to the Bay of Pigs Kennedy said it “was bound to be all right 
because all of his advisors were professors.”807 Bundy never lost confidence in his 
intellectual abilities, but the Bay of Pigs caused him to cast a wider net.   
The nature of the NSC staff also changed in response to Komer’s 
recommendations. The traditional view is that Bundy’s NSC and Kennedy’s 
administration generally drew heavily from the faculty of the Ivy League.808 After May 
1961, Bundy’s NSC hires increasingly came from within the government and the NSC 
largely dispensed with its use of outside and part-time contractors. Bundy primarily drew 
staff from the State Department, but also hired a number of former CIA officials and 
staffers from other agencies.809 At the very least, this seems to indicate that Bundy felt a 
need for experience in government over outside insight. He also added a rotating 
representative from the Joint Chiefs to ensure a military representation on his staff.810 
																																																								
807 Bundy OH, p. 27. 
808 Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security (Free Press, 1988), p. 71 and 
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CIA: Chester Cooper, Harold Saunders Cooper, Peter Jessup, and Donald Ropa. Cooper, like Komer, came 
from ONE. 
State: David Klein, William Brubeck, James Thomson, Gordon Chase, Ulric Haynes, and William 
Bowdler. 
Defense: Lawrence J. Legere and Richard Bowman. 
Bureau of the Budget: Edward K. Hamilton 
Outside Government: Michael Forrestal, Francis Bator, and Clifford Alexander.  
Other White House Special Assistants and officials like Ralph Dungan, Arthur Schlesinger, and Myer 
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worked part time for him while also working for another department. Spurgeon Kenney, for instance, 
largely took over the role of Bundy’s disarmament advisor after Kaysen left but, officially, Kenny worked 
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After mid-1961 only three major officials came from outside government.811 Two were 
friends of Bundy and the third, Forrestal, was initially brought on to liaise with the State 
Department.812  
Bundy’s staffers might have been assigned to monitor specific areas, but Bundy 
agreed with Jackson in the debate over specialists versus generalists. Theodore Sorensen 
reiterated the White House’s general belief in generalists: “the very intensity of that 
expert’s study may prevent him from seeing the broader, more practical perspective 
which must govern public policy.”813 Bundy told one new hire he expected him to use his 
“lawyer-politician” kind of training in approaching problems.814 He pushed his staff, 
conducting his staff meetings in a manner similar to a graduate seminar—a tactic that 
enthralled some and bored others.815  
The vast majority of NSC staffers attended an Ivy League institution at some 
point in their lives, but, as an official from that time remembered, “there was a natural 
tendency to form and then perpetuate an Ivy League cadre.”816 Bundy’s staff was 
remarkably varied for the early 1960s. His staffers might have mostly shared an Ivy 
League background, but they came from a diverse set of socio-economic backgrounds 
and religions.817 He also hired two African-American for prominent positions.818 A 																																																								
811 These being Kaysen, Michael Forrestal, and Kaysen’s eventual replacement, Francis Bator. 
812 MVF OH, p. 5-6.  
813 Theodore Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows (Columbia 
UP, 1963), p. 65.  
814 Alexander interview I, p. 2, LBJL OHP. 
815 Haynes Oral History, ADST OHP, p. 41; Forrestal found these meetings painful, taking up valuable time 
and often degenerated into banter between Bundy and Kaysen. Forrestal OH, p. 15-16. 
816 Garthoff, p. 40 
817 For instance, all four of Bundy’s deputies were Jewish.  
818 These were the Ulric Haynes from the State Department and the aforementioned Clifford Alexander. 
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shocking lowly number, it was significant for its time considering that State Department 
only employed 17 African-Americans out of almost 5,000 FSOs.819 Women also played 
an important, if largely clerical role in Bundy’s NSC.820 It seems likely that Dorothy 
Fosdick would have changed that if she had accepted Bundy’s job offer.821 The NSC staff 
eventually grew to roughly 48 people.822 Of those, only 17 were Bundy’s “doers.” 
Probably half the remaining 31 were secretaries.823 Though most historians portray 
Bromley Smith as the man who held the NSC together, the archival records show that 
Bundy depended as much on secretaries and assistants as he did on his more famous 
staffers.824 Bundy’s staff is rightly portrayed in the literature as independent operators 
roaming over the Capitol doing the Kennedy’s bidding. They all would have been lost, 
however, without the administrative support.  
Bundy made one last major change in 1961 when he allowed Kennedy to ship 
Walt Rostow to the State Department. Bundy and Rostow had a fine professional 																																																																																																																																																																					
11/1/71, LBJL OHP. While Bundy’s racial views were considerably better than many of his 
contemporaries, they were not perfect by any means. In late 1961 Bundy got in trouble after it became 
public he had joined the prestigious, and segregated, Metropolitan Club in Washington. While Bundy 
defended the decision as a personal choice and remained in the Club, it did not help his case that Robert 
Kennedy quit the club shortly before precisely because of the Club’s racial views. David Wise, “Bundy 
Joins Exclusive Club Robt. Kennedy Quit in Bias Row.” Boston Globe, 10/5/61 and No Author. “Untitled.” 
Time, 10/31/61. 
819 Moskin, p. 488. 
820 One researcher, Ruth Nicalo, had served on the NSC continuously since the Truman Administration. 
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and Archive, Texas Tech University. www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu. 
821 McGeorge Bundy Interview, Donald A. Schmechel Oral History Project #4056, University of 
Washington Archives. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid. 
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relationship, but Rostow seemed unwilling to adopt Bundy’s new operational 
approach.825 Rostow remained focused on long-range planning and big, sweeping ideas 
that he hoped would revolutionize US diplomacy. This big picture thinking could be 
enthralling at times, but it had drawbacks.826 Kennedy, for one, grew frustrated at 
Rostow’s lengthy planning papers: he found they contained interesting ideas, but had few 
timely answers about how to solve the day’s problems.827 As a State Department staffer 
commented, “I quickly learned that…an analytical study…not geared to any action 
recommendation, even if cogent, was not very useful.”828 Rostow, at the time, did not 
learn the same lesson. Kennedy also grew pained with Rostow’s bellicose attitude 
towards South East Asia.829 Bundy and several staffers did not think Rostow’s projects 
were worth the time.830 Bundy did not push Rostow out, but probably did little to stop his 
transfer and in his place put his friend Carl Kaysen. Bundy later recalled it took until the 
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fall of 1961 before he felt comfortable with the operations of the administration.831 A 
surviving NSC staffer agreed with that assessment.832 The transfer of Rostow seems to be 
connected to this.  
What did all these changes mean in reality? Komer, for one, managed to heavily 
influence America’s policy towards South Asia. As part of this he initiated a diplomatic 
opening to India arguing that, in the Cold War battle for hearts and minds, democratic 
India, not dictatorial Pakistan, should be America’s main ally in South Asia. While 
Komer himself often remains a shadowy background figure, scholars of US-South Asian 
relations have recognized his importance.833 Less explored is Carl Kaysen’s role in the 
1961 Berlin Crisis. Though Kaysen was relatively new to the staff, it demonstrates how 
quickly the power of the staff grew when it came to making and shaping policy.  
When Kaysen joined the NSC staff, the Berlin Crisis threatened to devolve from a 
war of words to an actual war. The problem Kennedy faced was that he had no good 
options at his disposal. As tension grew, Paul Nitze presented Kennedy with a series of 
options; if the Soviets decide to blockade Berlin, the first response would be a show of 
force. If a show of force failed, the next step was a conventional attack into East 
Germany. If that, too, failed to produce the desired outcome, or Warsaw Pact forces 
responded with nuclear weapons, the United States would have to deploy its own nuclear 
forces.834 Unfortunately, the only nuclear war America was capable of launching was an 																																																								
831 Bundy OH, p. 85-86. 
832 Harold H. Saunders interview with author, 4/9/14. 
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all-out strike that experts believed would kill 54% of the population of the USSR and 
destroy 82% of the structures in the nation.835 Despite years of training for just such an 
eventuality, however, Nitze and others feared this sort of all-out nuclear assault would 
take too long to enact, giving the Soviets time to strike back at the US and Europe.836 
Kaysen believed that it was worth studying the possibility of a more limited strike and 
with Bundy’s approval took it upon himself to do so.837  
 Kaysen was an expert in economics by academic training and during the Second 
World War he worked for the OSS selecting targets for Allied bombers in Europe.838 
Using that wartime background, Kaysen identified targets that would quickly cripple the 
Soviet ability to respond without the US having to use a full nuclear strike. Using around 
60 aircraft, Kaysen argued that American forces could, effectively, destroy the majority 
of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons. Even allowing for a loss rate of 25% of the 
attacking force, the remaining bombers could inflict enough damage to have “eliminated 
or paralyzed the nuclear threat to the United States…”839 Kaysen admitted this plan made 
several important assumptions concerning the attack, but confidently stated it would still 
kill “less than 1,000,000 and probably not much more than 500,000” Soviets in the 
process.840  
 Kaysen received blowback on this study from the military, who felt his estimates 
were off, and some coworkers, who believed his statements were bloodthirsty and 																																																								
835 Kaplan, “JFK’s” 
836 Ibid. 
837 Kaysen MIT Interview, p. 9. 
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cavalier. The Air Force’s attitude, Kaysen remembered, was “very unpleasant, very 
hostile,” adding that the Air Force officers seemed to have “‘You bastards, its none of 
your business’”… just written over all their faces.”841 Privately, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs admitted that the Air Force’s war plan “is not the ultimate in strategic planning 
[but] it is far better than anything previously in existence.”842 One military officer 
perhaps spoke for much of the Pentagon when he expressed confusion about who Kaysen 
actually was. Kaysen, as he noted, had cultivated “considerable status and influence,” but 
also believed his work was on a “presumably temporary basis.”843 Clearly, the power and 
function of the NSC staff was so new it continued to elude some in government. Several 
of Kaysen’s coworkers in the White House reacted in horror. Ted Sorensen told Kaysen 
“You’re crazy! We shouldn’t let guys like you around here.”844 NSC colleague Marcus 
Raskin went even further, saying Kaysen’s report “makes us [no] better than those who 
measured the gas ovens or the engineers who built the tracks for the death trains in Nazi 
Germany.”845 Raskin and Kaysen argued until both men were in tears, and the argument, 
effectively, ended their friendship.846 In this plan, Kaysen assumed that the attack would 
stun the Soviets, who would not be able to respond. If they chose to attack, however, they 
would still have roughly 800 small nuclear warheads. Estimates suggested the use of 
those would kill 40% of NATO troops in the Federal Republic of Germany, paralyzing 																																																								
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the West German government in the process.847 The continental United States might be 
saved, but perhaps at the cost of Western Europe. 
 In spite of all these issues, Kaysen saw his plan as less of an actionable alternative 
than a bargaining chip. Kaysen admitted that his plan was full of assumptions and that 
answers to these “cannot be obtained without the most careful and detailed operational 
studies and exercises.”848 He added separately that Kennedy’s next step “is to call now 
for negotiations.”849 Kennedy never came close to using the plan, and Kaysen justified 
the exercise by saying, “I just thought it was a good idea to have a plan…Having a plan is 
different from recommending its use.”850 Henry Kissinger, still an NSC consultant when 
Kaysen wrote his memos, put the exercise in a wider perspective. He claimed, the White 
House needed more “than assurances by the JCS that they have matters well in hand. 
[Military] plans must be such that the President understands their implications [and] can 
have confidence in them.”851 He added that, “Civilian control over military operations 
may become illusory even if only conventional weapons are used under present 
circumstances. The President’s hand may well be forced…[I]t is essential that the 
military understand now what the President is prepared to countenance and what he will 
not agree to.”852 Kennedy used Kaysen’s plan to rein in the military and say that he 
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would not countenance all out nuclear war, unless it was the last possible option.853 
Moreover, it showed the military that the White House would not be beholden to plans 
they were offered: they would look for their own solutions if necessary. As Kissinger 
hoped, Kennedy used the information provided by the document to press military 
officials on how they would, or could, respond to the Soviets short of full nuclear war.854 
It was a discussion that frustrated and angered the Generals, but they could not ignore 
Kaysen’s findings. Of course, none of this should hide the fact that members of the 
Kennedy Administration, albeit briefly, looked approvingly on a plan for a surprise 
nuclear first strike. But, for a President stung by military obfuscation (or worse) during 
the Bay of Pigs, Kaysen’s document served as a shot across the bow of the services. By 
using the new powers of the NSC staff, Kennedy and Bundy were able to muzzle the 
military while they simultaneously worked on a diplomatic solution. Kaysen’s report also 
contributed in part to Robert McNamara’s own review of US nuclear strategy later in 
1961.855 He also proved that the NSC staff could provide Kennedy with the information 
needed to make an informed decision and, if needed, challenge the thinking in the rest of 
the government.   
 
Conclusion 
After 1961, the NSC staff functioned as Bundy’s collective right arm. It freed him 
to pursue his dual role as “honest broker” between the department chiefs and advisor, a 
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balancing act that, by all accounts, he performed well.856 Observing from afar, Richard 
Neustadt expressed some concern. Bundy ran a tight ship, to be sure, but Neustadt 
observed, “Bundy, in particular, is an accomplished juggler of many balls at once. He 
juggles while he skates, and skates so fast that even in close-up…he himself remains a 
blur—which is as it should be with a staff officer. But sometimes one ball or another 
crunches through the ice; recovery is costly. One wonders whether Bundy might not need 
a Bundy of his own.”857 Smith, who helped shape the NSC system, still felt it lacked 
something. In an interview in 1970 he remembered an instance in which Kennedy and his 
advisors talked about who should be in the Laotian cabinet. When Smith said the 
President did not have time to deal with such a minor matter, the interviewer pressed him 
on whether this was a sign of Kennedy being too involved. Smith snapped back: “I’m 
saying that a staff ought to allot a president’s time to be spent on national security 
problems so that he doesn’t get into this kind of situation.”858 The NSC staff was a 
double-edged sword. It kept track of events for Kennedy, yet also let him sink into the 
minutia.  
Bundy expected his staff to work for Kennedy, but also encouraged them to 
develop their own initiatives. In addition to Komer’s work in South Asia, he became a 
leading advocate for using foreign aid. David Halberstam, who rarely had a good word 
for members of the Kennedy White House, rather inelegantly called Komer “the most 
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articulate White House spokesman for the dark of skin.”859 Just before Kaysen left 
government service in 1963, his last project focused on an idea almost exactly opposed to 
where he started: instead of planning for nuclear war, he helped shape the 1963 Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, a first step towards Détente. Kaysen later remembered, “It made me feel 
good.”860 The NSC staff were supposed to function as free thinkers. Unlike Eisenhower’s 
NSC, which seemed to shut down new ideas, part of the reason Bundy hired his staffers 
was because they could turn their new ideas into actions. That, however, had limits. 
Many members of the NSC staff, for instance, were drawn to Vietnam and could neither 
understand the consequences of a war nor think their way to victory. A former ONE 
analyst observed of Bundy’s staff, “the simple fact was that each of them in some way 
and to some degree was committed to the existing policy, and none of them was 
intellectually free at that point or in those circumstances to stand back and look at the 
situation in its broadest aspects.”861 This might be an exaggeration, several members of 
Bundy’s staff were all too aware of the pitfalls of conflict in Southeast Asia, but it spoke 
to the mindset of Bundy, Komer, and Forrestal. While Bundy’s system remained and 
flourished, it too has had its successes and failures.862  
																																																								
859 Halberstam, p. 161. 
860 Carl Kaysen Interview, 2/28/86, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; At the Brink, WGBH. 
861 Willard C. Matthias, America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 
1936-1991 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), p. 189. 
862 Today’s NSC staff has expanded from Bundy’s four or five geographical desks to eighteen geographic 
and functional units and from Bundy’s 10-20 staffers to 200. Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler “How National 
Security Advisors See Their Roles” The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy E.R. Wittkopf and 
J.M. McCormick eds (Rowman and Littlefield Pub., 2007), p. 185 and Bradley H. Patterson, The White 
House Staff (Brookings Institution, 2000), p. 45. The previously mentioned SIPR cell, if counted 
separately, would increase this count to 19. 
 	
224 
The NSC staff remains a surprisingly invisible organization, even if the profile of 
the SANSA, now the National Security Advisor, has grown. That anonymity also has its 
roots in the Kennedy years. Bromley Smith thought that under Bundy’s system the 
perfect NSC staffer was a “castrated martyr who visualizes his task as nothing more than 
helping the president.”863 Some might dispute the castrated part: both Komer and Kaysen 
developed reputations for being fearsome operators.864 They also continued to have 
ambition: both Komer and Rostow wanted to be SANSA, though Rostow eventually won 
that battle.865 Kaysen left the White House in part, Bundy surmised, because he did not 
like being a deputy.866 Yet the second part of Smith’s quote continues to hold true. 
Whatever their personal peccadillos or ambitions, they understood that the NSC staff 
worked for the White House. As Komer noted, “Kennedy made it very clear we were his 
men [and] we operated for him.”867  
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Chapter 6: Charles Wilson’s Questions 
 Late in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, after a particularly difficult period, 
Charles Wilson contacted a senior White House advisor and asked, "Do you think I ought 
to resign?" The staffer he asked, no fan of the Secretary, shot back, "I think you should 
have done it six months ago."868 Wilson’s tenure was a strange combination of peace and 
war. On one hand, he was the first secretary to serve out a full term, coinciding with 
Dwight Eisenhower’s first term. The world was hardly a calm place during his tenure. 
Wilson oversaw the continued buildup of US nuclear forces, managed the last few 
months of the Korean War, and countered continued Soviet military growth. Yet, this was 
a remarkably stable period in many respects. America largely enjoyed a lull between 
“shooting wars.” Even if he was not fighting a war overseas, he experienced plenty of 
political combat at home. He dealt with generals and admirals who disagreed with his 
spending priorities, and congressmen who doubted his abilities, while also suffering the 
fallout from a series of public gaffes.  
 At times, Wilson could be his own worst enemy. He was also a hostage to fortune. 
In the early 1950s the Pentagon was far from a fully formed institution. It was less than a 
decade old and the 1947 National Security Act did little to address rivalries between the 
services. As originally envisioned, the Secretary of Defense was, in effect, a coordinator. 
Yet the Secretary lacked the power to perform much coordination. That meant that the 
Pentagon’s managers often took the blame for events far outside their control. The 
personnel turnover in that office did little to encourage any sort of stability. It also 																																																								
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suffered from an exaggerated reputation. Eisenhower promoted his Administration as one 
run as efficiently as the Army—perhaps an oxymoron—staffed by executives picked 
precisely because of their business background, competence, and managerial skill. Those 
promises quickly ran into the realities of the office.  
 Eisenhower’s first two secretaries, Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy, struggled 
with the demands of the office. McElroy was unlucky enough to start the job only days 
after Sputnik. Pressure from Congress caused Eisenhower to take seriously the need to 
enact reforms. Eisenhower turned to a familiar source for help: Nelson Rockefeller. At 
times Rockefeller had to work against McElroy in the efforts to restructure the 
department, a set of plans Eisenhower then pressed through Congress. It was a difficult 
fight, but Eisenhower eventually managed to win Congressional support for the majority 
of these reforms. The Administration’s final secretary of defense, Thomas Gates, was by 
far its least controversial. A product of seven years working in the Pentagon, he proved a 
remarkably competent and well-liked official who started many of the reforms that 
Robert McNamara later finished. But neither Gates nor Eisenhower could do anything to 
change the opinion that despite attempts at reform the Department of Defense was an 
unruly organization.  
 
Engineer Charlie 
The job of the Secretary of Defense has never been easy and it is hard to overstate 
the pressures during the Department’s its early years. They killed James Forrestal. 
George Marshall, who seemed to excel at every other job he held in government, left 
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little impact on the office. If Robert Lovett, Truman’s last secretary, might be 
remembered for his quiet competence, Louis Johnson, Truman’s second secretary, 
excelled at making enemies. Even Congress attempted to fix the office, through an 
amendment in 1949, it left the basic structure remarkably intact. The Secretary had few 
powers of coordination or oversight. These issues plagued two of the unluckiest and 
maybe unhappiest secretaries of defense in American history, an irony given they only 
briefly had to deal with a shooting war and mostly served in times of peace. Though their 
terms encompassed the height of the Cold War and they approved plans that would have 
destroyed nations, their unhappiness stemmed almost entirely from domestic sources. The 
root of Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy’s unhappiness and bad luck began with a 
confluence of events outside their control and ended with the transformation of their jobs.  
In 1953, the organization of the Pentagon seemed orderly in theory. Each branch 
of the military had a military and civilian head. The civilian head, the Service Secretary, 
controlled much of the service, including both day-to-day issues as well as higher level 
questions of strategy and force planning.869 When the Secretary of Defense wanted 
something done, the Service Secretaries gave the orders and had leeway in executing 
those orders.  In many respects, this was unchanged from the 19th century. The top 
military official in each service sat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While they wielded some 
influence, they were primarily an advisory body focused largely on planning.870 
Overseeing all of this was the Secretary of Defense, who theoretically played a 
coordination and oversight role. The Secretary could overrule the Service Secretaries, but 																																																								
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the Services retained significant power. In 1949, for instance, Louis Johnson cancelled a 
new class of aircraft carrier, directing funds instead towards a new generation of Air 
Force bombers. The resulting “Revolt of the Admirals” brought this all to the public’s 
attention, as high-ranking officers broke ranks and expressed their anger. This type of 
event would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to replicate in the State Department 
or CIA. It demonstrated that the Secretary of Defense had to be wary of his constituents 
lest they publically display their displeasure. In many respects, this organizational set-up 
was the last remnant of the Navy’s push for power in the mid-and-late 1940s when the 
Secretary of the Navy and his admirals argued for a minimum of oversight and 
coordination, letting each service retain significant power. It was messy and, at times, far 
from effective, but it preserved the direct powers of the individual services. While the 
system could cope with a Korea-type conflict, Lovett warned Truman that the system 
“will prove inadequate in [the] event of war” and would require “drastic 
reorganization.”871 
During the 1952 election, Eisenhower not only attacked Truman’s use of the NSC 
system, but also his management of the Pentagon. Given that Eisenhower oversaw the 
liberation of Europe, it is not surprising that he sought to institute some reforms based on 
his own experiences. More surprising, perhaps, was how this came about. As with so 
many issues of government organization during the 1950s, its origins lay with Nelson 
Rockefeller. After the 1952 election, Rockefeller self-financed a series of organizational 
studies with the help of Temple University. They were, in effect, his résumé and calling 
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card. He took these to Eisenhower, who liked them enough that he not only adopted 
several of the recommendations, but also used them as the rationale to establish 
PACGO.872 Defense reorganization was one of the first issues PACGO examined. As 
Rockefeller embarked on the study, an associate admitted that the organization of the 
Pentagon was a mess. He notes, “We have lashed ourselves down to incompetence.” 873 
He also warned, “Please be careful [because] centralized military management does well 
at the start but loses its wars.” Its supporters were “committed to the German system 
which captured civilian authority, lost two wars, and ruined Germany. Modern 
management has created our world leadership through the greatest possible 
decentralization….Many secretaries, otherwise able and sincere, have become captives of 
their military associates.”874 This was not an isolated fear: In his 1952 campaign Robert 
Taft accused JCS chairman Omar Bradley of being a partisan tool of the Truman 
Administration and needlessly advocated for a large Army and further unification of the 
Armed Forces.875 This only added to the fears that empowering the Secretary or JCS 
would lead to the “Prussianization” of the Pentagon.876  The exact same arguments used 
against the Army in the early 20th Century when the War Department attempted reforms 
were now used against the Department of Defense. 
Warnings like these might explain some of Rockefeller’s approach. While he 
advocated a stronger role for the Secretary, he did so in vague terms. His 1953 committee 
supported the idea that, in the final analysis, the Secretary of Defense had complete 																																																								
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control over the department. The report bemoaned that the “the so-called bureaucratic 
beavers” in the Pentagon occasionally challenged “the authority of the Secretary through 
technical interpretations of the” 1947 National Security Act.877 While Rockefeller argued 
that Eisenhower should remove “all doubt as to the Secretary’s over-riding authority,” he 
also admitted that some dissent in the department was healthy.878 Part of the problem, 
Rockefeller argued, was that the Secretary of Defense had a very small staff. This placed 
very practical limits on oversight and coordination. Rockefeller wanted a number of 
Assistant Secretary positions created to help the Secretary and oversee various matters.879 
Eisenhower agreed with many of Rockefeller’s recommendations. At the time it was 
thought that getting them implemented, however, might be difficult. One staffer noted 
that some would believe the plan “fails to go far enough,” while others “will probably 
hold that the plan goes too far.”880  
In the end the reorganization passed. Unfortunately for Rockefeller, neither 
Eisenhower nor his first two secretaries of defense, seemed enthusiastic about exploiting 
the post’s over-riding authority. In part, this stemmed from Eisenhower’s wish to serve, 
essentially, as his own secretary of defense. Eisenhower probably knew more about the 
military than Charles Wilson or Neil McElroy could ever learn. Like Kennedy and Rusk 
years later, Eisenhower wanted a competent manager who could back up his ideas, but 																																																								
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planned to serve as his own defense minister when it came to strategy.881 Despite this, the 
system could have worked if Eisenhower, consulting with the Service Secretaries, set the 
strategy. The Secretary would oversee the budgetary aspects of the strategy. The Service 
Secretaries would manage their respective branches.  
Yet three issues developed, which should have been easy to anticipate. The first 
was that Eisenhower had a tendency towards micromanagement.882 That, in turn, often 
caused his Secretaries of Defense to abdicate their responsibility on important issues. The 
structure of the Pentagon might have made for a nice organizational chart, but it also 
isolated many departments that in the post-war years benefited from coordination. This 
was most obvious in the case of scientific research and weapons development. By 1960, 
for instance, each service had fielded its own nuclear-capable ballistic missile. On one 
hand, that allowed redundancy in a very young field: if one system failed others could 
take its place. On the other hand, it also threw money at programs that on some occasions 
seemed to be needlessly overlapping, ill-conceived, or both. Lastly, there was the notion 
of the public perception of the Department and its Secretary. Between 1953 and 1958 a 
series of events took place that made the management of the Department seem 
questionable at best.     
 Charles E. Wilson, in some respects, perfectly personifies a Washington tradition: 
the successful business executive overcome by the intricacies of government. As Wilson 
himself admitted: “[O]rganizing the Pentagon and keeping it manned is a somewhat 
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bigger job than I thought it would be.”883 Wilson was hardly a neophyte, having run GM 
during the Second World War.884 He was a details man and interested in efficiency. 
Once, when visiting an ordnance plant during his tenure in the Pentagon, he listed off 
everything he noticed that reduced effectiveness.885 He gained the nickname “Engineer 
Charlie” for the reason that he had a keen grasp for engineering and delved into 
manufacturing schedules and efficiency problems.886 Eisenhower believed that this sort 
of details-oriented managerial expert would be ideally suited to run the Pentagon. Just 
like GM, the Pentagon in 1953 was a decentralized organization where the heads of the 
manufacturing divisions—in this case the Service Secretaries—were allowed to exercise 
considerable leeway.887 It was a structure in which Wilson felt comfortable, and he tried 
as closely as possible to run the Pentagon like GM. 
 Yet, Wilson hewed so closely to that model that it caused problems. His 
nomination was almost scuttled after he told a Senate panel that he did not have to divest 
himself from his GM stocks. His reasoning was that “what [is] good for our country [is] 
good for General Motors, and vice versa.”888 Wilson seemed unable to understand how 
these comments were controversial. Though a friendly fellow, he also was a one-man 
gaff generator. The press loved him for his jokes, and because his slip-ups created 
headlines.889 At one point he seemed to say anyone who argued for a larger defense 
budget was a liar. Later, he accidentally endorsed Joseph McCarthy at the height of his 																																																								
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attack on the Army.890 Many of his colleagues in the Administration, among them John 
Foster Dulles, thought Wilson was a poor manager. Sherman Adams considered him an 
“unalloyed and incorrigible bore, whose long-winded bromides were an unfair ordeal for 
those forced to listen to them.”891 Wilson came in knowing little of military strategy or 
national security. Once in office, he did little to correct that deficit, even sometimes 
skipping his briefings before NSC meetings.892 These did little to endear him to fellow 
cabinet members. Wilson’s embrace of his manufacturing persona also led to problems 
with the White House. Given the experience of Eisenhower, the Service Secretaries, and 
the JCS, Wilson often seemed to feel he could outsource most other matters of strategy, 
often looking to Eisenhower. The President complained that Wilson asked too many 
questions and sometimes took too long to make up his mind, noting, “I have got a man 
[as secretary of defense] who is frightened to make decisions.”893 Rockefeller’s 
reorganization had, theoretically, given Wilson extensive powers. Though he enumerated 
these capabilities to his subordinates, he did little to embrace them.894 The gaggle of 
Assistant Secretaries created by PACGO’s reform plan proved a mixed bag, largely 
depending on who held the position. Some embraced their powers.895 Others did not: the 
Assistant Secretary of Property and Installations, for instance, spent time developing 
regulations on how often the grass was mowed on military bases.896  
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 Wilson’s powers and managerial skills did nothing to stop the bitter conflict 
between the services within the Pentagon, which was exacerbated by Eisenhower’s “New 
Look” strategy. The “New Look” aimed to keep the defense budget down by investing 
heavily in America’s nuclear forces. The budgeting process during those years was 
messy. Even though the amount of money allocated to each service remained essentially 
unchanged regardless of circumstances, the services contested the budget with a fiery 
fervor.897 Wilson could hardly eliminate these rivalries, but there were two areas where 
he could have made an impact. The first was in the manner by which the Pentagon’s 
budget was determined. Every year the services were instructed to provide their ideal 
operating budget for the next year. Lawrence Korb, who served in Reagan’s Pentagon, 
wrote that, in constructing their budgets, each service could emphasize the “programs 
which contributed most to organizational health or organizational essence. Moreover, 
each service could legitimately claim that it alone had to provide for [America’s] 
security.”898 The individual service appropriations barely changed during the Eisenhower 
years, yet the budgets submitted to Wilson were gigantic and the services complained to 
Congress or in the press when their budgets were predictably cut. If the Eisenhower 
Administration had based its funding on these requests, America would have spent three 
times as much on defense as much as it actually did during the 1950s.899  
 In part, this was a self-inflicted wound caused by Wilson’s management style. 
The services crafted such lofty budgets because Wilson gave them little guidance on what 																																																								
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they should be buying. This led both to duplication on projects as well as unwise 
spending.900 Given “New Look” the excess and duplication was particularly noticeable in 
the field of nuclear weapons. As mentioned, all three services designed and deployed 
their own nuclear armed ballistic missiles. Indeed, when Alan Shepard was launched into 
space in 1961, he did so on top of an Army missile. The Navy, in hoping to steal some of 
the Air Force’s monopoly on the budget, developed nuclear capable bombers for service 
on aircraft carriers. The Army redesigned the organization of its ground forces to fight a 
dual conventional and nuclear conflict developing a range of nuclear weapons to support 
their strategy.  
 By 1956 one could legitimately question Wilson’s tenure. His management of the 
budget corresponded to Eisenhower’s requests: the Pentagon’s expenditures only rose by 
12%. Yet, Wilson’s budgetary success could not be divorced from his bumbling persona, 
his frosty relationship with many members of the Administration including Eisenhower, 
or the infighting among the services. This was graphically displayed during Stuart 
Symington’s investigation of Air Force readiness in 1956. Given that the Air Force 
regularly received almost 50% of the defense budget, one might find it hard to 
sympathize with the Senator’s argument that the Air Force was underfunded.901 But 
Wilson struggled in front of the committee, and fought openly with both Symington and 
Henry Jackson during the hearings. When asked during a press conference what he 
thought of the Democrats’ argument, he said their objections were “phony.” Though he 
admitted it was a poor choice of words, he backed the idea that these were politically 																																																								
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motivated and baseless attacks.902 Moreover, the Air Force used the testimony to appear a 
neglected service, despite the fact they received the largest share of the defense budget. 
Curtis LeMay painted a bleak picture of what might happen to the nation if the Air Force 
did not get more aircraft. The officer charged with continental air defense admitted that a 
variety of aging systems “downgrades our capability to achieve full organizational 
effectiveness.”903 The 1956 investigation did nothing to help the Democrats win the 1956 
election, but the ideas discussed before the committee lingered. Wilson based the defense 
of his tenure on the fact that the battle against the national deficit was as important as the 
battle against the Soviet Union. Even those initially won over by Wilson’s arguments 
struggled a year later to reconcile that argument with the report of the Gaither 
Committee’s and, more importantly, the launch of Sputnik. Luckily for Wilson, he left 
the Pentagon shortly before Sputnik’s launch. He joined the administration planning to 
serve for only four years. Increasingly unhappy, he did nothing to alter that plan. 
 
“It is impossible for him not to act” 
 Neil McElroy was only in office for four days before the Soviet Union launched 
Sputnik. That event, in effect, derailed his entire term in office and caused the 
Administration to spend two years involved in a bitter battle over preparedness and the 
proper organization of the Pentagon. While that battle resulted in a victory for the 
Administration—in the form of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958—it came at a 																																																								
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cost. As America ramped up its efforts to build new missiles, Eisenhower seemed to 
admit that the Pentagon’s organization was a problem. McElroy did not always handle 
events well, but his was a difficult situation. Like Wilson, he was a coordinator expected 
to work under a President who knew more about the subject than he did while occupying 
a somewhat undefined managerial role. Like Wilson, he was also new to government.  
 Eisenhower quickly decided that in addition to managing the Pentagon McElroy 
would also have to troubleshoot its reorganization. Eisenhower initially had reservations 
about launching into another reorganization effort, but eventually relented. He did so in 
part because of advice from Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller argued that the White House 
had to act and that, if it did not, someone else would.904 Rockefeller did not suggest this 
merely for the good of the Republic: he was motivated at least in part by personal 
ambition. Rockefeller rushed the first volume of his Rockefeller Brothers funded studies 
to the publishers earlier than anticipated so that he could advance his ideas in the public 
discussion, while burnishing his credentials.905 Rockefeller was hardly alone: others 
calling for a Pentagon reorganization after Sputnik included Eisenhower’s own Science 
Advisory board, the Joint Chiefs, and, more troublingly, members of the Senate.906 An 
associate lamented to Rockefeller that Eisenhower clearly wished to avoid the idea “that 
his action is prompted by panic…or that the Administration is admitting to an error or 
giving into strong domestic pressures….While it is difficult for the President to act under 
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these conditions, it is impossible for him not to act.”907 Rockefeller himself concluded 
that the organization he had helped to develop, no longer seemed “good enough under the 
present conditions of rapid change for informed rapid decisions.”908 Eisenhower’s 
concern that Congress would interfere or act first intensified after a difficult meeting 
between legislative leaders and Pentagon officials.909 Meanwhile, McElroy did his best to 
buy time. As late as December 1957, he told Rockefeller he wanted to conduct a “long, 
detailed study” before he made any decisions.910 Eisenhower would have none of it, and 
forced McElroy to immediately start working with Rockefeller on a reorganization 
plan.911  
Those making the reorganization plan asked what exactly needed to be done to 
make the Secretary of Defense more effective at his job? One PACGO analysts answered 
they should “distinguish between the legal authority of the Secretary to give orders… 
(which is relatively unlimited) and his authority to deal with organization and personnel 
system (which is very sharply limited).” The same question might be asked about 
research and procurement. “The issue” the analyst continued, “is whether operating 
agencies are to be set up in the office of the Secretary of Defense, or directly responsible 
to him.”912 Rockefeller himself observed that the financial management of the 
Department and its approach to research were among the most urgent matters to 
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examine.913 Extensive consideration was given to how to reorganize the individual 
services and reorient the Joint Chiefs of Staff.914 One of the participants lamented that it 
would be easier to just combine all the services into a single, unified, service, “but not 
now – it is too big a step from the viewpoint of disruption, regardless of political 
considerations.”915 Rockefeller and PACGO quickly identified three major areas needing 
reform: the roles of the Secretary and his assistants, the oversight of research and 
development, and lastly, the chain of command had between the Joint Chiefs, Service 
Secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense. 
Improving scientific research and development fields was perhaps the easiest goal 
to accomplish. Wilson had been unenthusiastic about research and development, saying 
“people hide behind [research] and go ahead with a lot of boondoggling….Just because 
somebody calls it research doesn’t mean it’s wonderful.”916 One of PACGO’s consultants 
observed that research in the Pentagon was hampered by “Inadequate national guidance 
on technological potential; Inadequate communications to higher levels [of authority]; 
Poorly defined requirements; Committee over-emphasis [one assumes this meant too 
much of an emphasis on committees]; [and] Decision[s] retardation through discontinuity 
[or, lack of a clear chain of command].”917 PACGO suggested that all research functions 
be grouped under the supervision of an Assistant Secretary for Research and 
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Engineering.918 It also argued that the Pentagon needed its own technological and 
scientific development group, an idea which evolved into the Defense Advanced Projects 
Research Agency.  
PACGO’s findings on the Secretary were somewhat counterintuitive: Rockefeller 
and PACGO suggested that the Secretary of Defense had so many oversight powers, he 
was actually spread far too thin.919 The extensive network of subordinates set up by 
Rockefeller and PACGO in 1953 enveloped the Secretary in minutia, while 
simultaneously giving too many people duplicative oversight into matters unrelated to 
their jobs. Thomas Gates, the Secretary of the Navy complained that there was “too much 
veto power at all echelons in hands of people who don’t have any responsibility for 
action.”920 PACGO recommended culling the number of Assistant Secretaries of Defense 
dramatically. The few that remained would have enlarged offices to more tightly control 
business. That would, PACGO hoped “strengthen the positive leadership of the 
Secretary” by “freeing [him] and the Deputy Secretary to consider and make the 
important decisions necessary for unified direction of the Department of Defense.”921 As 
if to emphasize the centrality of the Secretary, one organizational chart in the report 
included a large arrow pointing to the Secretary’s place on the chart, reading: “The power 
of decision is reserved for the Secretary of Defense.”922 Service Secretaries would further 
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see their role degraded under this plan.923 Instead of being in charge of strategy and, 
effectively, in command of their services, their job became more administrative in nature. 
Command of the services effectively fell to the uniformed members in the Joint Chiefs, 
who would also become the prime military advisors to both the Secretary and 
President.924  
One participant used the reorganization exercise to address the problems of inter-
service fights going public. He suggested that the number of legislative liaisons and 
public relations personnel be slashed, and that those remaining be placed under the strict 
supervision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Presumably the idea behind this 
was that such an action would cut back on leaks and enable the Pentagon to, more 
forcefully, shape its public image. The author of the proposal adopted a less totalitarian 
frame: he merely suggested it would reduce “the problem of lobbying and propaganda” 
from the services.925 Despite the headaches this caused during both the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations, this suggestion did not make it into the final plan.  
Both the Pentagon and White House endorsed PACGO’s reforms.926 But, it would 
take an act of Congress to make such major changes, however. Congressional leaders 
seemed impressed when Eisenhower announced the plan. The President said that, as long 
as the Secretary of Defense had increased powers, the minute details did not matter that 
																																																								923	Though,	interestingly,	it	recommended	they	return	as	statutory	members	of	the	NSC.	Ibid.	
924 Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 258. 925	Charles	Coolidge	to	Eisenhower,	2/27/58,	PACGO	18,	Department	of	Defense	Reorganization	(1),	DDE.	
926 Ibid, p. 252-257. 
 	
242 
much.927 The ideas were quickly developed into potential legislation. The veneer of 
agreement, however, masked deep differences.   
Neil McElroy caused the first problem. Just before the bill went to Congress 
McElroy proposed a significant rewrite. It was, in Rockefeller’s words, “a weak watered 
down version.” McElroy did this, it seems, to win support from the Service chiefs, 
despite the fact he effectively agreed they should be stripped of power. McElroy told 
Rockefeller, “We want to get your substantial help on wording and then let it roll at the 
White House. They are going to rewrite the whole thing [anyway].” Rockefeller 
complained “what was needed was a clear statement [of the new organization of the 
Pentagon] and a clear statement of the organizational and legislative changes needed to 
carry it out.” When Rockefeller warned McElroy about changing language to merely 
placate the Service Secretaries and JCS, McElroy responded “Well, the President will use 
what he wants and eliminate what he doesn’t want.” Rockefeller objected to the fact that 
McElroy wanted to rewrite the legislation “for his own protection within the Department. 
Whatever the President does beyond this is OK [sic] with him, but he will always be able 
to say to the Service people that he stood…and fought for [them]. [W]hat the President 
did beyond that was not his responsibility.”928 Rockefeller and other PACGO staffers 
seemed to doubt McElroy’s own understanding of just what powers he did or did not 
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poses.929 Whether this assessment was correct, it emphasized the poor relationship 
between the two. 
That action delayed the legislation, but paled in comparison with the hearings 
about the bill in the House. Despite the ostensible agreement of House leaders with 
Eisenhower, Democrats, led by Carl Vinson (D-GA), submitted their own bill two 
months before the White House sent its reorganization plan to Congress. Vinson and 
others heavily criticized Eisenhower’s plan. The old arguments against centralization that 
were enumerated in the early 1900s, 1946, and 1953, returned. The gist of the dissent 
focused on the centralization, or “Prussianization,” of the military and argued that the 
expanded powers of the JCS would threaten civil control over defense. While the House 
bill payed lip service to increasing the Secretary’s power, it effectively reinvested 
authority in the Service Secretaries. More vexingly to Eisenhower, the bill received 
significant support.930 Republican amendments to align it more with Eisenhower’s vision 
were stripped out. Yet, in Sputnik’s shadow, the pressure on many Republicans to vote 
through some set of Pentagon reforms was so great that the bill still received nearly 
unanimous support. Despite being stripped of what the White House wanted most, it 
sailed out of the House on a 402-1 vote.931  
In the Senate, the bill fared better. But at that point the Administration made an 
important error. Despite the fact that Eisenhower claimed that all he cared about was the 
Secretary’s power, he was also tired of the services taking their cases to the Congress or 																																																								929	Role	and	Authority	of	the	Secretary	of	Defense,	n.d.,	PACGO 18, Defense Reorganization (3), DDE. 
930 Brian R. Duchin,“‘The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of That Year:’ President Eisenhower and the 
1958 Reorganization of the Department of Defense” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 2, p. 252-
254. 
931 Ibid, p. 254. 
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the public to complain about the Pentagon’s budget. The White House wanted to include 
stipulations in the reorganization plan stating that once the Pentagon’s budget was 
decided high ranking officers could not publically criticize it. They could express their 
personal opinions as much as they wanted before its release, but had to toe the line after it 
became public. This frustrated many in Congress and seemed to inflame fears that 
Eisenhower was creating a powerful Prussian system to rule the Pentagon. Eisenhower’s 
fears over this were not unwarranted. The White House suffered criticism from Air Force 
at the beginning of his first term, and the Navy in the middle of his second. The Army 
proved to be a continuous problem. A troika of former paratroopers—Matthew 
Ridgeway, James Gavin, and Maxwell Taylor, criticized the New Look from both inside 
the Army and after they retired. At one point Charles Wilson ran an investigation to root 
out a cell of Army officers in Maxwell Taylor’s office who were leaking material to the 
press. Taylor escaped without censure, but the officers were reassigned to lower level 
jobs and their files burned.932 Having such experts question Eisenhower publically on an 
issue in which he claimed to have authority looked bad. As with events like Sputnik and 
the Gaither Committee, it reinforced the view that the Pentagon was badly managed in 
spite of the president’s involvement. Shutting down these leaks produced poor optics, but 
was an understandable priority of the Administration. This came to a head when Arleigh 
Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, went before a Senate Committee and expressed his 
concerns not over the Pentagon’s budget, but over Eisenhower’s reorganization plans. 
McElroy responded to this by saying he was disappointed in Burke. He said that the 
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Pentagon would not punish the Admiral, but subtly hinted that Eisenhower might not be 
as forgiving.933 The uproar from senators was predictably intense. It seems unlikely 
Eisenhower would have sacked Burke, but McElroy’s misstep forced the Administration 
to perform major damage control.  
 This turn of events availed the administration of an opportunity. In a moment of 
amazing legislative jujitsu—or calculated desperation—the White House leveraged 
Democratic fears into a victory. At this point, the Democrats had heavily committed to 
allowing military officers to express their concerns before Congress. Eisenhower came 
back to the Democrats and said that the gag provision could be removed from the bill if, 
in return, the White House got several other concessions it wanted. The Democrats 
agreed. Eisenhower had forced their hand—they could hardly say no after arguing against 
the gag—but criticism from the current and ex-military officials continued to take a toll 
on the White House, including Maxwell Taylor’s testimony before the SNPM two years 
later.  
 Those Senate concessions allowed Eisenhower to bury Vinson’s House bill. The 
1958 plan to reorganize the Pentagon struggled out of Congress, but did so in a form 
close to Rockefeller’s original. In the end, Eisenhower could be reasonably happy with 
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The Secretary of Defense was granted more 
powers, including over budgeting, which were boosted by a newly enhanced group of 
Assistant Secretaries. These powers largely came at the expense of the Service 
Secretaries who lost not only much of their budgetary powers but also their places in the 
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chain of command. As one colonel later observed “the solution to deficiencies in the 
Pentagon lay in reorganization to suppress Service perspectives in favor of those 
representing a joint or unified point of view.”934 The Joint Chiefs assumed that 
responsibility while also retaining their role as the prime military advisors to the 
President. The research and development arm of the Pentagon was also strengthened.935 
In the end, Neil McElroy had little time to enjoy his new responsibilities. He left the 
Pentagon in early December 1959. 
 
The Twilight Secretary 
McElroy’s replacement was thrust into an unenviable situation: he faced an 
entirely new and untried organization that, publically, seemed to be failing the nation. Yet 
that man, Thomas S. Gates, led something of a charmed life in his role as secretary. 
Gates’ career before the Pentagon was far closer to that of someone like Robert Lovett 
than it was Charles Wilson. Like Lovett, Eberstadt, and a host of others, Gates was an 
investment banker by trade. After a stint in the Navy during the Second World War, he 
joined the Department of Defense in 1953, serving in the two top civilian jobs in the 
Naval Department and becoming McElroy’s second in command in June 1959. It was a 
short apprenticeship: a little over six months later Gates ran the entire Department. He 
was generally perceived as intelligent, hardworking, and friendly.936 Carl Vinson even 
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said Gates was, “‘the best appointment President Eisenhower has made.’”937 Gates 
seemed to work well with almost everyone in the Eisenhower Administration. One of his 
subordinates thought, if he held the post of Secretary longer, he would “have ‘gone down 
as one of the great ones.’”938 
Gates seemed the perfect person to embrace the new powers afforded the 
Secretary. His long service in the Department made him uniquely equipped, compared to 
his predecessors, to carry out his job. While Eisenhower remained engaged in matters of 
defense, Gates had the confidence to work with the President, not merely take orders 
from him. He set about reforming the Department. Much of that was easier since he was 
able to delegate matters to his new subordinates instead of having to manage them. He 
reached out to the State Department, believing the work of the departments was “almost 
indivisible.”939 That meant an increased role for the Office of International Security 
Affairs (ISA). ISA was technically the Pentagon’s foreign policy arm. It administered the 
Pentagon’s mutual aid program and coordinated the Pentagon’s response to foreign 
policy issues.940 Under Wilson and McElroy, the office was something of a backwater.941 
That began to change under Gates, who expected the Pentagon to take a far more active 
role in shaping matters traditionally considered diplomatic rather than military.942 Gates 
also engaged closely with the newly-empowered JCS. While Wilson had good relations 
with Admiral Radford, neither Wilson nor McElroy felt it necessary to spend much time 																																																								
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with the Chiefs. Gates took to meeting with them almost every week.943 He also did more 
to include them in talks on matters of both policy and budget.944 Far from being a 
nuisance, Gates viewed them as an important part of the job.  
 Whereas Wilson and McElroy had established monetary ceilings for the services, 
Gates took a new view on the budget. Samuel Huntington, in his 1957 review of civil-
military relations, noted, “So long as the Secretary of Defense [is] unable to arrive at an 
independent balancing of military and fiscal demands, the basic decisions on military 
policy were inevitably the result of the political battle between the Comptroller versus the 
Chiefs.”945 Gates, for the first time in the history of the Pentagon instituted programs to 
give the Secretary the ability to assess that balance. He first asked the comptroller to 
determine the simple “dollar value” of military programs.946 Though far simpler than 
what Robert McNamara later instituted, it was an important start. He also advocated for 
an increase in the defense budget. Gates felt comfortable in doing this after getting 
encouragement from an usual source: Dwight Eisenhower. Despite spending the past 
seven years arguing against a larger defense budget, in 1960 Eisenhower hinted the 
department might get more funding.947 The budget Gates submitted also hewed far closer 
to the budgets submitted later by McNamara, rather than those under Eisenhower. It 
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increased funding for nuclear missiles, while eliminating funding for new bombers. It 
looked to finance the development of a new transport aircraft, increased research 
throughout the Pentagon, and, for the first time in years, gave the Army money to procure 
conventional weapons systems.948 More importantly, Gates commissioned two studies to 
define exactly what new powers he had thanks to the 1958 reorganization. As a result of 
these studies—which he passed on to McNamara—he made other changes to the 
structure and operations of the Defense Department.949 He instituted a new personnel 
policy, one that closely resembled ideas Henry Jackson espoused, that forced officers to 
have more diverse postings as they moved up the ranks.950 He also established both the 
Defense Communications Agency, which, as the name implied, oversaw the Pentagon’s 
communications network, as well as gave the Pentagon its own unified intelligence 
service with the Defense Intelligence Agency.951 
Not surprisingly, Gates had a remarkably easy time when called to testify before 
of the SNPM in 1960. Jackson was smart in how he structured the first few rounds of 
testimony. While they were critical of the NSC and its process, they primarily focused on 
questions of defense. Robert Lovett’s blistering statement to the committee, for instance, 
barely mentions the NSC by name. The two Gaither Committee alums and CEO who 
followed his testimony—Baxter, Sprague, and Watson—also talked, in large part, about 
how a lack of coordination over science and technology, and the unwillingness of 
Eisenhower, Wilson, and McElroy to raise the defense budget, all threatened the nation’s 																																																								
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security. In this environment, one might expect Gates to feel the brunt of the SNPM’s 
anger. But Jackson seemed almost fawning at times and Gates escaped largely unscathed. 
Despite the fact that this all took place in late June of 1960 and in the aftermath of the U-
2 incident, Jackson began his questions by saying “As I indicated in my opening 
statement, I think you have set a fine example for the kind of person we need in the 
Department of Defense, both from the standpoint of know-how and a willingness to stay 
on the job.”952 Jackson’s whole line of questioning with Gates was remarkably cordial. 
When Jackson said that it was important to get the best people in the right jobs now, 
Gates answered “I live with a sense of urgency in the Department of Defense, so I share 
that point of view.” Jackson responded, “I am happy to hear you say that.”953 He even 
compared Gates to the hero of the SNPM’s investigations, Lovett: “I want to commend 
you highly for what you have said here. It is certainly in accord with what Mr. Lovett had 
to say and, in my judgement, Mr. Lovett has set an example that all Secretaries can well 
live up to.”954 About the only thing Gates did that drew the ire of the SNPM’s Democrats 
was in his defense of the NSC system. Nonetheless, Jackson’s treatment of Gates 
demonstrates how much the Secretary had done to rehabilitate the image of his office.  
Jackson’s positive assessment of Gates makes perfect sense. Jackson was deeply 
critical of Eisenhower’s military priorities, but this was not the fault of the Pentagon, but 
rather that of the NSC and White House. The SNPM staff even praised the 1958 
reorganization in their final report. While it noted: “one must guard against seeking 
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organizational solutions to problems which are not really organizational” it added, “Yet 
there are reforms which are promising of results. They point in the direction of a more 
vigorous employment of the broad authority already invested in the Secretary of 
Defense.”955 The SNPM said the reorganization of scientific research in the Pentagon was 
a model for other government agencies.956 More importantly, Jackson and the SNPM 
staff saw the Secretary of Defense as one of the two main cabinet members who should 
be overseeing the nation’s national security. The SNPM’s final report said the Secretaries 
of State and Defense, “speak for the requirements of national safety and survival.”957 
Replacing an ineffective NSC system, Jackson wanted a strong Secretary of Defense to 
take an active role in decision making.    
The Pentagon’s official history of the period states that “Gates's forceful grasp of 
his responsibilities, his interest in policy both military and diplomatic—and his 
aggressive leadership style, emphasizing anticipation of issues…all marked him as 
unique among Eisenhower's secretaries of defense and as a man of the same stamp as his 
successor, McNamara.”958 Despite all he had accomplished, Gates was worn out by his 
year in the spotlight. As he remembered, Congressional relations could be tricky because 
“I had [Stuart] Symington running for president. I had Kennedy running for President. I 
had Lyndon Johnson running for President. I had Scoop Jackson who had ideas that he 
might be President…We had a very, tough, tough, tough year…. There was no personal 
animosity…but there was a big political ballgame going on, and everybody was 																																																								955	“Super-Cabinet Officers and Super Staffs” in Organizing for National Security, Vol. III.	956	“Science Organization and the President’s Office” in Organizing for National Security, Vol. III.	957	“The Secretary of State in the National Security Policy Process” in Organizing for National Security, 
Vol. III.	
958 Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 737. 
 	
252 
involved[.]”959 Despite all this, Gates managed to make it to January 1961 with his 
reputation intact and having restored some prestige and stability to an office that, for 
years, seemed to struggle. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite the problems in the Pentagon during the Eisenhower years, Wilson, 
McElroy, and others had genuine successes that should not be overlooked. They made 
major advances in developing America’s nuclear weapons, modernized other parts of 
America’s armed forces, and kept the Defense budget within limits prescribed by 
Eisenhower. Yet, they did so at a price. There is an irony that Eisenhower, the model 
soldier, had so many headaches when it came to the management of defense. There is 
also some irony that Gates, least in the mold of Eisenhower’s ideal secretary, proved the 
best. In part this might merely have been a product of Gates’ 14 months in office: he just 
did not have time to get in trouble or make waves.960 Yet the Secretary still made 
remarkable advances in a short time. Gates, admittedly, benefitted from practical 
experience that his predecessors did not have. Only Wilson spent anything near the 
amount of time Gates did in the Pentagon, and Gates still beat him by four years. Yet 
Wilson never wanted to utilize his power in the same way Gates did. He felt overawed by 
Eisenhower in ways Gates seemingly did not. That hampered his effectiveness. McElroy 
did not seem to have the inclination to stay in the job for very long. 																																																								
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 Eisenhower made mistakes, but they were not as serious as his opponents 
claimed. He greatly increased the reconnaissance capabilities of the US, which allowed 
him to say that the Missile Gap was a myth even if no one believed him. But the issues in 
the Pentagon made this charge far more believable. While neither Eisenhower nor 
Pentagon officials were responsible for the early failures of the US missile program, the 
Pentagon’s scattershot approach to programs reinforced the perception that the nation 
was falling behind. Diffuse responsibilities for science and technological research, 
warring service secretaries and generals, and a lack of direction from the Secretary did 
not help the situation. 
 Eisenhower considered an attempt at short circuiting much of this criticism. At 
the heart of Eisenhower’s approach to defense management was a simple goal: to prevent 
the Pentagon’s budget from bankrupting the nation. The reforms of 1958 were, in part, 
about a larger set of issues, but giving the Secretary increased powers was a first step at 
creating greater budgetary controls. Wilson once said that his goal was “security with 
solvency.”961 Eisenhower repurposed it into a warning about the military-industrial 
complex. Though he made the phrase famous in his farewell speech, two years earlier he 
considered deploying it when invited to speak before the American Association of 
Newspaper Editors. At that time, Eisenhower had considered delivering a speech that in 
part called attention to the “appalling cost” of security.962 In the end, he modified that talk 
to focus more narrowly about Pentagon reorganization.963 For the President, however, 
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fears of the runaway spending of the military-industrial complex found a place in his 
wider public relations effort over the Pentagon reforms.964  
 The President’s experience with Pentagon reforms also make it more 
understandable why Eisenhower never took similar steps to reform the NSC. Indeed, we 
might be able to see patterns in Eisenhower’s handling of Pentagon reforms that hint at 
why he did not take more action in his own White House. There is no doubt that the 
legislation helped the Pentagon, but Eisenhower seemed largely unwilling to make these 
changes while Wilson was in charge. When McElroy took over, the President was far 
more insistent on those changes being made. Even if we accept a more complex “hidden 
hand” style of management, it still seems Eisenhower was a hands-off leader, at least in 
terms of internal organization, once a subordinate had established himself. To new 
subordinates, however, he seemed either willing to either let them change an organization 
or to force changes on them. He allowed Gordon Gray to change the NSC structure and 
forced McElroy to do the same. But the process of modifying the Pentagon was brutal. 
Though the Administration emerged from it intact, it exposed it to months of negative 
press and an awkward and messy battle through Congress. With less than two years left 
on his term in office, it makes more sense why Eisenhower might not have repeated this 
with the organization of the White House during the run-up to the 1960 election. Despite 
Gates’ glowing reputation, the Pentagon, like the NSC, entered 1960 as a questionable 
institution. If not openly damaged, it seemed to be making poor policy choices. Jackson’s 
work via the SNPM did not necessarily present anything new on this front, but it 
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highlighted the Pentagon’s problems only two years after Eisenhower had supposedly 
fixed them. While the Democrats promised to do better after the 1960 election, few had 
yet defined what “better” really meant.   
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Chapter 7: Robert McNamara’s Answers 
 When Robert Kennedy called Robert McNamara in 1960 to see if the Ford CEO 
wanted to serve in his brother’s Administration, McNamara had no idea who the younger 
Kennedy was.965 Three years later, when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, then-
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara acted, in some respects, more like a member of 
the family than a cabinet secretary. He first escorted Robert Kennedy to Andrews Air 
Force base to meet Air Force One. Over the next few days, he played a key role in 
orchestrating the funeral, and even found Kennedy’s eventual resting place in Arlington 
National Cemetery.966 Between 1961 and 1963 McNamara developed a close relationship 
to both Kennedys. His personal relationship with Robert Kennedy perhaps bordered more 
closely on a friendship. Jackie Kennedy said he was the most attractive man in the 
Pentagon, saying that “‘Men can’t understand his sex appeal.’”967 Even if John Kennedy 
had problems understanding Robert McNamara’s appeal to women, he considered 
McNamara a key advisor. McGeorge Bundy, for one, believed that Kennedy spent more 
time talking to McNamara than almost anyone else in the Administration.968  
 If time were to somehow stop in early 1964, Robert McNamara might be 
remembered as one of the greatest cabinet secretaries of the 20th Century. Lest that seem 
like hyperbole, one must only consider what had come before. No one would argue 
McNamara was perfect—his reputation for arrogance remains legendary—but he had 
almost done the impossible. Three different attempts at reforms and a revolving door of 																																																								
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secretaries—Forrestal, Johnson, Lovett, Marshall, Wilson, and McElroy—all failed to 
tame the Department of Defense. The Democrats had used this chaos, to sell a story, one 
that Henry Jackson perfected during the SNPM hearings in 1960. America was falling 
behind militarily. Running the Pentagon looked like a thankless job. Yet when writing the 
official history of the McNamara years, the Pentagon’s own history team admitted that 
while he might be the most controversial Secretary of Defense, he was also “arguably the 
most successful in administering the Defense Department.”969  
 At first glance, McNamara’s revolution in the Pentagon might not appear as 
revolutionary. Many of McNamara’s most significant improvements built on work begun 
by Thomas Gates. McNamara’s budgeting policies, though more advanced than what 
Gates envisioned, fit a similar pattern. His use of statistical controls and analysis often 
dovetailed with work long embraced by the services. His tight control of systems 
development, the TFX program being one example, was foreshadowed by some of Gates’ 
own activities. He also took the position in directions Gates might not have imagined, or 
simply did not have time to explore, including playing a leading role in diplomacy such 
as the Skybolt Crisis in 1962 and 1963. During the Eisenhower Administration the 
question about the Defense Department seemed to be, could it be managed? By the time 
of Kennedy’s assassination, one could debate how McNamara was managing the 
Pentagon, but one could not deny that the Pentagon was being managed.  
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 The new president announced his pick for Secretary of Defense. The man he 
picked was the CEO of an auto company. He had come up through the ranks of his 
company where he had overseen impressive advances in managerial control. He had a 
background in maximizing efficiency, much of it gained from wartime experience. This 
was not, however, Charles Wilson in 1952, this was Robert McNamara in 1960. One 
might be forgiven for confusing the two. It says something, however, about the length of 
political memories that the same background used to justify Wilson only eight years 
earlier could so quickly be turned around and used to justify the choice of McNamara in 
1960.  
If John F. Kennedy looked fresh and young compared to Dwight Eisenhower, the 
same could be said of McNamara and Wilson. “Engineer Charlie” came up through 
Westinghouse and General Motors and knew his way around a factory floor. McNamara, 
by contrast, was educated in management theory at Harvard Business School and, instead 
of knowing the ins and outs of an assembly line, was schooled in how to use data to 
achieve results. McNamara was the New Frontier. Moreover, McNamara had a pedigree 
that made Democrats salivate, including an undergraduate education at UC Berkeley and 
a teaching stint at Harvard Business School after he graduated. He also possessed the 
real-world experience that seemed to define action intellectuals.  
McNamara’s service during the Second World War choosing targets as part of a 
Statistical Control Unit (SCU) helped shape his career.970 At the very least, during this 
time he met future Air Force General Curtis LeMay. LeMay used the analysis of 																																																								
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McNamara and others as the justification to switch to low-level, nighttime, firebombing. 
He did this despite McNamara’s warning that the tactic might cost him 51% of his crews 
over time.971 The move proved brutally effective, and did so without the losses 
McNamara feared.972 
The SCU also set him up for a promising career in business. Ford Motor 
Company hired a group of SCU vets en masse as they hemorrhaged profits in the years 
after the war.973 McNamara and his fellow “Whiz Kids” discovered that Ford did not 
even know how much it cost to build one of their vehicles. This included both the 
individual pieces as well as the cost of labor.974 They helped turn Ford around, and 
McNamara made a name for himself as an astute, if sometimes arrogant, leader.975 That 
arrogance and some enmity led several colleagues to largely shut him out of what they 
were convinced was Ford’s next money maker: a car called the Edsel. That car proved a 
disastrous failure. But McNamara, largely untainted by the debacle, moved in to contain 
the damage, winning praise from the company.976 In 1960, only a little more than a 
decade after he joined the company, Henry Ford II selected McNamara to be the next 
CEO, the first non-family member to hold the job. 
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 Although this sort of track record gained him a national reputation, he was not 
John F. Kennedy’s first choice as Secretary of Defense. Apparently, Kennedy and others 
thought so highly of Thomas Gates that they wanted to keep him.977 Gates, a Republican, 
would add a sheen of bipartisanship to the new cabinet. Yet, how could Gates stay on 
after the blistering critiques employed against Eisenhower’s defense mismanagement 
during the campaign? Even if Gates was a reformer, there were limits to what might be 
acceptable. Both Robert Lovett and John Kenneth Galbraith suggested Kennedy contact 
McNamara.978  
Compared to Bundy, Nitze, and Rostow, who all lost their first choice jobs during 
the transition, McNamara had an easy time. As Bundy quipped, “[E]verybody that I know 
[had a long and painful process] …with the exception of Bob McNamara.”979 The 
Kennedy campaign already had a file on McNamara. The endorsements by Galbraith and 
Lovett helped, but McNamara was already a bright prospect. In addition to his business 
background and military service, McNamara had the support of the United Auto 
Workers, supported the American Civil Liberties Union, chose to live in Ann Arbor to be 
near the University of Michigan, and was a Republican, though in name only.980 Initially, 
the campaign offered McNamara the job of either Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary 
of Defense. McNamara immediately turned down the Treasury job, but seemed intrigued 
by the Pentagon. He traveled to Washington to meet with Kennedy, who finally sold him 
on the job after he promised McNamara he would have free rein to staff the Pentagon as 																																																								
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he chose. McNamara left his $400,000 a year job for one that only earned him 
$25,000.981  
In some respects, Kennedy and McNamara were more open with each other 
during this process than Kennedy might have been with other appointees. McNamara told 
Kennedy that he felt underprepared for the task, saying there was no school for cabinet 
officials. That prompted Kennedy to respond that, as far as he knew, there were not any 
schools for presidents either.982 A few weeks later, and after talking to Gates, McNamara 
told the president he felt confident he could handle the job. In response, Kennedy 
responded, “I talked over the presidency with Eisenhower, and after hearing what it’s all 
about, I’m convinced I can handle it.”983 McNamara had done his homework. In addition 
to his discussions with Gates, he also read the SNPM’s reports.984 While Jackson called 
for a “more vigorous implementation of the broad powers already vested in the Secretary 
of Defense” McNamara admitted, “I knew full well this view was not unanimously 
shared either in or out of the Pentagon.”985 That might have been true, but after the 1958 
reforms and under Gates, the Pentagon had moved firmly in the direction of a more 
powerful Secretary. McNamara was not necessarily pushing dramatically new ideas, just 
accepting process already underway. 
Theodore Sorensen claimed that the President “was impressed but never 
overwhelmed by McNamara's confident, authoritative presentations of concise 																																																								
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982 Dallek, p. 313. 
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conclusions.”986 That might have been true, but perhaps that was because McNamara 
showed the President a humanity and perspective that he revealed to few others. Kennedy 
commented that he liked McNamara because, “He’s one of the few guys around this town 
who, when you ask him if he has anything to say and he hasn’t, says ‘No.’ That’s rare 
these days.”987 McNamara was not just a friend or confident, he was a “doer.” McGeorge 
Bundy also noted that Kennedy valued McNamara “because within the limits of the 
possible he offers a president more leverage with the Pentagon than any other instrument 
available.”988 Bundy admired McNamra’s managerial capabilities and the two maintained 
an impressive working relationship despite the fact their bureaucratic bailiwicks 
overlapped. Bundy’s group engaged in some military planning, but mostly attempted to 
stay out of serious military discussions.989 One account suggests that initially Kennedy 
viewed McNamara as a political prop—he looked good on paper and in the words of 
Robert Lovett, “he can’t do that much damage. Not that he can do much good, but he 
can’t do that much damage.”990 Even if this reflected Kennedy’s initial view of 
McNamara, that respect that developed between the two was real.  
Kennedy largely kept his promise to McNamara about staffing the Pentagon. At 
all levels, he got some of the appointments he wanted but was forced to accept others.991 
Importantly, however, he was allowed to select the staff of the Pentagon’s Comptroller 
General, perhaps the most transformative piece of his Pentagon restructuring. He picked 																																																								
986 Quoted in Kaplan et. al., p. 6. 
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RAND economist Charles Hitch, one of the nation’s leading thinkers in analyzing 
defense spending, to run this post. The management of the Pentagon’s budget took a 
dramatic turn under McNamara. Previously, the services had decided what programs they 
would like to pursue and effectively set their own budgets. In budgeting, the main role of 
the Secretary of Defense was dolling out money, not analyzing programs. Rockefeller’s 
study and McNamara’s own analysis suggested that the Secretary of Defense and the 
Comptroller needed to play a more active role in program management and oversight. In 
part this was to counteract not only needless duplication, but also to promote better 
systems and programs and eliminate dead-end programs. Previously, the Pentagon 
worked on twelve-month funding cycles. Under McNamara and Hitch the Pentagon 
would instead forecast out budgets five years in advance. In part this was to more 
accurately assess how much money the Pentagon would need in coming years to maintain 
critical programs.  
McNamara called this “quantitative common sense.”992 As two analysts 
commented, such budgeting is “essential if there is to be a comprehensive and consistent 
policy.”993 In some respects, this was a revolutionary concept. In others, it merely tapped 
into and magnified trends that long existed in the Pentagon. During his year in office, for 
instance, Gates tried employing a similar funding structure as a method to analyze 
programs.994 This attempt was far less sophisticated than what McNamara used, but it 
shows a wider acceptance of these methods. Moreover, it tapped into a method of 
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analysis long used by some of the services. McNamara himself is an example of this. The 
Army’s interest in “scientific analysis” had roots in the Progressive Era.995 In 1956 
Maxwell Taylor urged the Army to look “to improved management to ensure that not a 
dollar is wasted or diverted.”996 The Air Force founded the RAND Cooperation to 
perform just this sort of management oversight, albeit on a contract basis. This did not 
mean these reforms were enthusiastically embraced, but they engaged a logic the services 
themselves supported.  
For the first time, Hitch and his staff gave the Secretary an analytical staff which 
could analyze projects and, it was hoped, maximize the cost effectiveness of US defense 
spending. The most significant introduction was a process known as the Planning, 
Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Remarkably, Hitch had the system up and 
running in only nine months. PPBS aimed to improve “decision making based on explicit 
criteria of the national interest…as opposed to decision making by compromise among 
various institutional, parochial, or other vested interests…[and] to develop explicit 
criteria…that could be used by the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress 
as measures of the need for and adequacy of defense programs.”997 In essence, the 
questions were what did you need and how much of it did you need? Did the Air Force 
need hundreds of bombers and hundreds of nuclear missiles? Were some types of 
weapons more cost effective than others? Some of these answers were, of course, 
impossible to determine. PPBS also sought to assess, as Gates had during his brief tenure, 
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how much a system actually cost. When the Eisenhower Administration budgeted money 
for a weapons system, that system was budgeted a new tranche of funds every year 
starting with development, leading to production, and ending with deployment. For the 
System’s Analysts, this made little sense. An aircraft was not just an aircraft: it was the 
endpoint in a long equation used to calculate its real expense. You had to look at every 
aspect: Would bases need to be modified to fit these new aircraft? How much fuel would 
they consume? Would crew training have to be significantly modified or would the 
military need more recruits to use the aircraft? How many spare parts would need to be 
budgeted into its yearly upkeep? All of these elements added to the real cost of a weapons 
system.  
Emulating his president, McNamara was a micromanager, and often threw 
himself into the work alongside Hitch and his analysts, making “clear his belief in active 
management from the top.”998 As one Army officer recalled, “When McNamara came 
into the Pentagon…[a]ll of the services were found wanting.”999 He was shocked by the 
lack of standardization. For instance, there were “three different kinds of women’s 
athletic bloomers—Marine Corps, Army, Navy, or something. It was absurd…Same for 
belt buckles.”1000 Standardization was not a panacea. As he explained, however, 
“Standardization doesn’t save a lot of money, but it saves some, and the fact the 
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department would tolerate non-standard specifications for no advantage simply 
shows…they didn’t have the proper objectives in mind.”1001  
If McNamara ruffled some budgetary feathers, the Services grew to respect some 
of his innovations. One officer recalled that in the Department of the Army McNamara, 
established “a small group of people who became a special information channel through 
the Secretary of the Army to Mr. McNamara…I came out of that assignment fairly well 
educated in the techniques of program management, and to this day I am an ardent and 
enthusiastic believer in program management as the way to go for any large 
organization.”1002 Yet this all had a purpose. Kennedy wanted to spend more on defense, 
but did not want to ruin the budget. If McNamara did his job, the Pentagon could 
eliminate projects, encourage standardization, and find savings that would allow for more 
efficient defense spending at only slightly higher levels.  
 Outside the realm of budgets and belt buckles, however, McNamara oversaw a 
transformation of US strategy. In 1956, Col. William DePuy, who two decades later 
helped rebuild the Army in the aftermath of Vietnam, wrote to a friend: “There are those 
of us who believe that the whole subject of the so-called limited war [or non-nuclear] 
deserves much more attention from an analytical standpoint…. The level of provocation 
which the Soviet Union and United States would tolerate short of unleashing mutual 
destruction would seem, on the basis of pure logic, to be high now and going even 
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higher.”1003 To another colleague, he argued “I do not advocate [for a limited] war and I 
hope it does not take place, but I feel…that we are losing instead of gaining ground.”1004 
He even charged that the service would find it “difficult to perform its mission on the 
atomic or non-atomic battlefield.”1005 DePuy was a relatively low-ranking officer in the 
1950s. He represented a line of thinking similar to that which Maxwell Taylor, Matthew 
Ridgeway, and James Gavin argued on the national stage. Democrats, like Jackson in the 
SNPM and Kennedy’s 1960 campaign, and Republicans who feared that America 
suffered from both the conventional gap and a missile gap, amplified that argument. 
If America planned to “support any friend” and “oppose any foe” it had to be 
ready to respond along the full spectrum of force codified in the Administration’s 
“Flexible Response” doctrine. Even if Kennedy, McNamara, and others exaggerated 
some of the improvements that took place on their watch, the conventional capabilities of 
the US did grow.1006 McNamara oversaw the Army’s development of helicopter borne, 
airmobile, forces starting in 1962. The idea was not new, but languished in the final year 
of the Eisenhower Administration.1007 When it came to McNamara’s attention, he fired 
off a series of memos directing the Army to investigate the subject. The general who ran 
the study said of McNamara’s directives, “[T]here may have been in other fields other 
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directives as good as those…but [if so,] none ever came to me for action.”1008 McNamara 
also oversaw a massive expansion of the Army’s Special Forces as well as a complete 
reorganization of that service’s structure.1009 For Navy, he invested in new aircraft 
carriers and new aircraft, as it also stepped away from its focus on nuclear warfare.  
In some cases, these changes in spending priorities resulted in projects that 
sounded boring but had significant implications. One of these was McNamara’s role in 
growing the Air Force’s fleet of transport. The Eisenhower Administration had come 
under fire in 1960 and had been subject to yet another congressional subcommittee 
investigation over the poor ability of the US to rapidly deploy troops overseas.1010 Gates 
started to invest in this program, but McNamara ramped up the funding for an entirely 
new generation of US transport aircraft.1011 The changes arguably made the US military 
stronger, yet it also gave it an unreasonable sense of what might be possible. The Colonel 
DePuy of the 1950s became General DePuy in the 1960s and in 1962 he became heavily 
involved in the development of the Army’s special warfare capabilities. As he later 
recalled  
[C]ounterinsurgency was all the rage in Washington because the Kennedys had 
come into office…The Army was trying to find, as were the other services, a role 
in this new and exciting high-priority national endeavor... [American doctrine] 
was premised on the assumption that if we were smart enough…we could 
somehow thwart the efforts of the communists to subvert the Third 
World….There was a great deal of confidence in Washington, naïve confidence, 
that we could do anything we set our minds to.1012 
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That explanation equally applied to McNamara’s own style of management. McGeorge 
Bundy argued that McNamara “enthrones this thing they teach in the business school 
[where] you take your problem, you take it apart, you measure all the pieces, you get 
them in order, you put them together, and you have your answer. And of course some 
things aren't like that.”1013 That method of operation could work well, as in the case of 
PPBS. PPBS in turn helped McNamara to gain a measure of control over the Pentagon by 
more closely controlling the service’s programs.1014 Yet it also had a drawback that 
McNamara would run into multiple times during the early 1960s. While McNamara 
would become a skilled operator, the tendency to value reason and shun other views that 
did not line up with his own, led him into trouble.  
 
The Best Secretary of Defense We Have Ever Had 
Perhaps the most publically controversial decision McNamara made unrelated to 
Vietnam was his decision in the TFX program. In the late 1950s the Air Force and Navy 
began ruminating on a new generation of aircraft. Air Force wanted a low-altitude, all-
weather, nuclear strike aircraft that could also perform other tasks. Simultaneously, the 
Navy decided it needed a new fighter to defend its aircraft carriers. These ideas 
developed in parallel during the Eisenhower years. The Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, a position created after the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, believed 
these requirements could be combined into one aircraft. Thomas Gates thought the idea 
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possible, but decided to halt the program in late 1960 so as not to commit the incoming 
administration to such an advanced concept.1015 McNamara restarted the program, 
envisioning it as a shining example of how the services could combine requirements to 
save money.1016 
That might have been the only easy decision in the entire TFX process. Almost 
from the start, neither the Navy nor Air Force seemed enthusiastic about sharing a 
program.1017 For an aircraft that supposedly had common attributes, each service imposed 
major requirements. For instance, the Navy aircraft could not be over 55,000 pounds, 
while the Air Force aircraft could not be under 65,000.1018 McNamara sided with the 
Navy, but problems remained. McNamara tried to solve these by immersing himself in 
the design process. When a question came up over aircraft weight, he threw the plans for 
the TFX on the floor of his office and started listing off parts that could be lightened.1019 
With each new design, the prices quoted by the companies seemed to be going up and the 
project seemed no closer to reality.1020  
After two years of study, two competing designs made it to the final round of 
evaluations, one built by Boeing, another by General Dynamics. Both services believed 
the Boeing design was marginally better. Yet, to the shock of almost everyone, 
McNamara and his advisors chose the General Dynamics’ entry. According to the 
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Secretary, his main consideration was cost. The Boeing design had several advanced 
design features that might delay its production.1021 The General Dynamics design also 
had an 80% commonality of parts between the Air Force and Navy versions. The Boeing 
design had just 60%.1022 The General Dynamics design would save money and stood a 
better chance of being delivered on time.1023 Yet McNamara’s argument that costs matter 
had a painful flaw: he made many of the decisions regarding TFX without Hitch’s PPBS 
system, introduced six months after McNamara restarted the TFX program. Decades 
later, McNamara complained that “[n]either I nor my officials could monitor the 
underlying day-to-day change-orders that the two services put in their version of the 
TFX. That’s what screwed it up.”1024 That is a problematic excuse, especially because he 
was well aware of the climbing costs of the program. Hitch and his staff were supposed 
to provide the very oversight that McNamara claimed he could not. As two of his analysts 
later commented McNamara was overwhelmed. He “had many other decisions to make at 
the time. In short, the problem was not ‘too much McNamara’; it was too little.”1025 
Almost immediately the TFX decision came under fire. Some believed it was an 
example of civilian overreach into military affairs. Others saw the selection of Texas-
based General Dynamics as proof Lyndon Johnson had meddled in the process.1026 Into 
this fray stepped Henry Jackson. Jackson’s main concern was that Boeing, based in 
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Seattle, had been denied the contract due to fraudulent decision-making on the part of 
McNamara. Jackson, via his seat on the GOC, decided to launch an investigation into the 
TFX. It came at something of an awkward time in Jackson’s relationship with the White 
House. The bond between Jackson and Kennedy never regained the apparent closeness 
the two had during their tenure in the Senate. Jackson was hardly an enemy of the White 
House, but Kennedy did little to reach out to him in spite of Jackson’s organizational 
suggestions after the Bay of Pigs and the SNPM hearings he commissioned to bolster the 
Administration’s reputation after the Bay of Pigs.1027 While the White House gladly 
accepted Jackson’s support, the official communication between the two groups was 
thin.1028 
The Kennedy-Jackson relationship took a turn in March 1962, when Jackson 
launched an unexpected attack on Adlai Stevenson and Kennedy’s UN strategy. 
Foreshadowing his later neoconservative views, Jackson worried that America was too 
willing to subsume its vital interests to those of the UN.1029 As he said, “The hope for 
peace with justice does not lie with the [UN]. Indeed the truth is almost exactly the 
reverse. The best hope for the [UN] lies in the maintenance of peace…Peace depends on 
the power and unity of the Atlantic Alliance and the skill of our direct diplomacy.”1030 
Many liberals in Congress were surprised that Jackson would make such an attack, and 
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many conservatives applauded his speech.1031 Among the shocked liberals was Stevenson 
himself. Stevenson, perhaps correctly, believed that Jackson’s speech had been ghost 
written by former Stevenson paramour Dorothy Fosdick and former Stevenson assistant 
Robert Tufts. The White House had its own reservations about Stevenson, but the biting, 
public feud between Stevenson and Jackson did not help. 
The TFX investigation was far worse. As a CBS reporter said at the time, “Robert 
McNamara, called by many here the best Secretary of Defense we have ever had, this 
week began a new phase in his eminently successful life. He is under attack from what 
had been an adoring Congress an admiring press and a pleased public.”1032 For some, the 
bar for forgiving McNamara was surprisingly low. The Washington Start wrote in an 
editorial, “Congress just wishes [McNamara] would be more human and just once in a 
while say he was sorry or wrong or [not] smarter than they are.”1033 Initially, Kennedy 
thought the matter was a joke and would disappear quickly.1034  
 The hearings got off to a rocky start when, during a private meeting, Jackson felt 
McNamara insulted him.1035 A newspaper, perhaps with Administration backing, took a 
shot a Jackson when it claimed the investigation was “to help [him] get off the hook with 
his constituents in the State of Washington.”1036 This helped give rise to Jackson’s 
unwanted moniker “The Senator from Boeing.” Then there was the strange story of the 
two Air Force officers, who were called in for a background interview with the GOC, and 																																																								
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suffered such rough treatment at the hands of that committee they had to be treated by 
Pentagon doctors after suffering undue emotional duress.1037 For McNamara, he could 
not understand why these Senators who seemed to have little understanding of the real 
issues at stake subjected him and his deputies to such scrutiny.   
The GOC’s hearings on TFX stripped away at McNamara’s reputation. While 
Jackson could not prove anything, McNamara looked obstinate. Kennedy complained, 
“It’s a goddamn outrage [that] the Washington Star gives [so much] space to the TFX 
hearings where there is no funny business going on.”1038 The President, however, never 
lost faith in his Secretary. He told McNamara that no one outside Washington cared 
about the TFX.1039 McNamara, however, knew that was a lie. At one point in Executive 
Session, McNamara broke down in tears, saying bullies at his son’s school were telling 
the younger McNamara his father was a liar.1040 Years later Jackson said he “found 
McNamara’s demeanor appalling, an unsavory mix of arrogance and weakness 
unacceptable for a secretary of defense.”1041 A Navy official warned Kennedy that the 
hearings were causing a “psychotic atmosphere” to descend on the Pentagon.1042  
 In the end, two Pentagon officials resigned over TFX. Neither was accused of 
wrongdoing, but both had ties to General Dynamics that were deemed suspicious. The 
GOC called a halt to hearings in November 1963, admitting there was no evidence the 
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decision had been made for fraudulent reasons. By contrast, many of Jackson’s liberal 
colleagues worried about the extent of the investigation, the damage it seemed to be 
causing with McNamara, and the conservative allies he had recruited.1043 Kennedy was 
frustrated and grew concerned about McNamara when he heard about the crying episode, 
though his anger was directed at Jackson and others.1044 In a moment of frustration, he 
told his bother that he would threaten to cancel one of the defense programs that Jackson 
most prized to “Scare ol’ Scoop.” Robert Kennedy cheered him on.1045  
 Even among allies, there was doubt about how the decision over the TFX was 
made. Columnist Drew Pearson, who initially thought Johnson ordered the switch, later 
wrote confidently that “Lyndon had nothing to do with it.”1046 Instead, a source told him 
that Kennedy had ordered McNamara to make the switch because Boeing was getting too 
many contracts “so the contracts had to be passed around” especially since work for the 
TFX might be done in Massachusetts.1047 Even McGeorge Bundy privately admitted that 
McNamara “took the heat on the TFX. I would suppose that when you finally get to the 
bottom of the TFX that it was not an entirely technical decision….And not entirely his. 
And I would suppose that no one will ever be able to know that, and this is very 
important.”1048 It seems unlikely McNamara did anything wrong, but he did little to 
demonstrate that. His hubris painted him in a corner. In his haste to prove he was correct, 																																																								
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he decided to stake his claim on TFX. It was a poor choice and a poor project over which 
Congress flayed him. 
There is no way to view McNamara’s handling of the TFX program as a success. 
The General Dynamics design might have been the best, but it appeared haphazard and 
questionable. Though, some of Jackson’s attack might have been motivated by pique, the 
“Senator from Boeing” had justification to question McNamara’s ideas. This appeared 
even more the case later in the 1960s. First, the Navy dropped out of the program in 
1964. Second, the Pentagon ordered fewer aircraft than initially planned. Lastly, when 
finally introduced into the Air Force as the F-111, it had a disastrous combat debut in 
Vietnam.1049 From the perspective of 1968, the TFX appeared to be a disaster of 
McNamara’s making.  
 Yet with slightly more perspective, the program looks much better. The aircraft 
itself quickly overcame its teething troubles and became a superb aircraft, so good that 
the Pentagon considered restarting production in the mid-1980s. Moreover, even today 
the Air Force has still not managed to fill the gap left by the type’s retirement over two 
decades earlier.1050 McNamara successfully applied the mixed requirement methodology 
when he forced the Air Force to adopt two Navy aircraft. Both proved highly successful 
and saved money for the Pentagon. McNamara demonstrated that if properly applied this 
type of standardization can have its benefits, too. Moreover, it set the standard for future 
procurement efforts. Unlike Wilson and McElroy, no one could complain that Robert 
McNamara was not involved enough in the Pentagon. 																																																								
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The Trial and Tribulations of Skybolt 
If the TFX showed the limits of McNamara’s foresight and analytical capabilities, 
another situation demonstrated both how PPBS should ideally function as well as 
McNamara’s role as a diplomat. It also involved cancelling a major weapons system, in 
this case Douglas Aircraft Company’s GAM-87 missile, also known as the Skybolt. Like 
TFX, the Skybolt crisis made international headlines. Unlike TFX, it also threatened 
American relations with Great Britain, one of its closest allies, who chose Skybolt as their 
primary nuclear weapon. When McNamara decided to cancel the system he effectively 
removed the British from the nuclear club. McNamara’s budgetary decisions exacerbated 
the problem, even though his diplomacy also paved the way for positive ending to a 
potentially explosive problem.  
Skybolt began in 1959 as an attempt to prolong the life of America’s nuclear 
armed bombers. In the late 1950s manned bombers remained the mainstay of America’s 
nuclear deterrent. While the introduction of intermediate range and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (IRBM and ICBM) suggested a diminishing need for bombers, several 
arguments existed for sustaining America’s force. Teething troubles with the new 
generation of missiles raised questions about when they might actually be deployed and 
the new missiles were far less accurate than a manned bomber.1051 Lastly, and most 
fundamentally, a missile could not be recalled. A bomber, however, could be turned 
around in midflight if nuclear war could be avoided at the last minute. Skybolt was an 
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attempt to square this circle. It was essentially a small ICBM, that a B-52 could carry. 
While still outside Soviet airspace, and safe from Soviet interceptors and missiles, it 
could launch its Skybolt. With a range of over a thousand miles, the Skybolt could hit 
most targets in the Soviet Union. Skybolt was never meant to be the centerpiece of the 
US nuclear arsenal, merely one part of the nuclear toolbox.1052 The British quickly 
became interested in the weapon, too. For them, however, it would be the center of their 
nuclear arsenal.1053 They reached a deal with the Eisenhower Administration whereby the 
United States would foot the bill for Skybolt’s development, but Britain would buy 
hundreds of missiles once it became operational.   
In theory, it was a great solution to a pressing problem. In practice, it was a 
troublesome weapons system in part because it was expected to do things asked of no 
other missile.1054 Two of McNamara’s systems analysis officials referred to it as “the 
most complex ballistic missile system” developed by the US.1055 Over two years, the cost 
of the program grew to almost three times the original estimate.1056 Analysts warned that 
what started off as an $800 million project could actually cost $3 billion.1057 Twice 
members of the Eisenhower Administration recommended that it be cancelled. Perhaps as 																																																								
1052 In addition to a new manned bomber, a project McNamara also cancelled, the US employed a variety of 
stand-off weapons to increase the survivability of the bomber force. 
1053 Bob Clarke, Four Minute Warning (Tempus, 2005), p. 34-35. 
1054 Skybolt had to perform in ways expected of no other IR, IC, or SLBM. It would have to be robust 
enough to survive many take-offs and landings, to say nothing of being subjected to flight at hundreds of 
miles of hour, since missiles would be carried on aircraft even in peacetime. More importantly, after being 
fired from anywhere in the world from an unknown altitude, its guidance system would have to find its 
location and send it to its target. Normal IRBMs and ICBMs had it easy by comparison. They lived in 
protected shelters and with their exact coordinated preprogramed. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs) had to be able to quickly ascertain their firing location, but their firing altitude would always be 
the same, and they were equally sheltered until firing.  
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a face saving measure, Thomas Gates overruled those suggestions while simultaneously 
balking at increasing funding.1058 McNamara had doubts, but for the sake of the British 
continued the project. He admitted before Congress “it was a costly project and presents 
some unusually complex development problems.”1059 Yet he also acknowledged, “On 
balance, [however] we feel that the advantages of this weapons system warrant an 
effective development effort.”1060 Other changes made by McNamara threatened the 
system. Those changes would not have happened if he did not have the powers granted to 
the secretary back in 1958.  
 Much of this dealt with US nuclear strategy and continued a process begun by 
Carl Kaysen during the Berlin Crisis. As noted in Chapter 5, America’s nuclear strategy 
was an “all or nothing” gambit. Speaking of trains in World War One, Barbara Tuchman, 
noted: “From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times 
according to a schedule precise down to the number of train axels that would pass over a 
given bridge within a given time.”1061 If one replaces “train axles” with “nuclear 
bombers” and bridges with “tanker aircraft” or “targets” one gets a good idea of how US 
nuclear war plans worked in the 1950s and early 1960s. Launching a strike required 
coordinating over a thousand bombers with dozens of tanker aircraft all over the world to 
drop over 1,700 nuclear weapons on between 700 and 1,000 targets.1062  
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Half measures did not exist. America’s nuclear war plan aimed to saturate 
Communist nations. If done properly, America would suffer limited retaliatory damage—
though what characterized limited was not at all clear.1063 A 1959 study estimated that if 
America did not send its full force a Soviet attack would kill roughly a third of the US 
population.1064 The stakes were high, and Air Force officials cared little for inflicting 
collateral damage. Official US policy admitted “the peoples of the Bloc countries other 
than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their 
governments” and aimed to “avoid non-military destruction and casualties” in these 
nations.1065 In a briefing early in McNamara’s term the Chief of the Air Force admitted 
US nuclear war plans “make no…distinction among the USSR, Communist China, [text 
classified], and apparently dictates that the [nuclear war plan] provide for the attack of a 
single list of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets.”1066 When the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
heard the implications of this and asked how the Air Force might avoid killing millions of 
innocent civilians, the Air Force chief of staff said, “Well, yeh [sic], we could do that, but 
I hope nobody thinks of it because it would really screw up the plan.”1067  
At best, McNamara had a mixed relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While 
the Army, to a greater or lesser extent, was happy with his budgetary priorities, other 																																																																																																																																																																					
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services found him arrogant and unwilling to heed their advice.1068 Though there might 
have been an extra edge in their relations with McNamara, this was not significantly 
different than their attitude during the Eisenhower years. In two years, for instance, the 
Kennedy Administration went through two Chiefs of Naval Operation where as 
Eisenhower went through five Army Chiefs of Staff in his two terms.1069 McNamara’s 
relations with the Air Force was perhaps the most challenging. Here McNamara came up 
against his former boss, Curtis LeMay, then the Air Force chief of staff. For a service that 
had been lavished with funds during the Eisenhower years, the Air Force received a rude 
awakening during the Kennedy era. Not only did the President chafe at LeMay almost 
every time the two met, but McNamara cancelled some of the Air Force’s favorite 
programs.1070 While the service got the TFX as well as a bevy of new Minuteman 
ICBMs, it lost its new manned bomber and several of its other missile and aircraft 
programs. Perhaps most importantly, however, McNamara decided he would insert 
himself and his office into the debate over nuclear strategy. He was frustrated by the 
constant request for more weapons, and shocked at the callousness toward casualty 
numbers. The same general who worried about the plan being screwed up also horrified 
McNamara with a joke about a possible nuclear war: “Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope you 
don’t have any friends or relations in Albania, because we’re just going to have to wipe it 
out.”1071 McNamara questioned whether the Air Force’s focus on targeting multiple 
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weapons on a single target was a sensible, or even cost effective, strategy.1072 All of this 
was done to ensure destruction in case one weapons failed. This thinking drove the Air 
Force’s decision behind Skybolt.  
 For several years analysts had spoken about a better way to conduct a nuclear 
war. After his early experiences, McNamara adopted these ideas as policy. In 1962, 
McNamara gave a major speech at a NATO conference in Athens in which he laid out a 
new policy:  
our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war: stemming from a 
major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military 
forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied 
society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear 
force only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious 
limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear 
war.1073 
 
Buried in this somewhat technical language was a major announcement: America would 
no longer target Soviet cities in a first strike. Its targets instead would be Soviet nuclear 
forces. Theoretically knocking out Soviet forces would save America cities and preserve 
enough of the Soviet Union and its leadership to allow its them to commence 
negotiations. Analysts claimed it would also save lives. It was a bold departure from 
previous strategy. Previous Secretaries of Defense had only had a marginal impact on US 
nuclear strategy. McNamara made it clear that LeMay and others, instead of being able to 
determine their own strategy, would now take their planning orders from the Secretary.  
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Barley lasting two years, the “Counterforce” doctrine was replaced by the strategy 
of mutually assured destruction.1074 McNamara realized that counterforce strikes did little 
to save lives and that a nation only needed a small number of nuclear weapons to make 
an attack costly.1075 Mutually assured destruction might have been a terrifying prospect, 
but it admitted nuclear war was effectively unwinnable. This reflected not just his 
thinking, but that of Kennedy as well. The President, for all his Cold Warrior instincts, 
never had much of a stomach for nuclear war. He quickly curtailed many of the civil 
defense initiatives started by Eisenhower.1076 As an official in the Pentagon noted, 
Kennedy eventually decided nuclear weapons “had a very small chance of being 
used….[N]either side was going to use [nuclear weapons] under any reasonable 
circumstances [and] you couldn't count on [them] to help you in anything else.”1077  
The brief existence of the counterforce, however, doctrine put another nail in 
Skybolt’s coffin. The system was never particularly accurate—in many respects, it never 
needed to be. Large cities were its main target. It was not accurate enough, however, to 
hit smaller targets like airfields or missile silos. Indeed, the Air Force already had a 
cheaper, more accurate, and more versatile weapon that could do all of this.1078 For 
America, its nuclear arsenal was already full better alternatives to Skybolt.1079  
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More worryingly Skybolt suffered a series of embarrassing engineering setbacks, 
including the fact it could not do the most basic thing asked of it: fly. It failed its first five 
test flights.1080 McNamara’s predecessors had involved themselves in programs, but with 
far different results.1081 When, during a Congressional hearing, Neil McElroy was asked 
why the Pentagon was building two different missile systems to do the same job, 
McElroy admitted “This is one area where we have not done very well in making a 
decision. As far as I am concerned, it would not bother me if you held our feet to the fire 
and forced us in connection with this budget.”1082 Asking Congress to make the decision 
for the Pentagon was anathema to the entire PPBS system. Indeed, two of McNamara’s 
analysts cited the Skybolt case as an example of why the Secretary of Defense needed an 
independent budgetary analysis staff. Throughout this period the Air Force repeatedly 
claimed that Skybolt was both cost effective and a better alternative to other weapons.1083 
For almost anyone in the Pentagon other than the Air Force, however, Skybolt’s flaws 
were increasingly apparent. As the nation’s nuclear arsenal grew the justification 
disappeared.1084  
The British, however, still depended on Skybolt. A colleague told Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan, “the strength of the [nuclear] deterrent must be the heart of our 
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defence policy.”1085 Few British officials worried about the niceties of nuclear 
warfighting strategy. One member of Parliament said, “Britain can knock down twelve 
cities in the region of Stalingrad and Moscow…and another dozen in the Crimea…We 
did not have this power at the time of Suez. We are a major power again.”1086 Britain 
could also not risk the possibility that America’s nuclear umbrella would be unavailable. 
Having been in the Cabinet during Suez, Macmillan understood what it was like to be 
abandoned by America. He put tremendous faith in the Anglo-American relationship but, 
as the Foreign Secretary noted, faith was not enough in this case. 
Macmillan would have even more to worry about had he known about the 
Kennedy Administration’s internal discussions about the future of Britain’s nuclear 
weapons. McNamara watched as his colleagues in the White House and State Department 
quietly advocated America’s push for its abolition. Under Secretary of State George Ball 
felt that it was better for the US to withdraw support for Skybolt, especially since 
America had refused to help either France or West Germany in their development of 
nuclear weapons. Ball feared that US support for a new British nuclear deterrent would 
lead to bitterness. Moreover, it might stymie Britain’s then attempt to joint the European 
Economic Council, a move which Washington hoped would help shore up Europe. 
Instead Ball and others wanted McNamara to promote the Multilateral Force (MLF), a 
plan to place nuclear weapons under NATO control on ships manned by multinational 
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NATO crews.1087 This idea stretched back to the Eisenhower years, and Kennedy was 
briefed on it during the transition.1088 It gained traction during the early 1960s and NSC 
officials even produced two documents which advocated stripping Britain of its nuclear 
deterrent. The first, an April 1961 NSAM-backed Policy Directive stated, “Over the long 
run, it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent 
business. If the development of Skybolt is not warranted for U.S. purposes alone, the U.S. 
should not prolong the life of the V-Bomber force by this or other means.”1089 A year 
later, a draft of the Basic National Security Policy argued for a reduction in the nuclear 
relationship with the UK.1090 Both papers believed that denying Britain its nuclear 
weapons would help bring Western European nations together to form a more effective 
bulwark against the Soviets. 
If McNamara the strategist felt the justification for Skybolt was thin, McNamara 
the analysist could hardly ignore the rising costs of the system and its inability to even 
fly. Almost until the end, however, he seemed willing to give the program every 
opportunity to work. As late as September 1962, McNamara approved more funds, and 
even reached an agreement with the Air Force to fund the program month-to-month, an 
unusual set-up for a department that planned its funding years in advance.1091 Yet within 
three months the cost increased again.1092 Even though the JCS, with the exception of 
Maxwell Taylor, were in favor of keeping Skybolt, few others were. Both the Treasury 																																																								
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Department and the Bureau of the Budget suggested that Skybolt be cancelled on cost 
measures alone.1093 When added to the voices in the White House and the State 
Department and the decreasing military utility of the system, the choice seemed obvious. 
McNamara recommended that Kennedy cancel the system and Kennedy approved the 
termination on November 23, 1962.1094 
Now came time for McNamara the diplomat to take the stage. The next few 
weeks proved so chaotic that Kennedy later recalled Richard Neustadt to the US to 
investigate just what happened. Under the auspices of PACGO, recommissioned briefly 
and seemingly for the only time during the Kennedy years, Neustadt studied the Skybolt 
story and wrote a report he delivered to Kennedy just before the President’s 
assassination.1095 The British argued that they had been blindsided by McNamara’s 
decision. Neustadt, however, showed the British deserved some of the blame since they 
suffered from a certain amount of confirmation bias. The British believed everything they 
heard about Skybolt from the Air Force and Douglas Aircraft, while minimizing the 
missile’s problems and ignored their only source close to McNamara’s office.1096 
Throughout Skybolt’s development, McNamara was candid about his own cautious 
optimism, while still being realistic about its chances.1097 While some of McNamara’s 
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deputies remained cagey about the increasingly dire state of the program, they did not 
conceal the truth.1098  
Realizing the damage this could do, McNamara offered to visit London to discuss 
the matter in person with his British counterparts.1099 At the same time, he went against 
the prevailing mood in Washington and was prepared to offer the British ways to 
preserve their independent nuclear capability. He offered them a series of alternatives that 
included joining the MLF, independently fund Skybolt themselves, adopt another US air 
launched nuclear weapon, or opt-in on the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) program.1100 Rusk, Ball, and other factions at State objected to McNamara’s 
generous offer, but Kennedy authorized McNamara to float the idea if prudent.1101 
  The Prime Minister had mixed emotions about the cancellation of Skybolt. As he 
noted in his diary, “it is clear that [McNamara and Kennedy] have decided—on wider 
grounds— to concentrate on [ICBMs and SLBMs]. It is also clear to me that they are 
determined to kill Skybolt on good general grounds—not merely to annoy us or drive [the 
UK] out of the nuclear business. But, of course, they have handled things in such a way 
as to make many of us very suspicious.”1102 Objectively, one can argue with that claim. 
McNamara informed Britain’s Ambassador to the US David Ormsby Gore and others 
weeks before its cancellation that Skybolt’s feature was bleak.1103  
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If McNamara made one misstep, it was in how he timed his announcement to the 
British. McNamara knew that if Kennedy decided to cancel the system in late November, 
he would have approximately two weeks before the news became public. McNamara 
expected to be in London at that time and wanted to break the news personally. Yet word 
slipped out earlier than he anticipated and his trip was delayed.1104 Thus the Secretary of 
Defense became a scapegoat in the British press. According to Ormsby Gore, officials in 
Britain’s Ministry of Defense leaked anti-McNamara stories to smear McNamara and 
sow “maximum distrust of American motives[. It] made the situation as difficult as 
possible for the Prime Minister as well as the President.”1105  
Perhaps lower-level Ministry of Defense officials had additional reasons to be 
angry at McNamara. Only a few months earlier, McNamara announced that the US was 
pulling funds for Britain’s Thor IRBMs. The Thor was actually an American missile 
developed prior to the deployment of America’s ICBM force. Its short range, however, 
meant it could not be launched from the US. To overcome this, America loaned it to the 
British who, with American financial support, deployed it beginning in 1960.1106 The US 
promised to subsidize the deployment until late 1964 and made similar deployments of 
Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey.1107 These, with the Thors, all concerned the Soviets 
and helped contribute to their 1962 efforts to put missiles in Cuba. In May 1962, only a 
few months before the Skybolt Crisis, McNamara announced America would not renew 
Thor funding after 1964. The British would either need to return the missiles or continue 																																																								
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to deploy them with the associated financial burden. McNamara’s decision was not all 
that controversial. For the Americans, the Thor was an aging system with a short range 
made redundant by the new ICBM and SLBM force. The British thought that the Thor 
was almost obsolete.1108 While McNamara’s decision in this matter did not provoke the 
same anger, it did little to help. The removal of the Thors left one more hole in Britain’s 
nuclear arsenal—a situation exacerbated by Skybolt’s cancellation.1109  
 McNamara’s own diplomacy hit a further wall when he finally had a chance to sit 
down with Britain’s Defense Minister, Peter Thorneycroft. McNamara knew the meeting 
would be tough, but was shocked by Thorneycroft’s attitude. The Minister of Defense 
called Skybolt’s cancellation a betrayal.1110 The two quickly reached an impasse. 
McNamara expected Thorneycroft to ask for alternatives to Skybolt before he explicitly 
offered any. Thorneycroft expected McNamara to offer the British Polaris. McNamara 
finally offered the British Polaris if they agreed to commit their missiles to NATO’s—
essentially America’s—overall nuclear strike plan.1111 This was not a push to get the UK 
into the MLF. Indeed, it merely replicated what already existed: Britain’s nuclear strike 
plan was integrated into SAC’s own plan.1112 Thorneycroft responded to that suggestion 
harshly. Perhaps seeking to clarify McNamara’s point, ISA chief Paul Nitze asked if the 
UK would accept some sort of collaborative arrangement with the Americans. 
Thorneycroft’s response was that “Yes, we could make [a] collaborative arrangement of 																																																								
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that kind” though he also said Britain would need to know it could also act independently 
if needed.1113 Despite that positive ending neither side felt encouraged. McNamara 
suspected Thorneycroft had not even prepared for the meeting. When McNamara tried to 
engage the British minister on whether the UK could even manufacture submarines that 
could carry Polaris, Thorneycroft seemed dangerously ignorant of the specifics.1114 
Moreover McNamara was distressed to read press reports that night about how badly the 
meeting had gone.1115  
 Yet McNamara, Nitze, and Thorneycroft had stumbled on the eventual solution. 
They just lacked the power to make it possible. Regardless of McNamara’s power, he 
could not unilaterally offer nuclear weapons to the British; Kennedy would have to agree 
to the plan.1116 Kennedy and Macmillan met in Nassau to discuss the problem. Richard 
Neustadt helped popularize the idea that, in the end, David Ormsby Gore sat with 
Kennedy on the flight down and explained the situation to him. As Neustadt wrote,  
for the first time, [Kennedy]…got to the heart of the British problem, saw 
beneath the surface of “disaster” for the Tories to the point that there were 
but two ways to ward it off: by hailing [US] generosity or by assailing our 
bad faith. The “British problem” was his problem; he held the key to their 
resolution…The point was pure politics, not policy, not strategy, not 
diplomacy, not cost.1117 
 
Perhaps this is too simple an explanation or perhaps it does too much to talk up “The 
Special Relationship” between the two nations. In the end, however, Kennedy and 
Macmillan decided that Britain would get everything it needed for Polaris, except the 																																																								
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warheads, which the British would have to design themselves. Britain’s submarines 
would be committed to NATO’s nuclear reserve, though they reserved the right to 
operate independently if needed. McNamara was at Nassau and helped smooth out the 
details to the deal. While he did not play the starring role in the final treaty, his vision of 
the deal clearly won out over that advocated by other like Rusk, Ball, or even Bundy.  
 In the end, of course, Kennedy made the final decision to give Polaris to the 
British. What is remarkable is that this decision did not cause major faults within his 
Administration. In part, McNamara’s good working relationship with Rusk and Bundy 
must have played a role in this. In the years after the Nassau Conference, McNamara 
continued to work on State’s preferred solution, the MLF. The MLF remained a serious 
idea for years after, even if NATO eventually shelved the concept.1118 McNamara 
received a black eye when just after the Nassau Conference the Air Force proudly 
announced a successful guided flight of Skybolt.1119 Despite all his comments that 
Skybolt was unworkable, some latched onto this event as another of example of 
McNamara’s willingness to cancel a good program. The successful flight, however, really 
meant little. The system was still too expensive and lacked a clear role. Lest one think 
otherwise, Britain’s response is telling. Despite having invested over a decade into 
developing their own bomber force, they quickly jettisoned Skybolt and their aircraft in 
favor of the more survivable and cheaper Polaris SLBM. Months later, rumors surfaced 
that someone in Britain had leaked Skybolt’s plans to the Soviets. When he heard this, 
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almost certainly erroneous report Kennedy replied, “If the Russians want to build 
Skybolt, good luck to them.”1120  
 
Conclusion 
According to Eisenhower’s critics, the Pentagon suffered from sins large and 
small. The secretaries were too passive; the services were clearly upset; the strategy tied 
the hands of the nation; there was no coordination over research and needless duplication 
among programs. Robert McNamara’s appointment was meant to change all of that. In 
searching for a Secretary of Defense, Kennedy wanted someone who he could entrust to 
run the department without needing much oversight. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy would 
not be his own Secretary of Defense (a wag might opine that was because he was too 
busy being his own Secretary of State). Especially coming into office after a respected 
general, Kennedy wanted to show that his Administration could efficiently manage the 
nation’s security. One might criticize McNamara’s team for including so many 
technocrats at the expense of officials with military or diplomatic experience. In fact the 
only civilians in the Pentagon’s upper echelon that had significant government 
experience were Paul Nitze and his deputy, William Bundy. JCS chair Maxwell Taylor, a 
Kennedy ally, added to this group, but it was a small cadre in a large department.  
 Quickly, however, McNamara changed how the Defense Department worked. 
From strategy, to budgeting, and diplomacy, McNamara held the reins. PPBS was so 
successful that in 1966 Lyndon Johnson attempted to mandate its use in all federal 
																																																								
1120 Bradlee, p. 203. 
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agencies.1121 It was also so controversial that as soon as the Nixon Administration took 
office in 1969 they discontinued its use. Neither the PPBS system nor McNamara’s own 
judgement were flawless. In addition to the TFX, several other programs supported by 
the Secretary collapsed. Perhaps most strikingly was McNamara’s attempt to set up the 
“McNamara Line” a string of electronic sensors designed to monitor the movement of 
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.1122 McNamara’s review process also curtailed 
some of the flights of fancy seen during the Eisenhower years, including nuclear powered 
aircraft, radioactive cruise missiles, or worse. Nuclear weapons, never a completely safe 
system, became more stable under McNamara as proven systems were increasingly 
refined. Especially in the months after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy’s distrust of the military 
grew. He looked for a group of civilians who would control a military that seemed to 
want to deceive him. That certainly was an exaggeration, even if the Joint Chiefs were 
suspicious of both the President and his Secretary.1123 In McNamara, Kennedy had a 
trusted ally who successfully could run roughshod over the entire department if needed. 
This is also what Eisenhower had sought in his three secretaries. McNamara of course, 
made many enemies in the process. But he achieved something that no one else had and 
did so with a streak of ruthless efficiency—or at least the appearance of such—that 
continues to have repercussions and influence the office.  
 
 
 																																																								
1121 Jack Hooper “Planning, Programing, Budgeting System” Journal of Range Management Vol. 21 No. 3 
(May, 1968), p. 123. 
1122 Ann Finkbeiner, The Jasons (Viking, 2006), p. 62-89. 
1123 Moten, p. 276-77, 278, 280, 282-283. 
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Conclusion-The Strength of Government 
 
“The United States [needs a] government strong enough, at all levels, and in all branches, 
to meet explosive needs that no other force can handle.”1124 
 
 History has not been particularly kind to the people who populate this 
dissertation. In advancing what they perceived to be the nation’s interests, many of them 
enabled America’s descent into Vietnam. In part, this work is meant to demonstrate an 
alternative series of events that does not necessarily end in Saigon. The strengthening of 
the NSC staff and Secretary of Defense contributed, but did not lead, to the decisions 
surrounding that war. But the people involved in making those decisions came to 
personify the offices in which they served. That often overwhelmed the scope of the 
changes they made.  
 The most obvious examples of this are Bundy and McNamara. They oversaw 
much of this transformation, yet never escaped the shadow of the war. Nelson 
Rockefeller escaped Vietnam, but never achieved the goals he wanted. Publically rejected 
by his party in 1964, he briefly becoming Vice President after Watergate, only to suffer 
the indignity of being jettisoned from the 1976 ticket by Gerald Ford. His reputation 
further suffered when he died in the arms of his mistress. If Rockefeller personified a 
liberalism slowly disappearing from the Republican Party, Henry Jackson embodied an 
increasingly hawkish wing of the Democratic Party. His ambitions for higher office were 
also frustrated, in part because he moved increasingly right. The SNPM ran well into the 
late 1960s, though it never again made the news as in 1960. He expressed subtle 
frustration that Kennedy and Johnson continued to use the NSC staff rather than investing 																																																								
1124 Bundy, p. xi. 
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more power in Dean Rusk. The man who had almost been Kennedy’s Vice Presidential 
choice in 1960, had moved far enough across the political spectrum that, in 1968, he was 
a potential pick as Richard Nixon’s Secretary of Defense. 
 Many of the lower level figures faded into relative obscurity. Dorothy Fosdick 
remained on Jackson’s staff until he died in 1983. She continued to have an outsized role 
managing “Scoops Troops” and helped foster a generation of neo-conservatives, 
including staff alums like Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith.1125 After 
Jackson’s death, Fosdick tended his legacy and papers, until her own death in 1997. 
Robert Komer’s reputation survived his role in Vietnam, where he began a series of 
initiatives that led, after his departure, to the atrocities of the Phoenix Program. He 
returned to government service during the Carter Administration, and built the 
underpinnings of US strategy in the Middle East, leading later to the Carter Doctrine and 
the establishment of US Central Command. Bromley Smith, Carl Kaysen, and others 
never again achieved the same status they had during the Kennedy years. 
Perhaps the most intact reputation is that of Paul Nitze. Fired by Dulles, 
accidentally demoted by Kennedy, he never had a warm relationship with Robert 
McNamara. His participation in the Committee on the Present Danger against Jimmy 
Carter mimicked his actions as a member of the Gaither Committee in 1957. Unlike 
Jackson, he got a job in the Nixon Administration working on nuclear arms reduction, a 
role he continued in the Reagan Administration.  
																																																								
1125 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith (Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), p. 566. 
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The institutional changes they envisioned, promoted, or implemented have proven 
far more durable then their personal reputations. This might have surprised them had they 
known it at the time. We can debate the effectiveness and even wisdom of the individuals 
mentioned above, but it is hard to argue about their resilience of their ideas. While Nixon 
instituted a more formal, and larger NSC staff, its function mimicked Kennedy’s far more 
than Eisenhower’s. That trend continued under Ford and Carter. If McGeorge Bundy’s 
relationship with Dean Rusk was, at times, very formal, it looked positively ideal 
compared to bureaucratic disputes between Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, or 
between Zbignew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. These showdowns demonstrated that the 
National Security Advisor, and the NSC staff could overwhelm State, often to the 
personal gain of the SANSA, and to the political detriment of the administration in 
question.1126  
Reagan’s stated goal of reining in both the SANSA and NSC staff created a 
hollow institution. But the powers instilled by Bundy two decades earlier returned once a 
series of more ambitious National Security Advisors took over. They used the powers of 
the office to help plan and execute the Iran-Contra Affair. While the Tower Commission 
highlighted issues with the organization, there was little structural change to address the 
powers of the office. The Council staff regained some normality under Brent Scowcroft’s 
tenure in the George H.W. Bush years, and it continued to gain strength and size, in the 
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama years. While the outright infighting between the 
NSC staff and line agencies that often characterized the Council’s early years may have 																																																								
1126 The official title of the SANSA technically changed to the APNSA, or Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. 
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been brought under control, tensions remained between the President’s foreign policy 
staff and the rest of the government.  
 The Office of the Secretary of Defense has gone through a process similar to that 
of the NSC staff and the National Security Advisor. While Nixon’s first Secretary of 
Defense, Melvin Laird, attempted to walk back some of McNamara’s reforms—including 
abandoning PPBS—he also kept many of the powers associated with the office. Given 
the war raging in Southeast Asia, one can understand this. Even if PPBS was gone, 
McNamara’s five-year budgeting horizon remained and guided American defense 
spending during the return of Cold War tensions in the late 1970s through the 1980s. No 
Secretary of Defense in the pre-McNamara years, for instance, could have wielded the 
influence of a figure like Casper Weinberger. The growth of the Pentagon’s powers was 
probably most clearly manifested during the George W. Bush years, during which the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense effectively ran the war, and tried to build the peace, in 
Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld developed the same reputation for self-assurance—overinflated 
some might argue—that McNamara had in the 1960s. The job does not guarantee power 
or influence: one might be forgiven for not remembering that Barack Obama had as many 
Secretaries of Defense as did Truman during the tumultuous early years of that office. 
But in the current administration, James Mattis might once again be demonstrating that 
the defense and foreign policy powers established by Thomas Gates and Robert 
McNamara still play a key role in shaping policy. 
 Yet, much of this growth came at the expense of the military. It is important to 
remember that the National Security Act of 1947 was driven by the military in part so 
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that they could gain more control in the creation of national policy. They lost their seats 
in the NSC within a few years of its creation and struggled for influence in the Pentagon. 
They had little official presence in Eisenhower’s NSC. The most prominent service 
member in that group, Andrew Goodpaster, served in a capacity divorced from his 
military background. If the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave direct command 
authority back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it also put more power in the hands of the 
civilian Secretary of Defense. This was a trend that seemed to be accelerated during the 
Kennedy Administration, which even went so far as to put an Administration loyalist, 
Maxwell Taylor, in charge of the JCS. During this period, the national security state 
became one increasingly composed of civilians, often with very few military voices. 
These American institutional changes have also had an impact overseas. Just as 
Richmond Hobson at the turn of the last century looked to foreign nations for institutional 
ideas, both Japan and Great Britain have created their own, practically American, 
National Security Councils. Japan calls this an attempt at a “new centralized approach to 
national security” in a system “dogged with inefficiencies caused by information silos 
and bureaucratic red tape.”1127 In Great Britain, after initial effort by Gordon Brown, 
David Cameron established a British NSC, which “at a stroke…created a mechanism to 
force interaction between intelligence leaders and the most senior policymakers in the 
land.”1128 The head of Britain’s signals intelligence agency said it was “‘one of the best 
																																																								
1127 Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper) 2014 (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014), p. 106. 
1128 R.J. Aldrich and R. Cormac. The Black Door (William Collins, 2016), p. 459. 
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things this government has done,’ because it ‘takes the sentiment in the room and 
translates it into tasking for each organization.’”1129  
The decisions made by Eisenhower and Kennedy also give us a better 
understanding of their approach to management. Eisenhower did not make organizational 
changes without careful consideration. Both the 1953 reorganizations of the Pentagon and 
NSC came after months long research initiatives. Once he adopted these plans, however, 
he was resistant to major changes in both organization and personnel. Eisenhower had 
little confidence in Charles Wilson and probably should not have let Robert Cutler come 
back for a second stint on the NSC. Yet his personal loyalty, perhaps an honorable trait in 
a cut-throat political climate, seemed to overrule these concerns. About the only 
significant move considered was appointing John Foster Dulles as First Secretary, but he 
did this only to keep the increasingly frail Dulles in Washington. Two years before his 
death, Rockefeller claimed that Eisenhower’s problem was that he let himself be 
“dominated by these strong personalities in his cabinet.”1130 That is probably an overly 
harsh analysis but the fact remains that only outside events were able to force Eisenhower 
to make major organizational changes.  
Kennedy, by contrast, seemed much more open to experimentation. In keeping 
with his informal style, he gave his subordinates significant freedom in building their 
respective fiefdoms. His relatively short time in office makes it difficult to determine how 
concerned he was about relieving officials from office. But he effectively fired Allen 
Dulles (and might have been prepared to fire John McCone), sent Chester Bowles into 																																																								
1129 Peter Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy, p. 95 and Aldrich and Cormac, p. 459. 
1130 Nelson Rockefeller Oral History Interview, 10/4/77, RG 4, Series Q, Box 1, Folder 11. 
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internal exile, and imprisoned Walt Rostow in Foggy Bottom. Perhaps his foreign policy 
needed more of a guiding hand and less of a micromanager, but he was willing to accept 
and enforce change when needed.  
There was something special about the late 1950s and early 1960s it seems that 
made these changes possible. Even if the managerial moment of the Eisenhower years 
was shunned by the Kennedy clique, both Administrations shared a belief in expertise 
and deliberation, with the “Action Intellectuals” replacing the “Corporate Board” of the 
1950s. Kennedy’s academic advisors replaced Eisenhower’s boards of consultants, 
combining industrialists and financiers, but even that distinction is suspect. Eisenhower 
tapped academia on several occasions, especially in matters relating to science. Similarly, 
Kennedy did not ignore the business world. His Assistant Secretary of State for the Far 
East, for example, founded his own Wall Street investment firm. An aide once said of 
Kennedy that he believed “a consensus could be formed…if only enough energy [and] 
brains were put into the effort.”1131 That comment applies to both leaders. 
Kennedy placed an emphasis on leaner organization, and was much more willing 
to insert himself into fixing a problem. It is hard to imagine Eisenhower calling up a desk 
officer in the State Department, as Kennedy sometimes did. One recent author has 
posited that Kennedy sought to take government away from the gray organization man 
and his military counterpart, the organization general, and replace both with bold new 
thinking that engaged the world.1132 Perhaps, both Eisenhower and Kennedy were united 
in a common approach, even if they did so with radically different aims. Both presidents 																																																								
1131 David Bell handwritten note, 14 June 1981, DEB 23, Clay Committee Dec, 1962, JFK. 
1132 Steven Watts, JFK and the Masculine Mystique (St. Martin’s Press: 2016), p. 263.  
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made it their business to tame the bureaucracy. One could argue that every president tries 
to do that in one fashion or another, but the Cold War seemed to add a level of urgency to 
that effort. We might be able to decouple the urgency they felt from the Cold War and 
replace it with something else: starting in the late 1940s—or, perhaps even the Second 
World War—American officials had to deal with foreign and military affairs during so-
called peace time in a way they had not done before. This is not to suggest America was 
an isolationist power prior to the 1930s, but, starting in the Second World War, the nation 
was so embroiled in world events that it had to have the means to react quickly to an 
ever-changing world. That, of course, took on new meaning when one added the potential 
of nuclear Armageddon to the mix.  
Part of the reason these changes happened is that the ideas involved were 
appealing, and the figures pugnacious. The broad concepts outlined by Nelson 
Rockefeller, among others, as early as 1956 came into being under a completely different 
Administration only a few years later. The idea for the White House Situation Room 
floated around Washington for almost a decade. The strengthening of the powers of the 
Secretary of Defense was also a process that, but for circumstances, might have appeared 
much earlier in the Eisenhower Administration. Even when these ideas seemed to be 
defeated, advocates kept raising them. It was probably only a matter of time before 
someone in power decided these ideas were worth a try. If the circumstances of the time 
proved ripe for their adoption, it was not because they were born of the moment, merely 
because their various proponents had spent so much time wearing down their opponents. 
These changes were not created simply by issuing orders from above, rather they 
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represented an agreement, express or tacit, between political appointees and long serving 
staffers.   
Perhaps the national discussion on organization was not necessary. The 
concentration of policy in the both the NSC and in the office of the Secretary of Defense 
was, at heart, one of broad bipartisan agreement. Much as Jackson complained about the 
difficulty of getting the best people into office, most agreed it was the strength of the 
institutions, the strength of government, that would ultimately ensure the nation’s 
security. Big government was not the problem: the absence or weakness of institutions 
was. That did not stop Democrats and Republicans from arguing over all aspects of these 
ideas. For Democrats, the First Secretary concept was a wasteful exercise in bureaucratic 
restructuring. A group of both Republicans and Democrats worried that the Secretary of 
Defense would become “a man on horseback” if given too much power. Robert 
McNamara might never have crossed the line into dictatorship, but his powers led to 
objections from many on the right and left, even before Vietnam. Nevertheless, whether 
or not the result of the seemingly dire conditions of, members of the left and right all 
seemed to agree that a change was needed.  
One change Jackson failed to achieve was that “The Congress should put its own 
house in better order.”1133 Jackson had hoped that the House and Senate could jointly, or 
separately, meet annually to review America’s national security situation and how the 
White House was budgeting to meet threats to the nation’s defense. While Congress was 
hardly just a bystander on foreign policy during the remainder of the 20th Century, even 
																																																								
1133 “Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson” in Organizing for National Security, Vol. III, p. 7. 
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the passage of the War Powers Act failed to stop White House adventurism. The 
restrictions in that Act could not curb the powers consolidated in the Executive Branch, 
many of which dated from the Eisenhower-Kennedy era.  
While all of these reforms were important, 1960 saw a decisive and permanent 
change in the makeup of both the Pentagon and the NSC. As discussed, the origins and 
implementations of these reforms are far more complex than just Jackson’s hearings and 
report. In many cases, they may not even have been the motivating influence behind the 
decisions to change existing structures. Yet, to use a cliché, there was something in the 
water in the late 1950s and early 1960s exemplified by Jackson’s recommendations. 
Those recommendations were unevenly adopted and sometimes completely ignored, but 
the organizational changes they introduced have survived the Cold War and the War on 
Terror. This is not to suggest they are perfect or should not be modified. Evolution is 
constant. The tools that worked for the last fifty years may not be appropriate for the next 
fifty. What is missing is the type of sustained dialog that occurred around the time of the 
SNPM in 1960. 
This is not for lack of trying. Other Congressional investigations, including the 
Tower and 9/11 Commissions, have examined the state of the nation’s national policy 
machinery. In 2006, George W. Bush commissioned a bipartisan study group to examine 
how America made national security decisions. It found, the “system did work well 
enough to achieve its principal aim of victory in the Cold War,” but also said:  
the national security of the United States of America is fundamentally at risk. The 
U.S. position of world leadership, our country’s prosperity and priceless 
freedoms, and the safety of our people are challenged not only by a profusion of 
new and unpredictable threats, but by the now undeniable fact that the national 
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security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly 
changing global security environment.1134 
 
Jackson came quite close to saying this in 1960 when he wrote, “Can free socities 
outplan, outperform, outlast—and if need be, outsacrifice—totalitarian systems? Can we 
recognize fresh problems in a changing world—and respond in time with new plans for 
meeting them?”1135 Indeed, Jackson, Dorothy Fosdick, Robert Tufts, or another member 
of the SNPM probably could have written the 2006 panel’s major conclusions. It argued 
that the White House staff in its current configuration did a poor job at integrating policy 
from other parts of the government, in part because there was just too much to do.1136 It 
complained about the lack of long range planning and strategy, and said there had to be 
better integration between those making policy and officials controlling the budget.1137 
Most importantly, it recommended disbanding the NSC and its staff and replacing it with 
a new body and, in an un-Jackson like move, putting it under the jurisdiction of a First 
Secretary like figure called the Director of National Security.1138 It broke with the SNPM 
in advocating the adoption of a Kennedy-like Task Force process.1139 It also advocated 
finally abandoning the Eberstadt staffing system and creating a permanent National 
Security Professional Corps to staff these organizations.1140 Like Jackson’s report, the 
document spends considerable time focusing on the needs at the State Department and 
the White House as opposed to the Defense Department. And, like Jackson’s reports, it 																																																								
1134 Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield (Center for the Study of the 
Presidency/PNSR, 2008),, p. i. 
1135 “Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson” in Organizing for National Security, Vol. III, p. 3. 
1136 p. vi. 
1137 p. xi and xii 
1138 p. xi 
1139 p. xi. 
1140 p. xii. 
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ends with a plea for better coordination between the White House and Congress.1141 Yet 
this report made little impact after its release. Surely, it will not be the last report to 
recommend some sort of massive intuitional change. The United States retains a system 
of governance envisioned in the 1950s, implemented in the 1960s, and refined ever since. 
It is also a system that, despite some modifications, remains basically unchanged. 
Jackson unintentionally wrote a defense of this system in 1960 when he said, 
“Democracies headline their difficulties and mistakes; dictatorships hide theirs.”1142 We 
like to believe that maybe the system is not quite as inefficient or messy as it seems. Even 
so, the question they debated fifty years ago, about whether and to what extent 
organization can affect outcome, is a concept we still feel the need to wrestle with today. 
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